Attacking password managers is still a scalability problem, there would be always better targets out there to gain access to credentials.
Sure if you are in a position that your threat model includes actual targeted attacks then you need to reconsider things. But then software password managers might not be the way to go regardless.
A lot of security advice needs to be taken in the context it was given - that context is always a specific threat model(s).
Writing down passwords in an office is a terrible idea, keeping a small book with passwords in a drawer in your study is quite fine for most people.
Security is always a trade off between different threat models, anything you do reduces the likelihood of ones and increase the likelihood of others.
Encrypting the laptop reduces the chance of some random person extracting data if the device is lost or stolen, also to some extent reduces the chances of it being successfully searched by law enforcement. It does however increases the chances of a threat agent torturing you or your loved ones for access.
Now this isn’t an argument to not use device encryption, unless ofc the threat of violence is actually real at that point neither option might actually be viable and you would look for other means to store and transport data other than an encrypted device.