Why jet engines aren't made in China

> airlines don't want 6 competing types of narrowbody in their fleet, they want one type of narrowbody in their fleet with an abundance of type-rated pilots, multiple maintenance options and a robust aftermarket.

Which is in itself a regulatory problem. Why is the government certifying only a specific company's design, granting them a lock on the market for everything to do with it?

Certifications should work in one of two ways. Either the industry comes together to submit a royalty-free design IETF style and then anybody can make it, or they certify a specific company's patented design and that company is prohibited from making it themselves and can only license it in exchange for a fixed fee per-plane, no license restrictions other than the payment of the fee, and a requirement to publish the uniform fee and charge the same amount to all producers. Then you get a company that designs planes but a competitive market for producing and maintaining them. And a requirement that Airbus do the same thing, because why should foreign companies be exempt from antitrust laws when they want to sell to the domestic market?

Notice also that the traditional 737, 757 and 777 are all over 20 years old, which is the term of a patent. In the absence of some chicanery that means they should all correspondingly be available for anyone to produce by now or design variants of which share parts and should only need partial rather than full recertification.

There is no reason it needs to work the way it does other than regulatory capture.

> governments don't know how to mandate good corporate governance.

General Motors?

Could also try not giving them the money.

Forcing others to do better - or not exist.

This, like the linked article by the same author ("America Doesn't Have the Stomach for Growth") raises a few interesting points but doesn't have a strong central thesis. If I could summarize this article, the main thrusts are 1) it's too technically complex, 2) the margins are thin, 3) there are strong regulatory requirements, and 4) opportunity cost vs. AI and chips. Anyone that knows Chinese modern manufacturing knows that is an incredibly weak argument overall.

On technical complexity, China _has_ a more technically complex engine, totally domestic! The WS-15 is a _more_ difficult engine to make. It runs hotter, has an afterburner and variable nozzle... and it is made virtually entirely domestically; yes, including the turbine blades that the author wastes two pages reassuring you only the West can make.

On thin margins... this is laughable. The CCP loves to subsidize strategically industries in six million ways and it is _really_ good at it. Way better than any Western government. Talk about efficient use of gov't money, the CCP will get you high quality engineers, raw materials, a captive market, whatever you need. Negative margins do not bother them one iota.

On strong regulatory requirements... China has a massive domestic market, a physically large country and several strong allies / client states. International requirements are irrelevant to start and once they have proven performance in their markets they can get them anyway.

On opportunity costs... this is the least weak of the arguments. I would argue that 1) China has enough top talent to go around, 2) even in a post-AI world jet engines are useful, and 3) it's clearly a priority of Xi Jinping and thus this whole discussion is irrelevant. That said, there is something to this argument and I would be interested to read a political/strategic analysis on this topic.

Overall, this and Aakash's other articles seem like starting with a conclusion then grasping at random factoids to defend it. If I might give advice to the author: try writing with a strong central thesis.

What a silly idea. Design and manufacturing of something as complex as an airliner is inextricably coupled. There's no way for one company to design the whole aircraft and then just hand it off to others. We're not talking about toasters here.

> If they hadn't merged with Boeing then it would have been with some other large aerospace or defense company like Raytheon or Lockheed Martin

Which is kind of the idea. You then have Raytheon or Lockheed serving the part of the deep pocket who takes possession of their infrastructure instead of handing it to their only competitor. That company may then notice that they're in a position to take a piece of the huge commercial airliner market if they would make an R&D investment into the thing they just bought, and unlike MDD, they have the resources to do that.

Conversely, the buyer isn't interested in the civilian market at all and only buys them for the military assets and sells the civilian infrastructure at fire sale prices to whoever will take it. That still isn't allowed to be Boeing so you now have someone getting a couple billion dollars worth of infrastructure for 10% of its original creation cost, and that make them a viable company because they're starting off ahead by a large amount of capital infrastructure they didn't have to pay the normal price to get.