Earlier quoted context omitted.
Searle's Chinese Room Argument springs to mind: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ The idea that "human-like" behaviour will lead to self-awareness is both unproven (it can't be proven until it happens) and impossible to disprove (like Russell's teapot). Yet, one common assumption of many people running these companies or investing in them, or of some developers investing their time in these technologie…
> The idea that "human-like" behaviour will lead to self-awareness is both unproven (it can't be proven until it happens) and impossible to disprove (like Russell's teapot). I think Searle's view was that: - while it cannot be dis-_proven_, the Chinese Room argument was meant to provide reasons against believing it - the "it can't be proven until it happens" part is misunderstanding: you won't know if it happens beca…
> while it cannot be dis-_proven_, the Chinese Room argument was meant to provide reasons against believing it
Yes, like Russell's teapot. I also think that's what Searle means.
> the "it can't be proven until it happens" part is misunderstanding: you won't know if it happens because the objective, externally available attributes don't indicate whether self-awareness (or indeed awareness at all) is present
Yes, agreed, I believe that's what Searle is saying too. I think I was maybe being ambiguous here - I wanted to say that even if you forgave the AI maximalists for ignoring all relevant philosophical work, the notion that "appearing human-like" inevitably tends to what would actually be "consciousness" or "intelligence" is more than a big claim.
Searle goes further, and I'm not sure if I follow him all the way, personally, but it's a side point.