Earlier quoted context omitted.
By that logic regulators should lower fines if the action wasn’t profitable. Which creates an expensive legal fight around the net profits of some action were after guilt is determined. Instead, it’s much better to scale fines based on the scale of the entity involved, which also results in huge fines, but it’s easier to measure revenue. Thus the fines are more broadly effective, and you can still escalate if they do…
> By that logic regulators should lower fines if the action wasn’t profitable. The logic isn't some rigid "make the fine based on the profit". The logic is based on the intent: make the behavior happen less. So you can have a base fine of X, even when there's no profit or even if there are losses, and have a scalable fine based on higher profits. This way the company is discouraged to do the bad behavior in general,…
If the base fine is X, then every actual fine would be X + Y where Y is the profit motive causing the behavior. As such every court case is now also a fight about lowering Y and companies are incentivized to make Y appear lower etc.
Further as companies vary in size generally at large companies Y will be vastly larger than X meaning lowering Y is nearly as valuable at winning.