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LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

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Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#251

Post by whymarrh »

racl101 wrote: post #236

This is why I never liked that 1Password started moving to cloud based, subscription model. I hate that they try so hard to hide the standalone version for which you just paid a fixed price. That's the only way that I still use 1Password. Yes, there's not much redundancy or convenience without the cloud, especially if your computer's hard drive becomes damaged, but if I lose my master password at least it's on me.

1Password's cloud offering architecture has a few important distinctions from other offerings. Namely the use of a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) and a "Secret Key" that is never transmitted to 1Password servers. [1, 2] If you ultimately trust the app for local vaults, there's a case for extending that trust to the cloud offering.

[1]: https://blog.1password.com/what-the-secret-key-does/

[2]: https://old.reddit.com/r/1Password/comments/rp8t02/security_...

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#252

Post by gruez »

foxfluff wrote: post #246
ksec wrote: post #231

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes that is what is so weird about the whole thing. 1. If LastPass has been compromised, the scale of these attack would have been tens of thousands times higher. But it isn't. And I think it is reasonable to trust and assume Lastpass does not hold the masterpassword, as they have stated. 2. If it was browser extension, and clipboard sniffing, the scale would have been higher as well. But it is important to note ther…

> 1. If LastPass has been compromised, the scale of these attack would have been tens of thousands times higher. But it isn't. Wait wait, what do we know about the scale of the attack and how? Even if the attacker had every single LP master password, that says nothing about how much resources they're spending hammering the service.

If the attacker only got a hold of password hashes or something, then it's true that they'll only be crack a limited amount. However, if that were the case you'd expect the people with easy passwords to get hit first, because an attacker would presumably go through the common words in the wordlist before the uncommon words, and finally a brute force search. Doing attacks in this manner would maxitimize the speed at which you gain access to accounts. However, this doesn't seem to be the case? You'd expect all the people with easy passwords "p4ssw0rd" or whatever to fall first, and in great numbers. This doesn't seem to be the case because many people seem to be swearing their passwords were unique/secure.

If the attacker got a hold of the raw passwords, then the speed of compromise could be easily thousands of accounts per hour. Just set up a bunch of TOR clients and bruteforce over that, or pay $10 for a few leaked VPN account credentials.

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#253

Post by tialaramex »

gruez wrote: post #118
vorpalhex wrote: post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because each hardware key is unique, this is not a feature currently available nor likely to become available. Each token from the yubikey is not (readily) linkable to the key itself since the underlying secret is opaque and can't be exported, so tricks like Shamir's aren't readily possible. Yubikeys do solve a lot of use cases very well but that is a downside to them. That is probably still a good tradeoff for most…

>Because each hardware key is unique, this is not a feature currently available nor likely to become available. You don't necessarily have to do it crypto wallet style and have the private key be exportable. Just adding a public key export (on the security token side) and a way to enroll a token by its public key (on the browser/website side) would allow you to enable 2fa without having to make a trip to the safe dep…

For FIDO (and thus WebAuthn, and thus to make this actually practical beyond a toy that only works for some particular Yubico product) the keys are random per enrollment. This is intentional because it means that you can't be tracked, since "your" key on Facebook and "your" key on GitHub are no more related to each other than "my" key on Facebook is to "your" key on GitHub.

Google have apparently some plans to address this problem in the medium term. Adam Langley has written vaguely on this subject before. In the short term, their priority is the trick he wrote about most recently - if your Android phone is enrolled as a Security Key with Google, and it's signed in to Google because it's an Android phone, and you use Chrome on a desktop, which is also signed into Google, the Chrome can use Bluetooth to determine if the phone is physically nearby and if so propose to authenticate your desktop Chrome to a remote web site using the Android phone. Elegant, albeit not suitable for those who fear lock-in.

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#254

Post by gruez »

40four wrote: post #162
benbristow wrote: post #141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To be fair to LastPass/LogMeIn, they're a company handling a lot of valuable information (passwords/form-fill data/card numbers/notes etc.) - and they're one of the biggest out there. You'd expect them to be one of the more targeted companies just because of the 'treasure' they hold - hence the more security breaches.

An “Ask HN” was just trending about this yesterday ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29705957 ). Sounds like a good reason not to trust any third party service with my password database to me. I’ve always taken the route of managing my own local Keepass DB & key files. Sure it’s more cumbersome, but it prevents me from having to decide whether or not to trust some third party vendor or not. I know 100% that I’m…

>I know 100% that I’m in full control and I’ve never put my DB or key file in the cloud. I can sleep sound knowing that whatever password service, or file sharing service, somehow getting compromised, cannot endanger one of my most valuable assets

What's the risk of keeping the keyfile/password on your device(s) but uploading the database to the cloud? Assuming your keyfile has enough entropy (eg. 256 bits), your database is good as useless without the corresponding key file.

