Earlier quoted context omitted.
A couple of years ago some microsoft sales employee probably didnt know about any of this. Also he is talking about mostly self-hosted MS services and i doubt the NSA really has access to that. Also found your conversation style to be quite cocky.
Keep in mind this was in Germany and it doesn't read like native English. I.e. you're almost certainly reading a translation.
Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
271–280 of 310 posts
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#272Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know enough about the details of the build dependencies for any of these projects to give exact steps. To get a known-clean build (that is, a build guaranteed to match the source) of GCC 4.8.1, plug the GCC 4.8.1 into the procedure I gave above: In case it wasn't clear, k is used for indexing, and I use "function application" f(x) to mean compilation of x by compiler f. "Take one compiler source (GCC 4.8.1),…
One of the most useful forms of diversity is the "my opponent does not have access to time machine" defense. e.g. use some C compiler for amiga, or 1980's DEC unix, or whatever to bootstrap gcc3 for windows, and use that to bootstrap clang for linux, etc. The odds that hardware and binaries you've had for 30 years could carry a trojan that successfully applies to a compiler that was not written yet, for an architectu…
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#273Earlier quoted context omitted.
Please explain which exact steps and which assumptions would be needed to have a trusted GCC 4.8.1, both gcc and g++ and then keeping it trusted as the new releases appear. Then the same for LLVM.
I don't know enough about the details of the build dependencies for any of these projects to give exact steps. To get a known-clean build (that is, a build guaranteed to match the source) of GCC 4.8.1, plug the GCC 4.8.1 into the procedure I gave above: In case it wasn't clear, k is used for indexing, and I use "function application" f(x) to mean compilation of x by compiler f. "Take one compiler source (GCC 4.8.1),…
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#274Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#275Earlier quoted context omitted.
>Nor is exchange BCC a copy to the NSA - again someone would have noticed. True, but what about Windows Phone vs. Android (with Google's apps, not just a FOSS build like Replicant) vs. Apple? Which is the lesser evil for your privacy?
> Which is the lesser evil for your privacy? Cyanogen.
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#276Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know enough about the details of the build dependencies for any of these projects to give exact steps. To get a known-clean build (that is, a build guaranteed to match the source) of GCC 4.8.1, plug the GCC 4.8.1 into the procedure I gave above: In case it wasn't clear, k is used for indexing, and I use "function application" f(x) to mean compilation of x by compiler f. "Take one compiler source (GCC 4.8.1),…
You're not giving a useful procedure for me. Let's say that only Gcc can compile itself and its own libraries (e.g version n-1 can compile version n). How can I make trusted GCC 4.8.1 if other compilers won't compile the sources of GCC? Do you agree that I have to implement all the features of GCC used in the sources of GCC in one or more other compilers? If not, don't I have to have a trusted GCC from the start? And…
If GCC is in fact the only thing that can compile GCC, then you cannot use DDC to get a trusted version of GCC.
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#277GNU/Linux, and Free software and hardware in general, look to be the BIG winners out of the NSA brouhaha, because all non-US governments, businesses, organizations, and individuals around the planet who need to safeguard their private or confidential information now have reason to mistrust proprietary (unauditable) software and hardware. Free, open software and hardware are less likely to have secret 'back doors' ins…
Mistrust of commercial solutions does not translate into trust for open-source ones. Have you audited the crypto code of all your packages? Would you even know how?
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#278Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is always going to be an issue of trust at some point: the linux code base is public, but almost none of us compile linux and the packages we need to build a complete OS from source. We end-up getting pre-built packages from repositories that are often distributed all around the word. How easy/hard would it be to compromise some packages or some repositories if you are determined enough? You certainly could not…
But at least it's harder to hide it, and at some point you know it's going to be found out. If we found out about the proprietary solutions spying on us, I think we'll find out even sooner about the open source ones.
Re: Why We Can No Longer Trust Microsoft
#279When a company does what's asked of it by a government and people are upset with the company something's seriously wrong. A company's main priority is typically to make money within the bounds of the law. A government's should be to improve the quality of life and uphold the moral values of its citizens. I have a feeling had Apple been first on board rather than last the journalist would argue that Microsoft were evi…