My mathematical logic is rusty, but if I recall correctly, Gödel's incompleteness theorem basically states that it is impossible to solve this kind of question. No matter how many tests you run, there will always be an uncertainty. An incredibly stupid example is that the rule could be "yes for strictly increasing, OR if one of the numbers is -18273192783127897981." You'll never know. I understand this is contrived,…
This has nothing to do with Gödel's incompleteness theorem. It's much simpler than that: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wittgenstein_on_Rules_and_Priv...
From the article
... It is perfectly consistent with your previous use of
'plus' that you actually meant it to mean the 'quus'
function, ...
That may be true, but only if you assume I'm not referring to the plus derived from the axioms of principa mathematica. I am. Is it then the question that when I refer to the principa mathematica that I'm actually referring to principa quus? If I then describe axiom 1 can you not know my words are referring to axiom quus?It seems the only power of this assertion is that language provides no absolute common ground.
Am I understanding this correctly?