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#255

Post by postalrat »

throw10920 wrote: post #108
junon wrote: post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1password has been audited a bazillion times. They're E2EE. They're cheap. Your master passwords aren't stored on their servers. Neither is your key information. The only thing I pay for is the managed hosting, but in theory it's not much different than anything else properly designed (e.g. bitwarden) aside from the obvious things, such as OSS-ness. The only relevant CVEs are relatively mild compared to LastPass. Giv…

> Your master passwords aren't stored on their servers. Neither is your key information. ...and, those are the only things that really matter for an attacker. Encrypted data (assuming reasonably strong encryption) is useless without the key.

Some encrypted data is worthless. Some isn't. Depends on what value it has when down the road the encryption is broken.

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#256

Post by gruez »

foxfluff wrote: post #245
dqv wrote: post #207

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not here to defend LastPass, but there are some rational answers to the questions you're asking, a lot of them having to do with human psychology. First thing's first, and yes I am "victim blaming" when I say this: 60% of users reuse their passwords. [0,1] It's a widespread problem. Maybe that number is lower for a technical site like HN, but I have encountered technical people who do not practice what they preac…

> You can check for a compromised password the same way you check if a password is valid, both without having stored the original password in plaintext. You have a list of known-compromised hashes and see if the hashed password is in that list. That would require them to store password hashes unsalted and using the same hash function & number of rounds as the online dumps of compromised hashes. If that's what's going…

>That would require them to store password hashes unsalted and using the same hash function & number of rounds as the online dumps of compromised hashes.

Even if you don't have the precomputed hashes, you can still bruteforce using a wordlist.

>Password databases are supposed to encrypted, so without the master password they also won't see see the rest of the hashes in the db to see if they reused the master password. So no, they won't know which passwords are compromised unless there are some absolute design disasters going on.

You don't need access to the database to pull this off, just a wordlist obtained from prior dumps/leaks.

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#257

Post by Natfan »

miketery wrote: post #217

A user posted this comment then deleted it. Is this true? If so. JFC. >>> Take this with a grain of salt. LogMeIn, the owners of LastPass, had a Chinese APT group in their servers for years. They only found out because the attackers started launching unoptimised SQL queries that started killing their database cluster. They didn’t have to report this breach, despite being based in Germany where it’s a legal requiremen…

Not saying you're lying, but could you provide a source?

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#258

Post by bshipp »

dylan604 wrote: post #208
lathiat wrote: post #188

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Maybe look at BitWarden

Easy thing to suggest. However, in my experience, as soon as I decide to use a program after researching it, take the time to switch over to it, that company will then switch to a cloud based whatever. Here we are again at the same spot different name. Sometimes the devil you know, you know?

I'm in the same boat. I've used lastpass for years and tried a few alternatives over the time but they fell down when it came to providing access to my "vault" on different systems or architectures. The biggest benefit is lastpass generating and storing random passwords for every site and application without me having to cut and paste a thing, and having it easily accessible.

That said, if their closed-source browser extension is leaking my master password to random websites I'll cut them out of my life tomorrow.

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#259

Post by foxfluff »

gruez wrote: post #252
foxfluff wrote: post #246

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> 1. If LastPass has been compromised, the scale of these attack would have been tens of thousands times higher. But it isn't. Wait wait, what do we know about the scale of the attack and how? Even if the attacker had every single LP master password, that says nothing about how much resources they're spending hammering the service.

If the attacker only got a hold of password hashes or something, then it's true that they'll only be crack a limited amount. However, if that were the case you'd expect the people with easy passwords to get hit first, because an attacker would presumably go through the common words in the wordlist before the uncommon words, and finally a brute force search. Doing attacks in this manner would maxitimize the speed at w…

It's not a given that brute forcing is the strategy the attacker would choose. That might just lead to their Tor & VPN IPs getting quickly blocked, if they aren't already. There are only around 1500 Tor exit nodes and it's trivial to block them. Sometimes trying to stay under the radar might be the smarter choice.

Anyway, we still have no idea what the scale of the attack is or when exactly it started (IIRC someone reported this happening much earlier this month).

Re: LastPass users warned their master passwords are compromised

#260

Post by Latty »

civilized wrote: post #191
Latty wrote: post #174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Inherently less secure than an extension that fills the passwords, as it relies on you checking the URL correctly, while an extension will only fill it when the origin is correct, which means you are less likely to be phished (although a security key is even better for that).

Meh... you're just looking at one threat, and one that isn't remotely likely in my reckoning. I don't think I've ever been phished. It's very easy to spot.

The one that springs to mind was the one that changes the contents of the page while it's in the background to a google log in page—very sophisticated and not something most people were prepared to spot, as people think of following a link as the moment of vulnerability.

Tons of people who are very aware and capable have been phished successfully. If you think it isn't likely, you are likely vulnerable.

"Not very likely" is just obviously not true—phishing is a very common attack, and companies like Google have adopted security keys to protect against it.

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