271–280 of 498 posts
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"Just wait 2 weeks to use new versions by default" is an amazing defense method against supply chain attacks.
Its also really ineffective defense against 0 days!
They stop working before can use them.
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> These companies tell customers to be suspicious of phishing attempts, and then they pull these stunts. Yep. At every BigCo I've worked at, nearly all of the emails from Corporate have been indistinguishable from phishing. Sometimes, they're actual spam! Do the executives and directors responsible for sending these messages care? No. They never do, and get super defensive and self-righteous when you show them exactl…
A few years ago our annual corporate phishing training was initiated by an email sent from a random address asking us to log in with our internal credentials on a random website. A week later some executive pushing the training emailed the entire company saying that it was unacceptable that nobody from engineering had logged into the training site and spun some story about regulatory requirements. After lots of back…
I know this isn't really possible for smaller guys but larger players (like NPM) really should buy up all the TLD versions of "npm" (that is: npm.io, npm.sh, npm.help, etc). One of the reasons this was so effective is that the attacker managed to snap up "npm.help"
I agree that especially larger players should be proactive and register all similar-sounding TLDs to mitigate such phishing attacks, but they can't be outright prevented this way.
Really feels like these big open packages repos need a better security solution. Or at least a core subset of carefully vetted ones. Same issue with python, rust etc. It’s all very trust driven
Dodged a bullet indeed I find it insane that someone would get access to a package like this, then just push a shitty crypto stealer. You're a criminal with a one-in-a-million opportunity. Wouldn't you invest an extra week pushing a more fledged out exploit? You can exfiltrate API keys, add your SSH public key to the server then exfiltrate the server's IP address so you can snoop in there manually, if you're on a dev…
Get in, steal a couple hundred grand, get out, do the exact same thing a few months later. Repeat a few times and you can live worry free until retirement if you know to evade the cops. Even if you steal other stuff, you're going to need to turn it all into cryptocurrency anyway, and how much is an AWS key really going to bring in. There are criminals that focus on extracting passwords and password manager databases…
step 1: live in a place where the cops do not police this type of activity
step 2: $$$$
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The claim is valid -- it is legit from npm.help If you think npm.help is something it isn't, that's not something DKIM et al can help with.
Do you remember a few years ago that browsers used to put a lock icon for all HTTPS connections? That lock icon signified that the connection is encrypted alright. To a tech geek that's a valid use of a lock icon. But browsers still removed it because it's a massive UX fail. You have to consider what the lock icon means to people who are minimally tech literate. I understand and have set up DKIM and SPF, but you cann…
Few years ago? I have lock icon right now in my address bar
The nx supply chain attack via npm was the bullet many companies did not doge. I mean, all you needed was to have the VS Code nx plugin installed — which always checked for the latest published nx version on npm. And if you had a local session with GitHub (eg logged into your company’s account via the GH CLI), or some important creds in a .env file… that was exfiltrated. This happened even if you had pinned dependenc…
I avoid anything to do with NPM, except for the typescript compiler, and I'm looking forward to the rewrite in Go where I can remove even that. For this reason.
As a comparison, in Go, you have minimum version spec, and it takes great pains to never execute anything you download, even during compilation stage.
NPM will often have different source then the github repo source. How does anyone even trust the system?
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In a case like this, the package maintainer's account itself has been hacked, so I'm not sure if that would be meaningful. The only solution would be to prevent all releases from being applied immediately.
A solution could be enforcing hardware keys for 2FA for all maintainers if a package has more than XX thousand weekly downloads. No hardware keys, no new releases.
They have it implemented.
I created NPM account today and added passkey from my laptop and hardware key as secondary. As I have it configured it asked my for it while publishing my test package.
So the guy either had TOTP or just the pw.
Seems like should be easy to implement enforcement.
Wow! This site uses anubis with the meta-refreshed based challenge that doesn't require javascript. So I can actually read the article in my old browser. It's so rare for anubis deployals to be setup with any configuration beyond the defaults. What a delight.