What if I’m wrong? (2023)

---

We can only be sure of two things with 100% certainty.

G1: "I" exist.

G2: logical truths.

Everything else is contingent, right? We observe certain things with our senses. And we're trying to surmise what it is. How it works. What's causing it. Etc. And any knowledge we gain can never be given 100% certainty, can it? Because our senses are fallible. Can we guarantee we are not living in a simulation, being experimented on by showing Divine events such as a resurrection just to see how we react? Can we guarantee that we are not a brain in vat being fed signals that generate our universe. Can we guarantee there is no unknown unknowns we can't even think of because of our vantage point in reality? I don't think we can. And until we can eliminate these logically valid causes, we can only talk about how likely one possibility is over another. We can try to do the best we can, but we have to be humble. But as long as we are dependent on our own senses, no other knowledge we gain can ever go up to 100% certainty apart from G1 and G2. I hope there is not much to disagree about here?

(For the purpose of our discussion, let's eliminate the other possibilities and assume that the world we see is "real" with say 99.99% certainty. Thus G1 implies "I" and world we see.)

Using G1 and G2, we can come to a conclusion with 100% certainty that:

C1: An eternal First Cause exists.

---

What piqued my interest in this conversation was the book's claim that a personal God can be shown with 100% certainty, just from logic. If true, that'd be amazing. We'd settle the question of God once and for all. I won't be able to deny logical truths.

But I don't think the book succeeds. It shows FC for sure. But it does not succeed in showing that FC has free will. My claim is that there are still (at least) two possibilities for FC: FC is a personal God or FC is a set of impersonal rules. Both these possibilities can explain everything we see in the world. And our quest is to try figure out which one reflects the True nature of FC.

---

> Of all the possible rulesets that could exist, why this one and not another?

If you notice, G1 is also an observation. By which I mean that it could have been the case that I didn't exist, right? Which means even FC doesn't have a 100% certain reason to exist. Given G1, FC definitely exists. But:

P1: it is logically possible that nothing (neither I nor FC) existed.

I'd love it if you could show that P1 isn't a valid possibility.

So given P1, we can then ask the question: why does FC exist in the first place, right? From our vantage point, we are asking, what causes/sustains us and the world we see. The answer is FC. But what causes FC? Well:

C2: FC is a brute force fact of reality.

Given G1, FC always has to have existed. We can ask "why FC?", but is has no answer. I think you'd agree to this?

So let's say FC=God. That is, God is real and He caused G1. We can ask the question: why does God exists? And the answer is C2. He just does. I've heard it put this way: that God is His own cause. So the takeaway is that C2 is valid: base reality FC can (and must) exist without any reason attached to it. Makes sense?

Thus, when you ask: "why this one and not another?", my answer is the same: C2. That it is a brute-force fact of reality. We cannot expect a reasonable answer to the question because there isn't any. The difference is what we are applying C2 to. Theism applies it to FC=God. Naturalism applies it to FC=base ruleset.

---

> So case 1: the FC actualizes the rules, but is distinct from them; in case 2, the FC is identified with the rules. To me that seems a contradiction.

Right sorry. The difference to me is which rules we are talking about. One is the rules of our universe. General relativity. Quantum mechanics. Whatever base rules lie underneath them. However, I am thinking in more general terms. As I said in the first paragraph, it is not necessarily the case that there is FC and then our universe, right? It could be the case that our universe is a simulation in supercomputers of another universe. It could be the case that I am a brain in vat being fed signals that match the rules of our universe. More realistically, we could be one out of many universes originating from eternal inflation. And FC would then be some base rules causing base realities, inside which the rules for the universe we actually see embedded in an emergent way.

So more generally, I think of: FC -> emergence1 -> emergence2 -> ... -> our universe -> physics -> ... -> lions.

I don't know if you agree yet, the idea is that the explanations for the world we see comes in layers of what I am calling emergence. Why lions? Because biology. Biology can completely explain lions, except the question: why biology? Then we say because chemistry. Why chemistry? Because physics. Why physics? Because FC. Why FC? Brute force fact. (Note that there could be more layers between physics and FC, as per above.)

The important takeaway I want to convey is that FC can be just an impersonal set of rules out of which everything emerges

---

> So the existence of events such as E would not imply a "willing" FC. You could equally well say that events such as E are, nonetheless, acting according to the FC's necessary actions.

Words are tricky. Especially in discussions like this one. When I said "in favor of", I meant more in a probabilistic manner. E wouldn't imply with 100% certainty that there is a personal God. But it will make Him more likely than it is currently.

