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Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

michaelgeist.ca

281–290 of 374 posts

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#281
post #142

It feels like many democratic leaders are starting to think the CCP model—mass surveillance of citizens—is the right direction, with growing demands for chat control, facial verification, age verification, and more. Fxxk any politician who thinks they are above the citizens in a democracy.

I've been in mainland China for the past year and I wish western politicians would get it through their skulls that most of the ccp model's upsides come from CCTVs in public areas and a police force that prioritizes stopping street crime.

Do they de-prioritize or ignore other crimes that are not visible in the streets? This is an honest question, I want to know if actually focusing only on the streets makes people feel safe even if other types of crimes are rampant.

EDIT: I guess I could add examples of what "other crimes" could be. Fraud, corruption, sexual abuse, all victimless crimes, hitmen?

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s not how evidence works in Canada. Illegally obtained evidence is still evidence - you simply also have a tort against the officer for breaching your rights.

It would be inadmissible if the court deems it to impact the fairness of the trial, no? https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/chec...

Yes, in some cases, but this is not automatic, nor even close. The more serious the trial (ex, murder, child pornography), the more likely it serves the court’s interest to use the illegally obtained evidence. See https://doi.org/10.60082/2817-5069.3711 for a longitudinal study. Illegally obtained evidence is routinely used.

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#283
post #197
post #120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Consider: you don’t give a warrant to a wiretap subject. That itself is not that big a loophole. And therefore is unlikely to provoke change.

I don't even understand the concern here. Perhaps the parent thought this meant "a warrant is not required", which is absolutely untrue. Instead, the judge still creates the warrant, and any trial/arrest/action must have a warrant. (Finding out what ISP a user belongs to, isn't really that private. If you look at the US comparatively, Homeland has a list of every single credit card transaction ever . The US doesn't n…

Does a warrant ever expire? How long can they monitor you once the warrant is issued? Do they ever have to notify you or anyone else that you were being monitored and they found no criminal conduct? Don't you see the potential for abuse here?

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#284

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, but the warrant should be revealed eventually. Worst case, if you can't prove or disprove someone committed a crime after X time, you should alert them to discourage future crime (they may have already done more crimes during X time; besides public interest, it also forces you to cut your losses when the alternative would be to dig a deeper hole). Do these warrants have a fixed maximum duration of secrecy?

“warrant should be revealed eventually. Worst case, if you can't prove or disprove someone committed a crime after X time” This is the normal thinking, normal brained, route. It’s what we should all strive towards. Anyone who doesn’t agree needs therapy. There should be a window of discovery. 30 days, 90 maybe. But if you don’t have enough to justify notification of investigation, that’s it. No more resources spent.…

[deleted]

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#285

Regarding warrantless searches and access ... reading the text of the bill (OP link) warrants seem to be required. Simple, right? Well, no, this is a recently inserted block of text in the bill (confirm at the link above): Exception (2. 7)(b) However, a copy of the warrant is not required to be given to a person under subsection (2. 6) if the judge or justice who issues the warrant sets aside the requirement in respe…

Are you suggesting that when investigating members of a criminal organization, they should be notified? It seems pretty reasonable for there to be cases where making a target aware of investigation would be detrimental to proving the illegal activity they are currently engaged in but would likely discontinue if literally told “we are monitoring you specifically now”.

This is an interesting perspective, because from my point of view, the criminals ceasing their illegal activity would be a "win". Whereas, the alternative is the government knowingly allowing illegal activity to continue as they build their case with the goal of a "big bust" and larger jail sentences.

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#286

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bot? It sounds to me more like the words you’d hear from an astroturfing American who doesn’t understand anything about Canadian laws. I say that as an American familiar with only some Canadian law, but enough to at least be aware of Rights and Freedoms.

