281–290 of 328 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
And, like TED, there is no actual implementation in existence.
Except, a (prototype) implementation does exist - and you can buy one (or at least, you can when they're in stock)
So, not actual implementation of a lock.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I am not sure if I would call trying all combinations "picking s lock" Lockpicking is defined as opening a lock with an instrument other than the appropriate key. It is not defined by how many attempts it takes. Many of the most common lockpicking methods are nothing more than brute force, which are sometimes incredibly effective. They're also sometimes the opposite of effective, meaning they may take many thousand…
My point is that every single lock (or password) is susceptible to trying every key combination: the only protection against that is to increase the number of combinations available. Sure, if a particular lock is more prone to brute-forcing due to its design than an average lock (eg. side channel attacks like timing attacks with passwords), one could surely qualify that as a pickable lock (or a "weak" password scheme…
You quite literally said it's not pickable and not even lockpicking at all, and have even reiterated as much in this new comment, so please don't pretend otherwise.
> but only when you are able to reduce the problem space from the full set of combinations would I say you are picking a lock.
All of the dictionaries and an entire industry of professional locksmiths disagree with that statement. Given that you've twice admitted to having "no clue about locks," I'm not sure why you continue to insist that uninformed personal opinions are somehow factually obvious.
> Sure, if a particular lock is more prone to brute-forcing due to its design than an average lock (eg. side channel attacks like timing attacks with passwords), one could surely qualify that as a pickable lock (or a "weak" password scheme).
You keep trying to apply the concepts of digital authentication to locksmithing, but they're just not applicable in the way you're describing. The "average lock" doesn't exist, and certainly can't be used as a basis for determining the threshold of whether an entirely different lock qualifies as pickable.
As far as I can determine, your opinion boils down to believing that successfully brute-forcing a lock with only 100 possible combinations does qualify as lockpicking, but successfully brute-forcing a lock with 1,000,000 possible combinations somehow doesn't qualify as lockpicking.
I'm not sure how that position is justifiable, made worse that the lock being discussed is notably prone to brute force and within a very reasonable amount of time. So, if "weakness" is your qualification for a lock being pickable, then you're arguing against your own assertion that this lock is unpickable.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The interaction of engineering and "use" by the Lock Picking Lawyer ( https://youtu.be/Ecy1FBdCRbQ ) was fascinating - "use" here really meaning "exploiting". It's a problem many here are aware of, either by over-engineering things intended for use by non-engineers, or designing things to be used by customers when the designer isn't intimately familiar with the use. In this case it was sort of somewhere in between. I…
Def want to see Enclave's under Lock Picking Lawyer! If you make a "unpickable lock" you'd def want to send it to LPL, that's like the ultimate proof of how easy/hard it is to pick. The fact that there's no video, with how approachable LPL is and accepts random locks in his PO box, can only be seen as a red flag. Do it in the open, like Stuff Made Here!
I am a reasonably capable lockpicker and lock collector with hundreds of locks of every mechanism I can get my hands on... and as LPL often demonstrates, the vast majority of them, particularly the move clever seeming designs, are actually easy to pick. I have one of the Enclave lock prototypes on my desk and can confirm the machining is brilliant and I have no idea how one could approach picking this. No feedback at…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I can't be bothered to use YT anymore with all the ads. They're basically interactive, on-demand, corporate TV monetizing other people's content and nothing more. The world needs a co-op video sharing app and a microblogging app.
You could also just pay for YouTube premium. I subscribed about a year ago and I don’t regret it.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Def want to see Enclave's under Lock Picking Lawyer! If you make a "unpickable lock" you'd def want to send it to LPL, that's like the ultimate proof of how easy/hard it is to pick. The fact that there's no video, with how approachable LPL is and accepts random locks in his PO box, can only be seen as a red flag. Do it in the open, like Stuff Made Here!
> The fact that there's no video, with how approachable LPL is and accepts random locks in his PO box, can only be seen as a red flag. He says he's going to make a small number of prototypes and send them to the locksport community. It's not a "red flag", it's just very early in his design cycle.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The fact that there's no video, with how approachable LPL is and accepts random locks in his PO box, can only be seen as a red flag. He says he's going to make a small number of prototypes and send them to the locksport community. It's not a "red flag", it's just very early in his design cycle.
He's selling them at $250, patent pending and is sold out for 20 days ("again"), def sounds like a normal product and not a prototype.
It's for locksport and to play right now. There's no ready means to actually... lock something.. with it.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nice vid! You can print one of these for just 30 GBP? You know high end locks go for a lot more than that right? You could be printing money!
Yep the nice Abloy ones go for over three hundred livres Anglais. But nobody is going to buy a single thing that the insurers haven't approved. https://www.guardiansecuritysystems.co.uk/abloy-protec2-pl36...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I am not sure if I would call trying all combinations "picking s lock" Lockpicking is defined as opening a lock with an instrument other than the appropriate key. It is not defined by how many attempts it takes. Many of the most common lockpicking methods are nothing more than brute force, which are sometimes incredibly effective. They're also sometimes the opposite of effective, meaning they may take many thousand…
My point is that every single lock (or password) is susceptible to trying every key combination: the only protection against that is to increase the number of combinations available. Sure, if a particular lock is more prone to brute-forcing due to its design than an average lock (eg. side channel attacks like timing attacks with passwords), one could surely qualify that as a pickable lock (or a "weak" password scheme…
You can however use other properties of the lock to avoid brute forcing it, and get more like a gradient descent:
A blank key will be scratched by pins that are set at the wrong height, and you can keep filing and scratching till it's at the right value