>The first bug that our retrospective found was CVE-2015-5243. This is a monster of a bug, in which the prolific phpWhois library simply executes data obtained from the WHOIS server via the PHP ‘eval’ function, allowing instant RCE from any malicious WHOIS server. I don't want to live on this planet anymore
Always look on the bright side of Life. The non-sensicalness of it is just a phase. Remember the Tower of Babel didn't stop humanity. Here is a link that was posted a few days ago regarding how great things are compared to 200 years ago. Ice cream has only become a common experience in the last 200 years.. https://ourworldindata.org/a-history-of-global-living-condit...
We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
281–290 of 391 posts
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#282Earlier quoted context omitted.
It’s worse if you stop using the phrase ‘buy’ and instead use the term ‘rent’. A DNS provider could 10,000x your domain cost and there’s nothing you can do about it.
Can they? I thought ICANN prevented such steep increases?
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#283Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is the most obvious reason why Verisign is a monopolist and should be regulated like a utility. They make false claims about choice and not being locked in. You buy a domain, you use it, you're locked in forever. And they know it. That's why they fight tooth and nail to protect their monopoly.
See also personal phone numbers, which are now "portable" and thus "required for every single identity verification you will ever perform", without being regulated, which means your identity is one $30 bill autopayment or one dodgy MVNO customer service interaction from being lost forever.
It just makes many services such as Credit Karma unavailable to anyone but the first person to signup.
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#284Is this in the bugzilla/MDSP yet?
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#285As a reminder, RCE = remote code execution (it’s not defined in the article). https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/security/what-is-remote-...
It is defined in the article the first time it is used in the text. Maybe they read your comment and fixed it?
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#286> $ sqlite3 whois-log-copy.db "select source from queries"|sort|uniq|wc -l Oh cool they saved the logs in a database ! Wait... |sort|uniq|wc -l ?? But why ?
yeah, they could have done `sqlite …|sort -u|wc -l` instead and saved themselves a process invocation!
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#287Obviously there are a lot of errors by a lot of people that led to this, but here's one that would've prevented this specific exploit: > As part of our research, we discovered that a few years ago the WHOIS server for the .MOBI TLD migrated from whois.dotmobiregistry.net to whois.nic.mobi – and the dotmobiregistry.net domain had been left to expire seemingly in December 2023. Never ever ever ever let a domain expire.…
Always use subdomains. Businesses only ever need a single $10 domain for their entire existence.
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#288Very cool work. >The dotmobiregistry.net domain, and whois.dotmobiregisry.net hostname, has been pointed to sinkhole systems provided by ShadowServer that now proxy the legitimate WHOIS response for .mobi domains. If those domains were meant to be deprecated should be better to return a 404. Keeping them active and working like normal reduces the insensitive to switch to the legitimate domain.
Re: We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
#289Earlier quoted context omitted.
yeah, they could have done `sqlite …|sort -u|wc -l` instead and saved themselves a process invocation!
Hey now if you're just gonna count lines no need to sort it at all.