I mean yea, I assume that's the persona it was going for. It was an account just made to post this called canadian000, I would have called it out as a broke uni student being paid to astroturf ten years ago but I assumed that market has been fully cornered by bots by now. Maybe it's just a really dedicated politically-willed crazy but either way it contributes nothing to these discussions and should be banned. It's b…

[deleted]

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#287
The bill must of course be read in its wider context. The Supreme Court of Canada cases of R v Bykovets [1] and R v Spencer [2] are essential context for interpreting these amendments.

From R v Bykovets, paras 6-8:

[6] I respectfully disagree. This analysis runs counter to this Court’s jurisprudence under s. 8 of the Charter. We have never approached privacy piecemeal, based on police’s stated intention to use the information they gather in only one way. The right against unreasonable search and seizure, like all Charter rights, must receive a broad and purposive interpretation, reflective of its constitutional source. Since Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, we have held that s. 8 seeks to prevent breaches of privacy, rather than to condemn or condone breaches based on the state’s ultimate use of that information. Privacy, once breached, cannot be restored.

[7] To that end, our Court has applied a normative standard to reasonable expectations of privacy. We have defined s. 8 in terms of what privacy should be — in a free, democratic, and open society — balancing the individual’s right to be left alone against the community’s insistence on protection. This normative standard demands we take a broad, functional approach to the subject matter of the search and that we focus on its potential to reveal personal or biographical core information (R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at para. 32).

[8] Informational privacy is particularly critical — and particularly challenging. Our jurisprudence recognizes that computers are unique and present privacy risks that differ from s. 8’s traditional objects. Thus, this Court has determined that s. 8 generally prevents police from seizing a computer without a warrant — even though the device itself provides no information without judicial permission to search its contents — because seizing the computer gives the state the means through which to access its content (R. v. Reeves, 2018 SCC 56, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 531, at para. 34). (emphasis mine)

[1] https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/20302/i... [2] https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/14233/i...

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#288
post #197

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't even understand the concern here. Perhaps the parent thought this meant "a warrant is not required", which is absolutely untrue. Instead, the judge still creates the warrant, and any trial/arrest/action must have a warrant. (Finding out what ISP a user belongs to, isn't really that private. If you look at the US comparatively, Homeland has a list of every single credit card transaction ever . The US doesn't n…

Does a warrant ever expire? How long can they monitor you once the warrant is issued? Do they ever have to notify you or anyone else that you were being monitored and they found no criminal conduct? Don't you see the potential for abuse here?

All of these questions, and more, are answered by examining what happens with phone taps. Phone taps, which historically were treated precisely the same, and further, there was only ever one phone company in a region back then.

All legislative change is interpreted by courts. So to answer your questions:

# look to see how the legislation is written for phone taps

# know that this new legislation is changing things, the code is being modified

# now look at judicial decisions, and you will have your answer

Seeing as you have no idea how other warrants work, when they expire, you're really just looking for the worst case scenario, without even attempting to see what would happen, and has happened for 100+ years.

Yes?

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#289
Canadians have no rights that the government can't override, unlike the US where the Constitution grants God-given rights over and above the government. Pierre Trudeau built in a safeguard so that the Canadian government or provinces can override whatever rights they want as they deem fit. They also have the War Measures Act or the Emergencies Act which they've also used to override any rights that Canadians have.

But none of that matters if Canadians just allow politicians to impose laws that strip them of their rights to avoid mass surveillance. Who needs a Charter of Rights if Canadians don't care enough about their rights to protest the government when they try to strip away their rights?

Re: Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act: Dangerous backdoor surveillance risks remain

#290

Canadians have no rights that the government can't override, unlike the US where the Constitution grants God-given rights over and above the government. Pierre Trudeau built in a safeguard so that the Canadian government or provinces can override whatever rights they want as they deem fit. They also have the War Measures Act or the Emergencies Act which they've also used to override any rights that Canadians have. Bu…

While it's true that Section 33 of the Charter can override other sections, it cannot override _all_ of them; and the Emergencies Act is roughly equivalent in effect to the USA's ability to deploy the National Guard. It allows the Federal Government to deploy our military to handle emergencies when it is apparent that Provincial and local services are unable to handle them.
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