Let me put it this way. Take Conway's Game of Life (GoL). We humans created this "GoL universe" that runs on a grid based on a simple set of rules. Say I am running a GoL instance on my computer with an initial generation G0. G0 is a choice. There are infinite number of possibilities for G0 and I chose one of these to start with. But as soon as I fixed G0, the state of G1 to G-infinity is then automatically implied, right? I don't have to then setup G1, G2, etc. I can just let it run according to the rules. But I can intervene at any generation if I want to. At any generation Gi, I can modify the state in a arbitrary manner without regard to the rules and the state of Gi-1.

Now let's posit some observers embedded inside GoL. Say they start observing at generation k, such that 0So then reality for these observers could be 3 possibilities. Reminder that this is an analogy, so focus is on the ideas rather than the details.

P1: FC=I, sdht0. I setup the computer and choose to run GoL instead of say chess, and I chose the state of G0. This explains why the rules broke down at Gi.

P2: FC=rules of GoL + G0 (+ the computer). In this case, I sdht0, don't exist. Base reality started with G0.

P3: FC=rules of GoL + G0 + unrelated changes at Gi not implied by G0. This basically implies a discontinuous function for the rules.

I hope you can see how the analogy maps to our universe. (The random change at Gi is the popping in of unicorns.) So yes, as you said, we can never eliminate P3. But my point is: say we're only choosing between P1 and P2, theism vs naturalism, the fact that unicorns popped into existence would make P1 more likely. Conversely, the fact the universe has never broken its regularity would imply P2 is highly likely, because then God will be an extra things that we would not need to explain what we see. But none of the cases can be asserted with 100% certainty.

---

> Likewise, the fact that things behave in observably regular ways does not, of itself, imply that the FC is bound to act in a certain way.

Again, "bound to act" is a claim of certainty that I'm not making. I'm only saying it makes it highly possible that regular rules is all there is to it.

EDIT: I may have been using P incorrectly when I meant FC=rules. See below.

---

P = Our universe is regular to a high degree of accuracy.

P is a provisional truth. It is true and no one can deny it today. If there is a God, no one deny that He chose to create a universe that is regular. But the fact that it is true today doesn't mean it will remain true tomorrow.

Question: what FC is able to cause a universe whose observers see P.

There are probably infinite possibilities, but let's focus on the two interesting ones to us:

A1: FC=base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. N is true.

A2: FC=God. He chose to actualize base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. M is true.

In both cases, FC is a brute-force Truth.

The book claims that only and only A2 is possible. I'm claiming that A1 is also possible.

If P were not true (unicorns popping in), then it will harder to justify A1, though not impossible as you pointed out. But since P is true as of today, positing A1 is more straightforward.

I'm further claiming that as long as P is true, A2 is in fact unnecessary as it is adding one extra thing when it is not needed to explain P, but we don't need to get into that. I'm content just showing that A2 is not the only logical possibility.

--

I'm not saying we observe regularity and thus FC=rules. In a sense, I'm saying the opposite. In any universe where FC=rules, its observers will definitely observe P. Thus our observation of P makes FC=rules a good possibility. And I think then it's clear that FC=rules is mindless N.

--

The book is making a claim of logical truth: W -> M, that is, if "the observations of our world" then "FC has free will", because only M can explain what we see => N is impossible.

But something is shown to be a logical truth only when all other possibilities are eliminated right?

Is N, i.e, a FC without will, able to explain everything we see? My answer is yes, since we would definitely observe P in a universe where FC=rules. And if my claim that this is a valid possibility is correct, then W -> M is not true.

So a concrete goal for natural theology is to be able to find at least one observation of our world that FC=rules cannot explain, even in principle.

Apart from the foundational examples such as resurrection, I think last frontier in this regard is consciousness, but of course here too I think rules is all there is, even though we have a lot way to go in being able to say how.

I'd like to hear your thoughts on this point. You have already raised some good questions: "how can we explain lions but not unicorns" or "why these rules and not others". I think I have good answers to these at least to my satisfaction, if not yours. But would be glad if you can raise more pinpointing issues against FC=rules that will reveal a gap in my understanding.

This obviously isn't the same as a contradiction.

---

Alright. We've to first get into the meaning of the word existence.

From my perspective:

There is a property of reality called existence. And clearly the existence of 2+2=4 is very different from the existence of lions. Thus existence is of two kinds: potential existence and actual (ontological) existence. Concepts of both a universe with gravity and a universe with anti-gravity exist potentially (what I called ghost universes). But only the universe with gravity actually exists, but universe with anti-gravity doesn't.

