261–270 of 395 posts
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Can you expand a bit on chrome's anti-surveilance capabilities?
They pin certificates, so that a CA compromise that would enable MITM attack by the global passive adversary would be detectable (and in fact that mechanism has already been used to detect CA compromises.)
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Can we combine multiple algorithms such that having any one of them be secure is safe? For example, instead of encrypting with just RSA, do one pass with RSA and then another pass with ECC. Instead of just using AES, do one pass with AES, another pass with Twofish, and a third pass with RC4. Does that actually help?
You can do this but it will probably make it less secure, not more. Nobody seems to know if the NSA actually has practical attacks against primitives like AES or SHA-2. We do know for sure that they go after higher level implementation flaws. The more complex your encryption scheme is, the more likely it is that you'll introduce a grave flaw. It only takes one. I'd suggest that our best bet already exists: NaCl[1]. I…
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People who intend to enter a middle school and kill kids can hide their plans and communications using 256-bit encryption. Edit: Devil's advocate.
Ever heard about presumption of innocence? Just because you have physical capability to do something, does not give right to spy on you. Now if there is clear evidence that you are predisposed to do something, then you go to the judge and get a warrant for surveillance. And no, expectation of privacy by using strong encryption is not any kind of evidence, it is matter of personal choice/preference.
I wonder if RHEL and Ubuntu distros have NSA/FBI root kit backdoors in their kernel binaries and/or subscription services.
Which isn't to say that backdoors inserted into the binary that aren't in the published source are impossible, only that they need something more subtle than the crude/easily-detectable 'merge backdoor, compile, ship'. Something like a Ken Thompson 'Trusting Trust'[2]-style attack. (Though there are ways of at least having a good chance of detecting even those - see [3]).
(More likely, IMHO, are just deliberately-introduced, plausibly-deniable bugs in the source - think [4]. Yeah, they might be found & reported by an outsider reviewing the source, in which case you thank them, fix it, and introduce another couple somewhere else next week).
[1] http://blogs.kde.org/2013/06/19/really-source-code-software
[2] http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
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The strength of open source lies in the number of eyes with access to the code. Perhaps I lack the wherewithal to identify security vulnerabilities in deployed code, but there's a good chance that there are others who are able to spot said vulns.
ability to spot algorithmic vulnerabilities on that level? and doing it for free? the chances are nill
I'm talking about vulnerabilities in crypto software no in email clients, browsers or office software (that probably they use too)
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I have a problem with encryption being breakable, regardless of who's doing the breaking. I want encryption to be mathematically solid with the only option being brute-force older-than-age-of-earth time. When we get to quantum computing, then I don't know what we'll do...
Everyone focuses on the decrypting power of quantum computing, which is warranted as it will break _modern_ cryptography (in theory). However, think about the encrypting power a quantum computer will have; being able to generate completely random keys among other facets of crypto that seem implausible with modern computers. I think it will just open the door to a whole new science of crypto we haven't reached yet.
Either everything will fall apart or we'll have wised up before hand.
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I think we know very well which encryption has been foiled by the NSA. This is not speculation, but quasi-certainty: 1024-bit RSA. - Crytographers all acknowledge 1024-bit RSA is dead [1]. - Attack cost 10 years ago was estimated to be a few million USD to build a device able to crack a 1024-bit key every 12 months [2]. - "Much of" the "secure" HTTPS websites use such weak key sizes [3]. - NSA had a budget of 10.8 bi…
I am confused. When I see HN or facebook certs they show 128 bit encryption in the browser box. 128 bit seems pretty low.
I'm not sure what the crypto best practice is regarding key strength for 128 bit for symmetric crypto, but presumably it would depend on the cipher used.
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That security systems are designed in the most paranoid fashion possible doesn't tell you anything about the real nature of the threat. Schneier's book doesn't tell you that the NSA has been strong arming corporations into giving up their private keys and into installing backdoors on chips. In fact Schneier himself is outraged to the point that he seems to be calling for a redesign of basic Internet protocols and gov…
Yeah, I'm a little baffled by Schneier's reaction to this. The revelation is advanced cryptanalytic capabilities at NSA, which is literally an article of faith with Schneier. Why is he freaking out about this when he didn't instead freak out about wholesale call record database dumps or AT&T fiber taps?
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I think we know very well which encryption has been foiled by the NSA. This is not speculation, but quasi-certainty: 1024-bit RSA. - Crytographers all acknowledge 1024-bit RSA is dead [1]. - Attack cost 10 years ago was estimated to be a few million USD to build a device able to crack a 1024-bit key every 12 months [2]. - "Much of" the "secure" HTTPS websites use such weak key sizes [3]. - NSA had a budget of 10.8 bi…
I am confused. When I see HN or facebook certs they show 128 bit encryption in the browser box. 128 bit seems pretty low.
In the context of SSL, an assymetric algorithm like RSA is used to exchange symmetrc keys, which are used afterwards.
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I think we know very well which encryption has been foiled by the NSA. This is not speculation, but quasi-certainty: 1024-bit RSA. - Crytographers all acknowledge 1024-bit RSA is dead [1]. - Attack cost 10 years ago was estimated to be a few million USD to build a device able to crack a 1024-bit key every 12 months [2]. - "Much of" the "secure" HTTPS websites use such weak key sizes [3]. - NSA had a budget of 10.8 bi…
I am confused. When I see HN or facebook certs they show 128 bit encryption in the browser box. 128 bit seems pretty low.