Source: I work in the field. This is a current limitation, and an artifact of the data+method but not something that should be relied upon. If we do some adversary modelling, we can find two ways to work around this: 1) actively generate and search for such data; perhaps expensive for small actors but not well equipped malicious ones. 2) wait for deep learning to catch up, e.g. by extending NERFs (neural radiance fie…
> This is a current limitation The thing with any AI/ML tech is that current limitations are always underplayed by proponents. Self-driving cars will come out next year, every year. I'd say that until the tech actually exists, this is a great way to detect live deepfakes. Not using the technique just because maybe sometime in the future it won't work isn't very sound. For an extreme opponent you may need additional s…
To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways
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Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways
#282Encrypt/sign the feed, watermark the images with a QR code containing the sig, have an app on your phone with their pubkey and display a big green check when it matches. every pure deepfake attempt is now easily dealt with. Boom.
Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways
#283Earlier quoted context omitted.
you don't. You assume that the key distribution mechanism is secure, so that whoever has the key _is_ who they say they are. This doesn't prevent adversarial impersonation (where you cannot trust the party that want themselves impersonated). E.g., if you are an employer, and interviewing via video, you cannot tell that the person authenticated and performing on video is indeed the person you're hiring. I dont think t…
That just moves the problem around, it doesn't solve it. It's also incompatible with anti-money laundering laws that don't make it easy/safe to outsource ID verification.
Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways
#284Earlier quoted context omitted.
The solution you propose sounds vastly overengineered. Why would we need remote attestation, tampering resistance and enclaves when this is simply a problem of your peers being unauthenticated? If you care about the identity of who you are speaking to remotely, the only solution is to cryptographically verify the other end, which just requires plain old key distribution and verification. It's just not widespread enou…
How do you verify they are who they say they are, though? And verifying their picture matches their name?