Is is possible for there to be no potential existence? No, there is always potential existence in the form of all logically valid possibilities, because logic (potential existence) necessarily exists. It is illogical for logic to not exist.

But is it possible there were no actual existence? Yes, because we see some concepts exist and other don't. To paraphrase your words, there is nothing inherent in the concepts of something that can turn them into actual existence. Actual existence could have been otherwise, including there being nothing actualized.

Reality also contains some mechanism by which potentials can become actualized. This mechanism consists of "stating a purely actual axiom/FC" after which the rest of Reality follows. Theists state FC=God who then chooses which of the many potential existence to actualize. Naturalists state FC=base_ruleset out of which the rest of reality emerges.

Hopefully this clarifies my position in a different way.

---

>> I'd love it if you could show that P1 isn't a valid possibility.

> Sure. Logic exists.

Haha okay that's on me, I set the bar too low [0]. But as per above, I was talking about actual existence, not potential. Of course logic exists, but logic needs an axiom to start with. The question then becomes, is there necessarily some purely actualized axiom/FC? I think the answer is no. There could have been no actual existence. No "I", no FC, no God, nothing. Only potential existence, but nothing to actualize any of it.

---

> Hopefully I have shown that, FC=rules is not logical, while FC=Personal God is.

Detailed responses below, but briefly, FC=Personal God still needs to be taken as an axiom, same as FC=rules. You've tried to use existence as the logical basis, but as I show above, on clarifying the definition of the word existence, "it is impossible for God not to exist" fails.

More importantly, the fact that God has free will is still not proven. Maybe God can only create the universe we see, but no unicorns, no anti-gravity. The choices God has might be limited to 1.

---

> rather, the claim is that all existence of anything and everything, including logic itself, proceeds from God. (Actually, God, in a sense, is logic [...])

This is a main point to discuss, because I don't understand what you mean by "God, in a sense, is logic". I get that God is traditionally defined that way, but I am not able envision what it would mean to say that an entity that has "free will" is logic or the basis of logic.

How can God, who is claimed to be purely actual existence, be logic, which is purely potential existence?

Logic works on axioms. Logic by itself doesn't have any say on the axioms. It can say: if axioms, then something. But it cannot itself state the axiom. There is no such "will" in logic to posit axioms. But for each "stated" axiom, the logical truths contingent on that axiom automatically manifest. These truths are absolute and indisputable and not even God can change them.

So to me, logic precedes everything. Even God would be bound by logic, not the other way around. Can you explain why you think otherwise?

---

> God is existence. Existence doesn't need a reason outside existence for existing; in fact, it is illogical for such a reason to exist.

I am not sure which existence you're talking about. Clearly concepts like lions or unicorns need an external reason for existing. You may mean potential existence, for which the statement is true, but then God is not potential but purely actual existence. And the statement doesn't generally apply to actual existence.

> Given that God is existence, it is impossible for God not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. He needs no reason outside Himself for existing. It is illogical for Him not to exist. > while FC=Personal God is [logical].

This is a making a logical leap though. First we have to define God appropriately before we can equate God to existence. Because see, the point of contention is that God has a free will or not. So if you say God is existence, then aren't you by definition circularly proving God?

To show how, let replace God with Blob. Then, given that Blob is existence, it is impossible for Blob not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. It is illogical for Him not to exist. Therefore Blob has free will. Yes silly, but my point is God or Blob are just words at this point. We'll have to do more work to prove the other properties of God, especially free will.

Similarly, when you say, "[logic] proceeds from the FC; it is an expression of the FC's being. (The FC is not the FC if something, namely logic, is independent of it.)", then it seems to me you're just defining FC to have this property and calling it God who is of course personal. As I mention above, to me logic is separate and supreme to God, as it has a different kind of existence than God.

---

> Do you agree that reference to brute facts is illogical?

You already clarified this statement. But I was thinking about axioms. They are the free variables. There is no logical precedence to axioms. They just are posited as priors, and logical reasoning proceeds from the axioms/brute fact. Thus, it is all part of logic and hence not illogical.

And this "stating of axioms" is what the discussion is about. Why this axiom and not that axiom? Why a personal God and not a base_ruleset or vice versa.

> if you say one thing can happen without a reason (brute facts), you are thereby forced to say anything can happen without a reason, and that therefore you have no reason to think (say) that a chocolate cake can't start doing calculus, or some other bizarre idea.

