The EU could be scanning your chats by October 2025

That is true for scanning in the cloud, but it's important not to conflate this with client-side scanning. The distinction between cloud and local processing is foundational. Collapsing that boundary would mark a serious shift in how surveillance infrastructure operates.

> Once they receive the files they review them and confirm that the files meet the standard for the database, document its entry, create a hash and add that to the database. After that the file is destroyed.

That is already a structural problem: If the original is destroyed, how can independent parties verify that database entries still correspond to the intended legal and ethical scope? This makes meaningful oversight functionally impossible.

Even if centralizing control in a state-funded NGO were considered acceptable (which is already questionable), locating that NGO in the US (subject to US law and politics!) is a serious issue. Why should, say, the local devices of German citizens be scanned against a hash list maintained under US jurisdiction?

> So it's possible to submit an image that is not what CSAM is intended for, but the chances of it even remotely getting into the database is next to nothing. To add to this service providers can be sued for submitting invalid files.

Procedural safeguards are good, but they don't solve the underlying problem: the entire system hinges on policy decisions that can change. A single legislative change is all it takes to expand the list’s scope. The current process may seem narrow today, but it offers no guarantees about tomorrow.

We’ve seen this pattern countless times: surveillance powers are introduced under the pretext of targeting only the most heinous crimes, but once established, they’re gradually repurposed for a wide range of far less serious offenses. It is the default playbook.

Helps who? It absolutely helps to call out the hypocrisy and consequences. This is what you wanted. Enjoy it.

> I am vehemently against chat control, but at least in my country (Netherlands) I saw nothing beyond the pale re: covid measures given the situation. I also don't see how those measures, regardless of whether you agree with them, reflect on chat control, as I'm not aware of any covid measures targeting encryption, nor of any EU-level measures you might be referring to here.

You're willfully ignorant of the authoritarianism perpetrated, then.

- They imprisoned you in your home. - They disallowed movement beyond certain ranges. - They censored free speech and sometimes even legally punished or imprisoned people for speech. You would refer to it as "dangerous misinformation" but that is what every authoritarian government says when they're oppressing their populace. - they blamed different political or ethnic groups of the "spread of the disease". - they destroyed the concept of informed consent from the Nuremberg trials and coerced people under threat of job loss/house loss/family separation to get new vaccines (extremely questionable ones, to add insult to injury). - Questioning the vaccines in any way was censored and equated with the worst of offenses. - invasion of privacy and constitutional rights of all kinds were justified in the name of "stopping the crisis". - there was no perceived end and many legal frameworks stayed.

> you care to elucidate?

Hope you hace fun with the above. I could go for ages.

> Regardless by equating the two I think you alienate people

Oh my sweet summer child. You think I care about alienating people who wanted to send the "evil spreaders of disease" and "fredumb" lovers to camps?

I'm absolutely over you and the likes of you. You either come to the side of anti authoritarianism fully and do a full mea culpa or I'll just laugh while loudly saying "this is what you wanted".

> because as far as I can tell most people are still brodly understanding of COVID measures taken and the core demographic that's not is also generally in favor of Chat Control

I don't quite parse the last part but I can assure you that people who were manipulated to give away their rights during COVID can be coerced or manipulated to give whatever next right they're asked. You'll scream about terrorism, the evil right, the evil foreign country, the evil criminal or whatever and that's that.

Get shocked and push for freedom for all or just take it because it's what you asked for. Nanny government. No dissent.

The posturing about supposed expertise adds nothing. If you want to make an argument, make it. Vague appeals to technical depth are just noise.

> The client puts a flag on a match. It is [...] verified on the server [...] The current system just checks everything.

Sure, that’s how the flagging process works. It’s also beside the point. Listing technical details doesn’t change the core issue: this system performs scanning on the user device, which is what makes it problematic.

> If the client doesn't flag a file, it can never be decrypted on the server by anyone except the device owner. [...] If your device never talks to the cloud in both scenarios nothing happens.

Correct, but not relevant here. No one is arguing that airgapped devices leak information. The issue is what happens when devices are online.

> [On the structural problem of inability of independent oversight] They can verify it by the chain of custody and documentation that is stored about that hash.

What specific documentation would allow actual evaluation? And who can access it? The process is opaque by design: The list of neural hashes is private, matching and flagging happen silently, and escalation logic like threshold levels or safety voucher generation is not open to inspection. Whatever theoretical accountability might exist, it’s irrelevant in a system of systematic secrecy that cannot be independently observed or audited.

> CSAM is a UN protocol [...] countries [...] work with NCMEC on ensuring the CSAM hashes are correct. Germany is also one of the strictest countries in relation to CSAM.

Yes, Germany has police and ofc works to fight CSAM. That doesn’t change the concern: the system design is extensible and unverifiable. If a U.S. administration wanted to expand the scope (say, for terrorism, extremism, drugs, or IP enforcement), who exactly stops them? Not a German agency. Certainly not NCMEC.

> [On the obvious loophole of policy change] If the US government did do that. - It would first be challenged in the courts.

That is... optimistic. What legal mechanism exactly would allow a challenge to a (as an example) classified National Security Letter expanding the hash set? What court has even the standing to hear that? What precedent makes you believe such a challenge would surface in time?

> - They would not be able to hide the fact they have changed it.

Why not? The hashes are not reversible. The list is not public. The matches are not auditable. Gag orders are legal. What in this system ensures visibility or accountability?

> - This would lead to service providers not assisting with the corrupted CSAM. - As this is a worldwide initiative the rest of the world can just disconnect the US from the CSAM until what is put in is confirmed.

The Apple proposal is not a worldwide initiative, but a US-driven proposal involving a handful of US orgs. EU involvement in the whole issue has been comparatively lacking and is often dependent on US lobbying and funding. The idea that the world could or would opt out assumes a degree of transparency and technical independence that simply does not exist on this planet right now.

If you want to argue that the system is technically robust against political misuse, then please do. If there are decent guardrails in place, I'd really truly do like to know about them. But so far, it mostly reads like a wish list.