Earlier quoted context omitted.
I guess the core of my argument is that SVB's viability and the damage caused by their implosion are separable concerns, and FDIC has rather neatly separated them. Nobody has to take a bath on SVB's bond portfolio; deposits are guaranteed, so they can just be held to maturity; there's no pressure to sell. Meanwhile: SVB's equity is zeroed out, so they've paid the ultimate price for their incompetence.
I think you're assuming here that the HTM accounting means the bonds don't actually lose value if they're held to maturity? That's not the case; it's just arbitrary accounting treatment, and the regulatory decision to permit such accounting is a big part of why the SVB blew up. Accounting rules are supposed to reflect economic reality to some extent, but they obviously don't do so exactly. For example, under FIFO inv…
Interest rates take a random walk from now until maturity.
Under fair-value accounting, the balance sheet value starts at fair-value (obviously), then gyrates, but tends towards face value, and reaches it at maturity, due to time decay of bond premium. As you said yourself, every bond eventually matures in the absence of credit risks and fair-value can't indefinitely diverge from face value.
Under amortized cost basis accounting, the balance sheet value starts at fair-value but then increases every year until maturity, at which point it is also face value.
Surely you acknowledge that these are the same? They both describe the exact same cash flows.