251–260 of 405 posts
See the public phab ticket: https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T419143 In short, a Wikimedia Foundation account was doing some sort of test which involved loading a large number of user scripts. They decided to just start loading random user scripts, instead of creating some just for this test. The user who ran this test is a Staff Security Engineer at WMF, and naturally they decided to do this test under their highly…
See the public phab ticket: https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T419143 In short, a Wikimedia Foundation account was doing some sort of test which involved loading a large number of user scripts. They decided to just start loading random user scripts, instead of creating some just for this test. The user who ran this test is a Staff Security Engineer at WMF, and naturally they decided to do this test under their highly…
This is a pretty egregious failure for a staff security engineer
See the public phab ticket: https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T419143 In short, a Wikimedia Foundation account was doing some sort of test which involved loading a large number of user scripts. They decided to just start loading random user scripts, instead of creating some just for this test. The user who ran this test is a Staff Security Engineer at WMF, and naturally they decided to do this test under their highly…
"Claude> Yes, you're absolutely right! I'm sorry!"
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why would anyone test in production???!!!
Selecting the wrong environment in your test setup by mistake? I refuse to believe that someone on the security team intentionally tested random user scripts in production on purpose.
Do I have a bridge to sell you, oh boy
See the public phab ticket: https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T419143 In short, a Wikimedia Foundation account was doing some sort of test which involved loading a large number of user scripts. They decided to just start loading random user scripts, instead of creating some just for this test. The user who ran this test is a Staff Security Engineer at WMF, and naturally they decided to do this test under their highly…
Didn't realise this was some historic evil script and not some active attacker who could change tack at any moment. That makes the fix pretty easy. Write a regex to detect the evil script, and revert every page to a historic version without the script.
I agree, mostly, but I'm also really glad I don't have to put out this fire. Cheering them on from the sidelines, though!
Wow. This worm is fascinating. It seems to do the following: - Inject itself into the MediaWiki:Common.js page to persist globally, and into the User:Common.js page to do the same as a fallback - Uses jQuery to hide UI elements that would reveal the infection - Vandalizes 20 random articles with a 5000px wide image and another XSS script from basemetrika.ru - If an admin is infected, it will use the Special:Nuke page…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Didn't realise this was some historic evil script and not some active attacker who could change tack at any moment. That makes the fix pretty easy. Write a regex to detect the evil script, and revert every page to a historic version without the script.
Letting ancient evil code run? Have we learned nothing from A Fire Upon the Deep ?!
This library wasn't a living creature, or even possessed of automation (which here might mean something more, far more, than human)."