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faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets
271–273 of 273 posts
Re: faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets
#272Earlier quoted context omitted.
The only one that would fit my mainboard I bought on Amazon, and I only got it to upgrade Windows. The indication on it is "made in China". As a consumer I also have no idea how these suspicious chips that I'm required to plug into my mainboard are supposedly trusted, and by whom, and what for. "Plug this chip that says made in China into your mainboard, for security reasons, to continue." is not really emitting trus…
> "Plug this chip that says made in China into your mainboard, for security reasons, to continue." is not really emitting trust or confidence in any way. " I'm sure 30 other chips made in china on same board are entirely fine
Yeah, but from a user POV at least those are functional and not just for vaguely specified "security reasons".
Re: faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets
#273Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If you could replace all the vendor keys [...] You very much can. It's trivial. TPMs have four key "hierarchies" each of which has a seed . Of those four, one (the "null" hierarchy) gets a random seed each time the TPM is reset, while the other three (the platform, endorsement, and owner hierarchies) have their seeds stored in EEPROM/NVRAM, and there are functions in the spec for replacing those with new, randomly…
You cut off the "including the firmware signing keys" part, that's critical. Otherwise the vendor could be coerced or subverted to sign malicious firmware which then subverts your system at runtime. Only when you can bring your own keys for the entire boot and trust chain can you untether yourself from the vendor once you have purchased the hardware.
Well speak of the devil. It happened. https://www.theregister.com/2023/05/09/intel_oem_private_key...