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To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways

metaphysic.ai

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Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways

#281
post #113
post #18

Source: I work in the field. This is a current limitation, and an artifact of the data+method but not something that should be relied upon. If we do some adversary modelling, we can find two ways to work around this: 1) actively generate and search for such data; perhaps expensive for small actors but not well equipped malicious ones. 2) wait for deep learning to catch up, e.g. by extending NERFs (neural radiance fie…

> This is a current limitation The thing with any AI/ML tech is that current limitations are always underplayed by proponents. Self-driving cars will come out next year, every year. I'd say that until the tech actually exists, this is a great way to detect live deepfakes. Not using the technique just because maybe sometime in the future it won't work isn't very sound. For an extreme opponent you may need additional s…

One thing that I haven't seen mentioned is that many of the recent articles I've seen misuse the phrase "deep fake" and usually mean "face-swap algorithm" or "look-alike". The former, I believe has been able to defeat this test for 10 years at least and the latter has always been able defeat this trick.

Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways

#282
What's with everyone playing who-wants-to-be-a-gymnast by saying turn side ways, put a shoe on your head, do a backflip, move out of frame.?

Encrypt/sign the feed, watermark the images with a QR code containing the sig, have an app on your phone with their pubkey and display a big green check when it matches. every pure deepfake attempt is now easily dealt with. Boom.

Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways

#283
post #256

Earlier quoted context omitted.

you don't. You assume that the key distribution mechanism is secure, so that whoever has the key _is_ who they say they are. This doesn't prevent adversarial impersonation (where you cannot trust the party that want themselves impersonated). E.g., if you are an employer, and interviewing via video, you cannot tell that the person authenticated and performing on video is indeed the person you're hiring. I dont think t…

That just moves the problem around, it doesn't solve it. It's also incompatible with anti-money laundering laws that don't make it easy/safe to outsource ID verification.

Anti-money laundering laws aren't really viable in the end game, as will eventually be proven.

Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways

#284

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The solution you propose sounds vastly overengineered. Why would we need remote attestation, tampering resistance and enclaves when this is simply a problem of your peers being unauthenticated? If you care about the identity of who you are speaking to remotely, the only solution is to cryptographically verify the other end, which just requires plain old key distribution and verification. It's just not widespread enou…

How do you verify they are who they say they are, though? And verifying their picture matches their name?

What are the practical scenarios where you need this that would require the introduction of overengineered, Orwellian, crippled computers described above, while at the same time not being solvable by other more realistic means?

Re: To uncover a deepfake video call, ask the caller to turn sideways

#285

Signed up for one of those 'neobanks' (that don't have physical branches) and part of the signup required me to turn my head sideways. I wondered why they wanted me to do that. Now I know.

Thanks for contributing to the dataset. www.hownormalami.eu

Why should I trust that site?
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