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Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

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Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#281

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yum update, pip install whatever :)

Rubygems for everybody! Or arbitrary docker containers. My current deployments allow outbound SMTP only. All software packages (rpm or whatever) get pushed in via rsync from the outside, or are built in an adjacent lab behind the firewalls and pushed across.

It's sometimes surprising who gets unhappy when you tell them they can't just run arbitrary code from places unknown in prod.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#282
post #256

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. But gag orders do not require the recipient to lie about it. Someone who is under a gag order simply doesn't comment one way or the other about it. FWIW this is the principle behind warrant canaries. A warrant canary is the practice of putting a statement such as "we have not received any NSLs" in a regular report, and then omitting it once you have received an NSL. Because you've conditioned people to expect its…

I'm pretty sure that this strategy won't hold up in court. If you have a sign that indicates that a secret event have not happened, the intent of removing the sign is to indicate that the secret event did happen. The intent is particularly obvious to the originator of the secret event, so you won't be able to argue in the court that it was entirely coincidental.

I agree.

Could you have a canary community that calls companies once/quarter and specifically asks the NSL question? Seems safer for the companies themselves.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#283

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not like the MISO line is tied to a power rail. You just need to sink more current than the output of the chip you are trying to override. So the driver is likely in the single digit milliamp range, and in any case, you don't care if you toast the output driver on that chip. In fact, if you do, bonus!

Ok, but i suppose that in the future chip output pads can have circuitry which can detect a forced output (by measuring current). When this happens, the chip could short-circuit power lines, or superimpose a signal on the power-lines to notify the rest of the system.

> When this happens, the chip could short-circuit power lines

No chip design would ever do this. The chip would incinerate itself.

> superimpose a signal on the power-lines to notify the rest of the system

The rest of the system i.e. the BMC already know that something weird is up.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#284
In another thread Walterbell points out:

From 2016, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/03/repor....

> Apple has begun designing its own servers partly because of suspicions that hardware is being intercepted before it gets delivered to Apple, according to a report yesterday from The Information. "Apple has long suspected that servers it ordered from the traditional supply chain were intercepted during shipping, with additional chips and firmware added to them by unknown third parties in order to make them vulnerable to infiltration, according to a person familiar with the matter," the report said. "At one point, Apple even assigned people to take photographs of motherboards and annotate the function of each chip, explaining why it was supposed to be there. Building its own servers with motherboards it designed would be the most surefire way for Apple to prevent unauthorized snooping via extra chips."

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#285
Technical possibility is one thing; proving the story has actually happened is another thing. Until now, what we get is a categorical denial of the story from all related parties. And all the evidence Bloomberg can provide so far is just vague anonymous sources.

Talk is cheap, show me the code/server/chip if they ever exist. Otherwise, the story is just a blunt lie fabricated by Bloomberg serving as a propaganda to bash China amid the Sino-America trade war.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#286

There's a problem with exfiltrate via BMC network theory. In a sane setup, your BMC connection cannot access internet. You should build an isolated intranet for it (including VLAN or hardware isolation, not just subnet/IP), and put a VPN in the front gate. As a result, you login to your data center, or go to there if you like metaphors. If nobody’s there via VPN, BMC network is a silent and dark place. No connection…

If the BMC has write access to host memory it could surely use that access to create a side channel using the host's network interfaces. Having said that, it would be nice if networks were segmented in the way you describe. I've been appalled at the lack of segmentation I've seen in companies of all sizes that I've had gigs for.

Blame management.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#287

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are you referring to the original Xbox? Modchips hit the scene for that in ~ 2 years after release. It's not exactly what I would consider a basis for secure computing. Or maybe you are just referencing the procedures "main memory was encrypted by the on-CPU controller. Obviously, no open JTAGs" should be ratified to create a basis for secure computing, a checklist of things to do/prevent before considering a device…

Didn't even need a modchip. There was a technique where you could softmod by simply unplugging the ide harddrive right after boot and hot plugging it into a desktop. https://www.reddit.com/r/originalxbox/wiki/hotswap

Ah the old softmod, with the 007 game as I recall. Made a great party trick.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#288
post #254
post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They would not have blatantly lied about it in an official statement. That could not have passed legal.

You don't need to blatantly lie to author a rebuttal that doesn't actual rebut the claims against you. You accuse me of selling pink and purple unicorns to gangsters. I reply that "I have no knowledge of any contracts or agreements relating to the sale of unicorns, horses or horse-related animals from my firm, regardless of the colour, breed or condition of the animals. I categorically also deny having any business d…

The problem with your arguments throughout this thread is simple: if a rebuttal is clearly engineered to be deceptive, the courts will not regard it as a valid defense in any subsequent lawsuits from shareholders and customers. That's why rebuttals and denials are normally so vague.

Courts have surprisingly little tolerance for companies who think they're being more clever than their customers, their shareholders, or, for that matter, the judge.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#289

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Lots of current" in this case would only be about 20mA, generating heat that you can easily dissipate from just the surface of a 0201 resistor. I doubt many microprocessors have pins that can drive higher current than that. Realistically, in order to drive it low you don't have to bring it down to 0V. Most 5V chips will stop registering logic high around 2.5-3.3V for example.

These days 20mA is a "high current" I/O. When you do the math on an 88-pin package, 20mA * N active outputs gets big pretty fast. The max total I/O current can be found somewhere around page 987 of the data sheet... don't stop reading early... :) (edit: 88 I/O is a modest size microcontroller sort of chip)

I don't understand how this is relevant to holding a single pin low.

Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack

#290

I really hope that this is the straw that breaks the back of all these "management engines" Like seriously, why does my hobby consumer motherboard need that feature? Corp IT only ever deploys to large fleets of OEM machines.

Take a look at ASpeed (BMC supplier) stock movement: https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/5274.TWO/chart?p=5274.TWO

I know, but seeing the article mention "management engines" made me hope that it will direct a bunch of newfound scrutiny on Intel ME/AMD TrustZone/etc
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