Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it seems like Approval voting just moves the spoiler effect into how people vote that's orthogonal. ranked voting methods already have (arguably more severe) response to strategic voting AND ALSO can fail IIA even with no strategy applied, just by changing an irrelevant alternative. > Personally I think the possibilities of circular ties under Ranked Pairs is oversold. what does that even mean? we have VSE figures…
Restating my disclaimer of "It's been a while since I've studied the details of voting systems" ... > ranked voting methods ... can fail IIA even with no strategy applied, just by changing an irrelevant alternative. Can you clarify whether you're referring to some ranked methods (eg IRV), or all ranked methods (ie including ranked pairs) ? > that's not under or oversold, it's just measured performance. Isn't this due…
> Isn't this due to defining "performance" in a way that is congruent with Approval (/ Score)
1. i did not define performance in a way that is congruent with approval/score. scores are not utilities. they are the modification of utilities via ignorance, normalization, and strategy.
2. that the correct social welfare function is just the sum of all voter utilities (the definition of "performance") is mathematically proven. https://www.rangevoting.org/UtilFoundns
> do I Approve my latent terrible party or not?
this is not a "problem". it's well understood. https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6
approval voting obliterates IRV ("RCV") with any mixture of strategic or honest voters, so i'm not sure why you're bringing up strategy. https://www.rangevoting.org/StratHonMix