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Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

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Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#281
post #226

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know much about the tech, but would it be possible to setup your own local DNS server that your machines point to, and do the filtering within that DNS server?

I run my own recursive resolver (DNS server) in a datacenter. This DNS server gets its upstream resolution from nextdns.io which is configured with several blocklists - including one that is roughly analogous to ublock origin. On my local network, my DHCP server hands out my DNS server to all clients. This means that all clients on my network get fairly robust ad-blocking even if they do not have an adblocker install…

Google public DNS (8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4) was created because OpenDNS was redirecting "Google queries" typed into the browser GUI (rather than typed into an HTML form on a website).

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#283
post #205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

On every single operating system it is possible for this kind of improvement to be installed as a system-wide replacement for the local resolver, whether by a direct plugin or by running a resolver on localhost. This is how these upgrades can be deployed if you don't want to wait for the OS. The problem is that browsers and other applications are just unwilling to let the user see how their products work or decide an…

iOS and MacOS technically have this (requires a profile[0]) but Microsoft will probably drag their feed on this for the next 2 years with the amount of enterprise customers they have to keep happy; and, given that the network adapter config is still based on Aero controls, they're probably in no rush to add more configuration options before upgrading it to Metro controls. 0: https://paulmillr.com/posts/encrypted-dns/

It's almost ready in Windows.

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/networking-blog/windo...

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#285
post #138

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would like someone to correct me if I am wrong, but I think we can never have 100% privacy because the destination IPs cannot be encrypted or hidden, so as long as the destination IP can be observed, the server that you are connecting at can be obtained (I know a server can host many web pages, but this requires the port, which cannot be encrypted either). So I don't know to what extent this protocol can be useful.

> I know a server can host many web pages, but this requires the port, which cannot be encrypted either You can host multiple web sites in the same port since the 1990s, using name-based virtual hosts ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_hosting#Name-based ). It's rare nowadays to use a port other than 80 (for http:// ) or 443 (for https:// ) for public web sites.

yes you CAN if you wish of course. on the other hand nowadays 95% of domains on the Internet can be identified by IP[1][2]. so ISPs still have a pretty good guess what sites do you visit even without DNS or SNI data.

[1] https://blog.powerdns.com/2019/09/25/centralised-doh-is-bad-...

[2] https://blog.apnic.net/2019/08/23/what-can-you-learn-from-an...

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#286

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When enterprises own the devices on their networks they can add whatever root certificate they like and MITM filter whatever they like. This makes over the network traffic more secure and does nothing to really impact threat detection. If you don’t own the device then 1) should you be interfering or snooping the traffic at all? 2) if you need to limit threat then subnet clients you don’t own.

Not with TLS1.3 and DoH and ENSI they can’t.

ESNI is a draft. No support in Chrome and OpenSSL.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#287
post #247

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can't you do something analogous to editing your hosts file (but for name servers) and then re-centralize all of your apps using a single name server, which you can then control however you like?

No, because instead of setting your network to give out your DNs server to all of your devices, it’s ignored by the apps Instead of setting your devices to use a dns server of your choice it’s ignored by the apps Some apps allow you to configure them, so now you’re configuring 200 apps on 20 devices rather than just one dhcp setting. (Oh and OSs have generally broken hosts files)

Sorry, what I was trying to say is: you know each app tries to use a certain DNS server. So, in your Rasp Pi, you route their DNS server to point your own (as you would with an /etc/hosts file), that way when DoH occurs, you control the final resolution.

What I'm suggesting isn't merely setting up the 'default' dns server. What I'm suggesting is 'cnaming' the name servers that apps attempt connecting to, to point elsewhere.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#288
post #262

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As someone who recently set up a pihole, I was shocked that it was possible to redirect all DNS requests on the network (in plain text!) to the pi. I did the method where you set up a network firewall at the router level that redirects all port 53 traffic to the pi. It's a nice feature for getting my xbox filtered, but it really felt like an insecure historical quirk rather than a feature we should be praising. Surel…

If I get access to those devices, yeah, sure. But in practice, I'd argue this actually reduces privacy for users, as it gives apps and devices a secure path through the network which cannot be monitored by any intermediary - including the user of the app or the owner of the device themselves. So no chance to find out what kind of data is being transmitted there either. To me, DoH seems less about protecting the user…

I think your point is 100% correct but surely you understand that this applies to HTTPS too. Network filtering would be so much more powerful if my pihole could modify and block HTTP requests in-flight.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#289
post #200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have blocked 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8 and noticed some devices behave very badly, often crashing or restarting. Debugging the issue, once I removed the firewall rule they behaved normally. Almost all of the affected devices were google related, Android TV for example.

You can also DNAT all port 53 traffic to your resolver. Devices will think they are talking to 8.8.8.8 or whatever, but in reality they will ask your resolver and your filtering will apply. Your filtering can still break these devices.

This only works as long as DNS is both unauthenticated and unencrypted.

Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH

#290

The biggest and most consistent downside I see with these DNS enhancements is that it prevents filtering at the network level. Querying nameservers is being pushed into applications themselves to support these new features (such as Chrome and Firefox), which bypasses any system resolvers configured on the host. In most cases there is no way to signal from the network that it is not desirable to do this (Firefox being…

I don't know much about the tech, but would it be possible to setup your own local DNS server that your machines point to, and do the filtering within that DNS server?

It is not difficult to run own DOH server. For example, dnsdist >1.4 seems to be a popular choice:

https://blog.apnic.net/2020/02/28/how-to-deploy-dot-and-doh-...

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