People act like Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem is all about how formal systems are limited in their level of “insight about truth”. But actually it’s just the same observation as the Halting Problem: you have a system that tries to reason about the behavior of other systems (like Turing Machines or axiomatic set theory), but it can’t possibly always introspect about its own behavior because you can also configure it…
Because of the halting issue you cannot summarise reality into a set of axioms and rules. Which is the original purpose of mathematics. Therefore you cannot say mathematics is right or true without adding at the end: "this actually could all be wrong".
The predicate HaltaType>[anExpression] is true if and only
if anExpression of type aType halts.
The predicate Halt is inferentially undecidable, that is, it
is not the case that for every expression anExpression of type aType that
|- HaltaType>[anExpression] or |- ~HaltaType>[anExpression].
Inferential undecidability does not mean that mathematics
is wrong.
Of course, it is possible to have incorrect
mathematical proofs, such as the incorrect proof in
[Gödel 1931] for the inferential undecidability of Russell's
Principia Mathematica. (There is a correct proof here: