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Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
261–270 of 987 posts
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#262I like to think that at least one worker was loafing on a project that was due the next day and there was no way it was going to get done. Their job was riding on it. They got drunk to embrace the doom that faces them, only to wake up with this news. Free to loaf another day!
just his luck
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#263The government official who insisted that commercial AWS/GCP/Azure couldn't possibly be trusted with keeping the information will be keeping their head low for a few days then... "The Interior Ministry explained that while most systems at the Daejeon data center are backed up daily to separate equipment within the same center and to a physically remote backup facility, the G-Drive’s structure did not allow for extern…
Yeah let’s fax all government data to the Trump administration.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#264It's hard to believe this happened. South Korea has tech giants like Samsung, and yet this is how the government runs? Is the US government any better?
Well, Elon has a recent copy of everything at least.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#265[stub for offtopicness]
Someone found the literal HCF instruction.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#266Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agree completely that it's absolute wild to run such a system without backups. But at this point no government should keep critical data on foreign cloud storage.
> no government should keep critical data on foreign cloud storage Primary? No. Back-up? These guys couldn’t provision a back-up for their on-site data. Why do you think it was competently encrypted?
They fucked up, that much is clear but the should not have kept that data on foreign cloud storage regardless. It's not like there are only two choices here.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#267Earlier quoted context omitted.
Any even remotely proper symmetric encryption scheme "can be broken" but only if you have a theoretical adversary with nearly infinite power and time, which is in practice absolutely utterly impossible. I'm sure cryptographers would love to know what makes it possible for you to assume that say AES-256 or AES-512 can be broken in practice for you to include it in your risk assessment.
You’re assuming we don’t get better at building faster computers and decryption techniques. If an adversary gets hold of your encrypted data now, they can just shelf it until cracking becomes eventually possible in a few decades. And as we’re talking about literal state secrets here, they may very well still be valuable by then.
Barring any theoretical breakthroughs, AES can't be broken any time soon even if you turned every atom in the universe into a computer and had them all cracking all the time. There was a paper that does the math.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#268Earlier quoted context omitted.
Any even remotely proper symmetric encryption scheme "can be broken" but only if you have a theoretical adversary with nearly infinite power and time, which is in practice absolutely utterly impossible. I'm sure cryptographers would love to know what makes it possible for you to assume that say AES-256 or AES-512 can be broken in practice for you to include it in your risk assessment.
You’re assuming we don’t get better at building faster computers and decryption techniques. If an adversary gets hold of your encrypted data now, they can just shelf it until cracking becomes eventually possible in a few decades. And as we’re talking about literal state secrets here, they may very well still be valuable by then.
You make an incorrect assumption about my assumptions. Faster computers or decryption techniques will never fundamentally "break" symmetric encryption. There's no discrete logarithm or factorization problem to speed up. Someone might find ways to make for example AES key recovery somewhat faster, but the margin of safety in those cases is still incredibly vast. In the end there's such an unfathomably vast key space to search through.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#269Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can the NSA break the Ed25519 stuff? Like the crypto_box from libsodium?
ed25519 (and ec25519) are generally understood not to be backdoored by the NSA, or weak in any known sense. The lack of a backdoor can be proven by choosing parameters according to straightforward reasons that do not allow the possibility for the chooser to insert a backdoor. The curve25519 parameters have good reasons why they are chosen. By contrast, Dual_EC_DRBG contains two random-looking numbers, which the NSA p…
> but nobody's been able to break it, either.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. It could well be that someone has been able to break it but that they or that organization did not publish.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#270S. Korea has the most backward infosec requirements. It's wild
Having just visited South Korea last year, one thing that sort of caught me off guard was the lack of Google Maps or other major direction system. I wasn’t aware but turns out anything considered “detailed mapping” infrastructure has to be ran stored and on South Korean soil, probably lots of other requirements. So you’re stuck with some shotty local mapping systems that are just bad. There may be a point in time it…
In my experience Open Street Maps was very good there.