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Tracking down the 16-year-old WAL-reset SQLite bug

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Re: Tracking down the 16-year-old WAL-reset SQLite bug

#261

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why would enterprises need Keybase's product?

We used it for dozens of things back at my old job. Send each other passwords. Informal credentials store fo one off projects and non production. Sensitive project documentation

Aren't there already lots of products that offer that, often more integrated with enterprises' existing systems than Keybase would be?

Re: Tracking down the 16-year-old WAL-reset SQLite bug

#262

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's already how it works at the data-plane layer. I'm talking about the control-plane layer where tailscale needs to maintain a server that gets its state from somewhere (they need to know where to route your data, what your permissions ACLs are, device names, etc.). If everyone shared the same db cluster accessed over the network there is a real risk of an accident leaking the encryption keys (of the database its…

Is it? They're backing them all up to S3 so what if the S3 keys leak?

[deleted]

Re: Tracking down the 16-year-old WAL-reset SQLite bug

#263

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's already how it works at the data-plane layer. I'm talking about the control-plane layer where tailscale needs to maintain a server that gets its state from somewhere (they need to know where to route your data, what your permissions ACLs are, device names, etc.). If everyone shared the same db cluster accessed over the network there is a real risk of an accident leaking the encryption keys (of the database its…

Is it? They're backing them all up to S3 so what if the S3 keys leak?

It's harder to leak multiple S3 keys than a single postgres key.
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