Earlier quoted context omitted.
The general idea was that pilots would correctly recognize large amounts of undesired and uncommanded trim being runaway trim and perform the checklist to resolve that issue that they are expected to know by memory, since there is a need to execute it fast, without paging through the Quick Reference Handbook. This is not a checklist that was introduced with the 737 MAX, but one that has existed since the introduction…
I just want to say thank you for you great replies throughout this thread. There is too much simplification of this incident everywhere in the media, and even in technical circles to "Boeing put out a horrible design because of cost cutting that killed people". These are things I've tried to explain, but you put it much more eloquently.
This is wrong, it is unethical to approach engineering a system like this. In investigating these crashes, all the failures that lead up to the accident must be identified, all of the possible solutions must be explored. Sometimes its an easy fix, sometimes like United 173 we have to change the whole culture inside the cockpit to fix the problem (Cockpit Resource Management). Sometimes the solution wont show up until years later, so accidents from decades prior are used to formulate solutions to problems that had not been solvable until the right technology, either hard mechanical technology like hydraulic fuses, or physiological technology like CRM, comes along.
I feel like this attitude that there's only one thing to fix every time something goes wrong is why we see colossal fuckups in the software and infosec industries and I think that needs to change. System failures require systematic solutions, not just some quick fix or patch.