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Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

theregister.com

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Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#261

Post by t0mas88 »

While this sounds like it allowed remote voting, it's interesting that some places (e.g. The Netherlands) went back to 100% paper instead of voting machines. That causes counting to take quite some time, with estimates/interim counts in between.

I don't understand why voting machines can't just print your vote on a piece of paper behind a plastic window for you to see while also recoding the vote in a database. That is 100% anonymous and can't be cheated. The database is the instant answer at election closing time, and then you can take some days to count the papers as confirmation that nothing weird happened.

No way to hack that. If you print something different on the paper the voter will see it. If you try to hack it by printing more papers than actual votes, the paper count won't match the amount of voting passes that you collected/verified when letting people into the polling station.

It may even be safer than the current paper approach, because if the paper vote counters try to cheat their counts won't match the database triggering an investigation as well.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#262

Post by spiddy »

dietr1ch wrote: post #103
beautiful_apple wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can have e-voting systems that protect ballot secrecy and are verifiable. You can use homomorphic encryption or mixnets to prove that: 1) all valid votes were counted 2) no invalid votes were added 3) the totals for each candidate is correct And you can do that without providing proof of who any particular voter voted for. A few such systems: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Voting https://www.belenios.org/ A…

> You can have e-voting systems that protect ballot secrecy and are verifiable. In these systems the voter cannot verify that their vote was secret as they cannot understand, and much less verify the voting machine. > And you can do that without providing proof of who any particular voter voted for. Which is good for preventing the sale of votes, but keeps things obscure in a magical and correct box. How can I tell t…

you don’t need to be an aviation expert to trust the plane will fly.

likewise e-voting systems pass through cryptography experts auditing to verify it does what it says it does.

said that the voting solution can also provide cryptographic proof that your vote was unaltered, and accounted for, without need to expose your actual vote.

the claims about database altering, are also false as the vote is cryptographically signed and unalterable.

also there is another feature where you can recast vote on top of your previous one and the last vote will be the valid one. This is crucial for countries where the bad guys can come at your place and under distress (gun) force your vote. you can then recast safely invalidating the forced vote.

e-voting solutions is really interesting and in an alternate reality I think we could have had a mainstream e-voting and more even direct-democracy vs our current democracy by proxy (elected officials)

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#263

Post by zahlman »

mkehrt wrote: post #249
some_random wrote: post #241

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's been a talking point specific to the voting system in the US, strangely no other country seems to think it's an issue and as soon as the topic changes no one in the US has an issue requiring IDs for things.

Voting is a civil right. We need to have a system that allows everyone who is allowed to vote, to vote. Many people don't have IDs and it is an onerous process to get one. Any system that requires IDs for voting suppresses these people's civil rights.

> Many people don't have IDs and it is an onerous process to get one.

I have seen this constantly claimed, and never reasonably evidenced. It's also hard to believe the kind of American exceptionalism that supposedly causes these problems that everyone else can easily solve, despite an environment that is clearly heavily politically invested in solving it (because that also avoids the appearance of racism).

Meanwhile, American proponents of voter ID can readily find people including among the supposedly discriminated-against groups who will testify to the contrary.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#264

Post by beautiful_apple »

dietr1ch wrote: post #103
beautiful_apple wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can have e-voting systems that protect ballot secrecy and are verifiable. You can use homomorphic encryption or mixnets to prove that: 1) all valid votes were counted 2) no invalid votes were added 3) the totals for each candidate is correct And you can do that without providing proof of who any particular voter voted for. A few such systems: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Voting https://www.belenios.org/ A…

> You can have e-voting systems that protect ballot secrecy and are verifiable. In these systems the voter cannot verify that their vote was secret as they cannot understand, and much less verify the voting machine. > And you can do that without providing proof of who any particular voter voted for. Which is good for preventing the sale of votes, but keeps things obscure in a magical and correct box. How can I tell t…

I've worked on some research in this area as well (the experience of people with verifiability systems in real-world elections)

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-43756-4_...

Beyond this paper, based on my experience working with election officials, political candidates, and voters, I would agree that verifiability is not well understood.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#265

Post by dirasieb »

IX-103 wrote: post #248
dirasieb wrote: post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> paper ballots and requiring IDs isn't that racist? i've heard it repeated but i'm not so sure

Depends on what qualifies as an ID and how hard it is to get one. But unless you're actively providing them to people that need them with no extra work or travel on their part then you're going to be discriminating against people with less money or time. In the case where disproportionately more poor people are of a certain race then it can be seen as racist (as it affects the population of that race differently). If…

>Depends on what qualifies as an ID

how about the ones accepted by the police when they ask "show me your ID"?

if it's enough to ID you to cops it should be enough to ID you to enter the voting booth, no?

>and how hard it is to get one.

you can get one at the DMV

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#266

Post by zahlman »

IX-103 wrote: post #248
dirasieb wrote: post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> paper ballots and requiring IDs isn't that racist? i've heard it repeated but i'm not so sure

Depends on what qualifies as an ID and how hard it is to get one. But unless you're actively providing them to people that need them with no extra work or travel on their part then you're going to be discriminating against people with less money or time. In the case where disproportionately more poor people are of a certain race then it can be seen as racist (as it affects the population of that race differently). If…

Americans who make this link to racism are welcome to explain why the same argument gets zero traction in Canadian politics, even among the most left-wing parties.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#267

Post by jfengel »

rayiner wrote: post #243
alistairSH wrote: post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This. The process in my precinct is roughly... - Enter queue - A front of queue, show ID of some sort (various accepted) to volunteer - They scratch you from the list and hand you a paper scantron sheet - Go to private booth, fill out scantron - Go to exit, scan ballot (it scans and then drops into a locked box for manual tally later, if necessary) The "easy" ways to vote fraudulently are also easily caught... fake I…

> As noted, the number of fraudulent votes are astonishingly small, given the amount of money spent on proving otherwise How would you even know? The fact that prosecutions for fraudulent voting are rare tells you nothing. Prosecutions for tax evasion are also rare. Does that mean nobody evades taxes? If you have a system that’s insecure, how would you even know when it’s been compromised?

There have been numerous efforts to scrutinize the voting. In 2020 there were 62 lawsuits; none of them succeeded.

Tax evasion is rarely prosecuted because nobody is looking very hard. People looked very, very, very hard for fraud in 2020 and found zilch.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#268

Post by jfengel »

buckle8017 wrote: post #177
jfengel wrote: post #148

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure. And the weak evidence still isn't powerful, because so much effort had to be expended to gain it. If cheating were widespread it would have been detected much more easily. Instead, efforts to clean up the voter rolls never cause people to get caught. But they do cause many legitimate voters to lose the ability to vote.

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Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#270

Post by macintux »

t0mas88 wrote: post #261

While this sounds like it allowed remote voting, it's interesting that some places (e.g. The Netherlands) went back to 100% paper instead of voting machines. That causes counting to take quite some time, with estimates/interim counts in between. I don't understand why voting machines can't just print your vote on a piece of paper behind a plastic window for you to see while also recoding the vote in a database. That…

Voting machines here (Indiana) will print a sheet with your choices, which you can review before feeding it to a counting machine. That way you have a paper trail for recounts, and a sanity check before the vote is cast.
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