Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf] • Hacker News Board

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#281

Post by [deleted] » Thu, Feb 08, 2024, 4:27 PM UTC

ethbr1 wrote: post #135

michael1999 wrote: post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The issue here isn't using google chat, the accusation is that this was Spirit and Boeing conspiring to not record these in the proper work order system under the pretence that this work was being done by Spirit as-if-it-were pre-delivery. Read https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/146074-boeing-inte... And then this from the doc: "The investigation continues to determine what manufacturing documents were used to…

A key point I read somewhere in the accusations is that non-Boeing contractors (e.g. Spirit) by policy cannot have access to CMES. Consequently, you have a system of record that a major party to work doesn't have access to. As we've all seen, this leads to "actual coordination" being instead done in a system all involved parties do have access to (SAT). Which inevitably leads to a desync between CMES (SOR by fiat) an…

[deleted]

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#282

Post by Cacti » Thu, Feb 08, 2024, 7:58 PM UTC

Rapzid wrote: post #222

Cacti wrote: post #196

Earlier quoted context omitted.

lol of course it was intentional. what the Spirit mechanics had to do was a RMV, they knew this, because the Boeing eng rep told them so, but they didn’t like this, so they marked it in the system as an OPEN but performed the work of a RMV, to avoid the additional quality checks a RMV would require. And then they fucked up the RMV but didn’t know and no one else did because it was marked as an OPEN so no one checked…

Are Spirit employees allowed to file records in CMES?!

Are Spirit employees not accountable for their work?

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#283

Post by Cacti » Thu, Feb 08, 2024, 8:16 PM UTC

steve_gh wrote: post #214

Cacti wrote: post #196

Earlier quoted context omitted.

lol of course it was intentional. what the Spirit mechanics had to do was a RMV, they knew this, because the Boeing eng rep told them so, but they didn’t like this, so they marked it in the system as an OPEN but performed the work of a RMV, to avoid the additional quality checks a RMV would require. And then they fucked up the RMV but didn’t know and no one else did because it was marked as an OPEN so no one checked…

My experience in across a range of technical and consulting roles has been that junior folk understand the need gor their work to be reviewed and checked, because they know that they are inexperienced. Good senior folk want their work to be checked because they are experienced enough to know that they are fallible. It is the mid level folks (especially those who are promoted above their competence to senior roles) wh…

This is my experience as well, but it’s usually not those promoted above their capability but those who were passed over and then grow resentful that end up causing the issue. An otherwise competent, but now bitter, middle aged guy on the third shift (or otherwise with less supervision than usual) who is going through a divorce or some other major life stress is the scenario I see most often. They fall behind, they come in to catch up, they have to leave unexpectedly for a family medical crisis, they fall further behind, and so on and so on and before you know it, a perfectly rational person is doing stuff like half-assing the QA checks and it seems almost normal.

But you’re right. It’s not the black belts you have to watch out for it, it’s the browns.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#284

Post by ezfe » Fri, Feb 09, 2024, 2:28 PM UTC

flaminHotSpeedo wrote: post #260

ezfe wrote: post #211

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Photos may not have been after conclusion of repair so technically not conclusive. However it certainly lines up.

The report makes it clear that the photo was taken after the rivet rework was complete, immediately before restoration of the interior

Correct, however again the photo doesn't prove that the next step wasn't putting in the locking bolts.

I don't disagree with the conclusion, but the photo merely *supports* the conclusion, rather than proving it.

Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]

#285

Post by j-a-a-p » Tue, Feb 13, 2024, 7:21 PM UTC

alberto180 wrote: post #258

j-a-a-p wrote: post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Good point. Boeing (737) has the door open to the outside. The Airbus (320) the door opens to the inside. I can remember when I was small my Mom mentioned that doors of buildings in the US are mandatory to open to the outside, a rule that does not exist in Europe AFAIK. So there you have it, you have a significant higher chance of crashing in a Boeing, but when it happens, your can leave the plane 2 seconds faster.

Sorry that's both just wrong. The A320 Doors open to the outside (as can be seen here https://www.airplane-pictures.net/photo/1364569/d-ainb-lufth... ), and also come with a mechanical opening aid that Boeing doesn't come with, because of the Grandfathering of the 737. And emergency exits in "Europe" obviously open to the outside. At least in West/North Europe

Nope, you are wrong on both accounts. OP is referring to the emergency exit and why it would make sense to make them fail save. These doors are located above the wings. Your picture shows the normal entrance door. This door is gigantic and has all sorts of safety procedures to keep them closed.

Boeing opens the emergency exit to the outside and we all know that they will just pop out during flight every time they forget to bolt them. Airbus has a fail save design: unlock, pull in, then throw it out. No way you can open these during flight, with or without bolts.