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A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

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Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#271

Post by TrevorJ »

XorNot wrote: post #224
TrevorJ wrote: post #161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The simpler explanation: they understand knowledge is power and are happy to use any convenient excuse to acquire it.

If knowledge was power then by the argument advanced above, they would be able to stop terrorist attacks. Why don't they? Surely the obvious effective program being claimed to not exist would be an excellent argument to expand surveillance operations.

>Why don't they?

If I was slightly more conspiratorial I would suggest that that is the 64 million dollar question.

In reality though, I think we are talking about two different types of knowledge here.

When I say knowledge is power, I'm talking about power over individuals. The type of knowledge that allows you to say "Hmm, those are some interesting emails you sent, Senator. Let's see if we can come to an agreement to make sure nobody else sees these." The type of knowledge that makes the average citizen think twice before making that Google search, or before posting a comment online.

Even with total info awareness, to stop attacks you need the ability to filter and flag the data you have to sound the alarm when needed. Fundamentally, that's a data processing problem and not specifically what I am talking about.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#272

Post by iamsohungry »

russnewcomer wrote: post #266
iamsohungry wrote: post #261

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree that you've identified a problem. I don't agree that it's a technical problem. It seems to me that technology simply doesn't offer any solutions to this kind of problem. Perhaps that's a failure of imagination on my part, though: what are some areas of research you think might cause law enforcement to start responding to credible threats?

Metadata analysis and pattern recognition of publicly available data is one. Better data organization tools are another (a family member is studying forensic science and has done internships with large-ish police departments that still largely use printed and hand-written documents to manage cases) But that's my point. I haven't done much thinking on this either, so I can't see around the corners of time to see what…

Ah, I agree on that front. That does make sense.

But I still don't think this should distract from a conversation about encryption. Encryption has very importat implications for free press and privacy far outside of preventing terrorism, and it's important that it stay legal and accessible to normal people. Experts need to make their voices heard so that legal decision isn't made by people unconcerned with these important issues.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#273

Post by dplgk »

slg wrote: post #150
dplgk wrote: post #127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The terrorists will use encrypted, unbreakable methods no matter that Google or Apple use is their OS. That's really the only point that matters.

And I might be able to get my hands on an AK47 if I really wanted and had enough money to dedicate to it. That is the truth of the world. But do you believe that making it harder to acquire a weapon like that doesn't have some benefit? Back to HN's world, one of the basic principles of human factors is "make the right thing easy and the wrong thing hard." You might not be able to prevent people from doing the wrong t…

It's not hard to download some software while sitting in your house. Much easier than buying an illegal gun.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#274

Post by rnovak »

nitrogen wrote: post #239
rnovak wrote: post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not entirely, it's more of the "that word 'proof'/'proves' doesn't mean what you think it means" argument. My point is entirely aimed at the linguistic use of "proves" than anything else.

As always, the burden of proof lies with the party making the existence or effectiveness claim. It is on the surveillance proponents to prove their effectiveness.

I don't have a burden of proof because I have nothing to prove, I'm not making a claim one way or another.

The person I was commenting to, however, IS making a claim. Maybe your burden of proof applies to him?

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#275

Post by rnovak »

Zigurd wrote: post #248
rnovak wrote: post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only thing that can prove or disprove anything is the abundance of information, which we don't have. We have no idea how many attacks have been prevented (everyone likes to claim this is zero....but they do so without any evidence to support that, as relevant information is surely classified beyond Top Secret). We have only the slightest, tiniest, smallest idea of what the NSA and other intelligence organizations…

> We have no idea how many attacks have been prevented Yes, we do. We know ALL of the FBI's high profile terrorism cases. Apart from the Tsarnaev brothers, it has been all cases where one or more fools got snared by a provocateur. So unless you believe that there is a secret system of arrest, a secret court that hears terrorism trials, and secret prisons all operating inside the US, we know exactly how effective mass…

Unless you have security clearance, most likely above top secret, you have no clue what happens (and if you did, commenting on it in a public forum would most likely be a federal crime).

We already know there are secret courts that hear secret arguments that can't be refuted by defendants/targets. Oh, and if that court involved you, you're legally not even allowed to tell anyone.

We already know that the NSA/FBI/CIA/DEA uses parallel construction to actually prosecute crimes against US citizens.

How do we know this stuff? Someone with clearance risked his life, and gave up his freedom to tell the world. Oh, and the US said they MIGHT NOT waterboard him if he ever came back to the US to face his crimes.

And out of the thousands of documents he had, how many do we have access to? A few handful?

Sure...we know everything

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#276

Post by Khaine »

throwaway7767 wrote: post #243
Khaine wrote: post #237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

France has something like 11,500 on the extremist watchlist. I'm not sure its practical to watch and monitor that many people with the staffing levels of French Intelligence without acting like the stasi

That's precisely the point being discussed. The "collect it all!" mentality of the intelligence agencies just increases the size of the haystack and does not actually result in stopping these incidents, as they are now spread too thin.

My point was that the collect it all mentality is driven by the number of extremists on the list. It takes something like 20 agents to follow someone around the clock.

That means the DGSI would need 230,000 staff to follow all of the extremists all of the time

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#277

Post by nitrogen »

downandout wrote: post #252
mryan wrote: post #242

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The only way to deal with any form of mass shooting is to have systems in public places that can automatically detect and disable the shooter within milliseconds of their first shot. You are proposing that public spaces be fitted with some kind of system that can reliably detect bullets based on their "speed, size, and shape" profile. How do you propose to do this without using a bunch of sensors? > and much more t…

>you can't just brush away these - very valid - technical criticisms of your idea. You want to hash out the design of a complex idea in an HN comment thread?

Sure, why not? :-)

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#278

Post by zaroth »

TeMPOraL wrote: post #185
zaroth wrote: post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ah yes, the good old 'if only they could all be treated like Saudi royalty, they wouldn't blow themselves up in the middle of a marketplace' argument! Standard of living is a continuous curve which has absolutely nothing to do with mass murder. There is a binary switch which occurs separately from any experience which is measured in terms of 'standard of living'. Now maybe there are some experiences which can drive a…

> these are a group of people who use terrorism as a tool to wage war You mean the United States of America, terrorizing Pakistanis for years now? There's no binary switch. There are tactics effective for given goals and circumstances. Mass shootings and suicide bombings are a perfect strategy if you want to make a country destroy itself. The question is - why would you like to make that country destroy itself? The a…

No, I don't. I think they do quite a better job terrorizing themselves than they do us or we do them. In any case it's all out war at this point. Against exactly who or where will be interesting to find out.

You look for a second at the people who actually carried out recent attacks, you will see what I mean. Who said anything about police state?

The thing which has impressed me is apparently this guy was a prolific attack planner. Known and poorly tracked. I'd say a major intelligence failure.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#279

Post by fucking_tragedy »

kbart wrote: post #217
fucking_tragedy wrote: post #162

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Having traffic encrypted with illegal algorithms pass through the Internet would make you a target.

"illegal algorithms" Wow, how do you define that? So, start banning math now?

Hey, I'd love to know exactly how one implements backdoored crypto without banning securely encrypted communication.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#280

Post by fucking_tragedy »

arpa wrote: post #234
fucking_tragedy wrote: post #162

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Having traffic encrypted with illegal algorithms pass through the Internet would make you a target.

How would one determine whether a legal algorithm was used or an illegal one? Even without steganography?

Can we run the ciphertext through a state-approved program and get the plaintext? No? Then it isn't backdoored and is illegal.
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