Well no, because brute facts are also bound by logic. A "chocolate cake" as usually defined, does not have the capability to do calculus, otherwise it is not a chocolate cake, but say a cartoon character in the shape of a chocolate cake. The meaning of the words obviously matter. Unstoppable force and immovable object are "defined" to be impossible at the same time. Thus, bizarre ideas are ruled out by definitions/properties and rules of logic.

In particular, FC=base_ruleset is a brute fact. But base_ruleset has to be consistent with our observations W.

--

> P does not imply N because there is no logical connection between the two

> As stated above, if P (empirically-observed) and !P (empirically-falsified) are both compatible with N, then N cannot be said to be empirical.

> Not probabilistic or logically implying, but simply irrelevant and disconnected.

Perhaps the disagreement is that my approach is from Bayesian reasoning, asking the question: given W, which of A1 or A2 is more likely relative to each other. And seems like you're coming from the perspective of proving M or N with 100% certainty?

> Therefore, non-willing, non-free FC is compatible with unicorn events.

But if you want to talk about certainties, then yes, non-willing FC is definitely compatible with unicorn events, as I also showed with the Game of Life example.

And since N has a non-zero probability, that actually a proof against the 100% certainty of a FC with free will, no? As in okay, let's forget W. Just from logic, everything CAN be explained by "programming" (=N), so how can one logically posit M with 100% guarantee?

---

> There is no claim that God actualises base_rules

> it is change, not regularity, that the book uses as the starting point

Right yes, not explicitly in the book. I'm just extending it from what the books imply. FC has to explain everything we see (W). And I hope you agree that we do observe regularity (as part of W). Everything that we look at follows deep regular rules. In other words, the change we see is regular. It is thus implied in the book, even though it is not explicitly mentioned.

And that is also why we don't need to explain the change of everyday objects like lions. We have to explain the base_ruleset that gives rise to the regularity that explains the changes. Hence, A1 or A2.

[0] https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/thats-on-me-i-set-the-bar-too...

So I wasn't intending anything like a defence of God's existence. As I said:

>> To be clear, I am not making a full case for God's existence here; only showing that my position (of a willing FC) is logical, while I respectfully suggest your position is not. Therefore, your tu quoque against my position -- that I am also arguing for a brute fact -- does not succeed.

So if it's ok, I'm going to limit the discussion to that, rather than attempting a full defence of God=existence in a combox.

My goal was to show that we need some reason for base_ruleset actually existing, and hypothetical_ruleset not actually existing. "God wills it" is one such reason: in fact, it's the only reason we have had so far in this discussion. Your alternative, of asserting that something can happen without a reason, forces you to allow that anything crazy can happen (like a calculus-doing chocolate cake). You haven't refuted this point:

> A "chocolate cake" as usually defined, does not have the capability to do calculus, otherwise it is not a chocolate cake, but say a cartoon character in the shape of a chocolate cake.

I agree. But this is irrelevant. We both know what the words 'chocolate cake' refer to. We both know I'm talking about a real chocolate cake, not a cartoon character. And we both know it can't do math (and we both know why) -- that is, we both know there's a reason it can't do math. But if we say things can happen without a reason, then anything could happen. Bayesian reasoning won't protect you from this outcome, because that itself is a form of reasoning, and probability also assumes that things will continue to behave as they have in the past.

> But I was thinking about axioms. They are the free variables. There is no logical precedence to axioms. They just are posited as priors, and logical reasoning proceeds from the axioms/brute fact. Thus, it is all part of logic and hence not illogical.

Because there needs to be some reason for base_ruleset actually existing. We've already established that it might have been otherwise, because base_ruleset is not true in and of itself in the way 2+2=4 is. base_ruleset could just as easily have been hypothetical_ruleset. It therefore needs a reason outside itself for actually existing (or alternatively, one must explain why one doesn't need a reason, but that doesn't work, as just stated). base_ruleset is not axiomatic.

Do you agree base_ruleset might have been otherwise? Do you agree that you have given no reason for base_ruleset actually existing, and hypothetical_ruleset not actually existing? Finally :), do you agree that my position -- that God willed base_ruleset but not hypothetical_ruleset -- is at least internally consistent and does not fall to the same objections that I think your position falls to?

> Perhaps the disagreement is that my approach is from Bayesian reasoning, asking the question: given W, which of A1 or A2 is more likely relative to each other. And seems like you're coming from the perspective of proving M or N with 100% certainty?

I don't think Bayesian reasoning will help you here. I think I've shown that A1 must fail unless one is prepared to assert that things happen without reason (in which case the 'chocolate cake' argument applies). So questions of probability don't come into it. I don't know if I've proved A2, but so far, it's one of only two options that we have mentioned in this discussion, and the other has been disproved.