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Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

signal.org

261–270 of 618 posts

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#261

I'm worried that the provided information could be incorrect. For example, that user could have messages waiting to be delivered to himself. In that case, I think signal doesn't know the senders but should still disclose the number of those messages and their size. Signal erases that kind of information but I'm pretty sure that user must have had some messages delivered to them while signal was processing the subpoen…

It seems theoretically possible for signal to not know the original sender nor the final recipient e.g. if they use their central servers as a tor middleman (I forget the real node type name)

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#262

Beautiful. That's how you do it. I actually believe that law enforcement has the legal right to subpoena information, with a judge's consent, while investigating criminal activity. This is exactly the solution to that problem. These platforms should want to know as little about you as possible.

No the solution is functioning government. Government can tomorrow make encryption illegal. Why does everyone think the solution is technical when it's a cultural problem? The government has big guns and will use them to enforce the law.

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#263

While I applaud Signal's response I expect this entire event (subpoena and response) will be provided as one of the exhibits to congress by the Department of Justice to justify their request that it be unlawful to provide such services. The DoJ will say, "See, here is this horrible crime we are investigating and because this company chose to make it impossible for law enforcement, with a warrant and a subpoena to get…

"Do you have no other way of investigating these criminals?"

"Could you not put an officer out to surveille them?",

Your argument kind of falls on itself there --> We can surveil them in person, but not digitally?

Why?

I think the tech crowd has this wrong.

The issue - as you have indicated - is not 'By What Means To Surveil'.

The issues are: Legitimacy, Proportionality, Oversight.

Messages, tech, sign language, in person, phones or messaging pigeons, the issue remains the same:

Is there a legitimate reason for access?

Is the intervention proportional to the probability of cause, the ostensible crime, the risk to other citizens and the public good?

Is there authoritative Judicial oversight of the surveillance, and, is there sufficient Congressional oversight of the legality of the program?

Those are the questions.

Should police be able to tap Signal (or anything else) for data on anyone they want, for whatever they want, willy nilly without a Warrant or oversight?

Definitely not.

Should Apple be scanning content for crimes?

Probably not, but that's slightly more complicated.

Should the police be able to access the Signal messages of someone they apprehended at a murder scene wherein other suspects fled the scene, and are therefore likely the suspects accomplices?

Likely yes. Or at lest, most people would agree with it both in the pragmatic sense, and also the Constitutional sense.

Should the FBI be able to, with special permission of a Federal Judge, watch all cell tower transactions in 5x5 mile grid grid, while there's a literal manhunt on for literal terrorists during a literal state of emergency?

Probably yes again, it's hard because the proportionality and tactics are rare and unique.

The technology is a secondary issue.

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#264
post #236

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I mean I do. EFF, Wikimedia, ACLU (Only EFF is really for this particular issue though)

I stopped supporting the ACLU when they started doing this: Fighting against due process: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/see-you-court-aclu-sues... claiming there's no men: https://twitter.com/ACLU/status/1196877415810813955 and this: https://twitter.com/ACLU/status/1199725066302308354 Telling families to discuss pronouns: https://twitter.com/ACLU/status/1250795126584217602 and this: https://twitter.com/ACLU/st…

From the descriptions you gave, I did not expect most of those links to end up being "The ACLU harmlessly addresses a trans issue in passing."

I think there's an argument to be made for the ACLU becoming increasingly performative, with catchy Twitter slogans edging out the real work, but this isn't it.

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#265

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You’re attacking a straw man. I never proposed anything other than recognizing the cost of encryption. And if you are to honestly do so, then you also need to recognize things happen now digitally that would have been in person before, which ends up leaving clues like witnesses and DNA. The world isn’t black and white.

>You’re attacking a straw man. I never proposed anything other than recognizing the cost of encryption. I assume you're referring to this sentence in my comment: What you seem to be advocating is that everyone's privacy should be forfeited so police can get information without doing, you know, police work. Note that I said seem . Which, in this context, means that's what I understood you to be saying. Thank you for c…

Actually the word 'attack' comes from the expression that gave rise to the logical fallacy 'attacking a straw man.' [1]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#266

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Would you name some please? Do you mean like ACLU (BCCLA in Canada)

The ACLU is not what it once was. I will not donate to them. Even the EFF is growing questionable. I would definitely be curious what recommendations people have.

I am out of the loop on this one. What has the ACLU become today, and why is the EFF growing questionable?

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#267

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Spying programs and laws will only worsen unless people really voice their concerns and elect the right people. I very much suspect that who is elected has nearly zero effect on spying programs.

This is definitely not true. Dianne Feinstein for instance has been instrumental in almost all of these efforts. As a senator from California, she could be replaced with someone nearly politically identical that didn't support government surveillance.

who you are before you get elected and after are not the same. never forget that.

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#268
If we're talking about pure messaging here and not sending a jpg or other attachment, why not create an app that simply uses plaintext, like a terminal. Generate some 4096 bit keys and make it decentralised. Public keys could be shared among people willing to communicate. Anytime you have a central location where data is parsed, the time stamps and other metadata can be gleaned. The app could even fudge time stamps. I think the future of this is decentralised communications. At the centre of this entire issue is the notion that someone else think they have the right to intercept your communications. I believe a properly-implemted SSH plain text app using big keys would solve this to a point. The app could store all data in a self-encrypted file and self destruct if tampered with. Security is a process, not a product, as Bruce Schneier is famous for saying, so methinks that the process is as important as the product. SSH using massive keys is a proven thing and cracking 4096 bits of AES will not happen in the short or mid term. In fact, most serious cryptographers say the continents will shift before they can break it. Just a thought. I'm not a programmer outside of Bash/sed/awk and other *nix tools, so this isn't something I could develop, but as a decentralised tool, I think it could work if you were willing to use plain text only. The app could have random numbers as a beacon that can be changed at will and only those with that random number can communicate with you and you them. A la Google Authenticator or something similar.

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#269

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you use a passcode, they police cannot force you to unlock your phone: https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2019/08/can-police-force-...

>If you use a passcode, they police cannot force you to unlock your phone: And that's a good thing.

But it negates the GP who says the police can just pull it from the phone.

Re: Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Central District of California

#270

While I applaud Signal's response I expect this entire event (subpoena and response) will be provided as one of the exhibits to congress by the Department of Justice to justify their request that it be unlawful to provide such services. The DoJ will say, "See, here is this horrible crime we are investigating and because this company chose to make it impossible for law enforcement, with a warrant and a subpoena to get…

This is why there should not be a single entity that runs the network.

Make it fully decentralized with economic incentives for node operators.

some projects trying to do this now are Status, Session, Sylo

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