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Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

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251–260 of 363 posts

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#251
post #238

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does one choose individual photos to not upload?

You store the photos you want to keep private in another app. I'm sure there are lots in the App Store. Still waiting on that citation.

If the default behavior is not to exclude photo rolls from this new feature, I'm not sure where the argument exists. Telling iOS users they should download some app to keep photos private is absurd.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#252
post #126

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would gladly have a mobile phone full of memes that have been modified to match, just for the lulz. I honestly think every meme should be put through just to have "illegal memes"

Illegal memes. Finally. Illegal Pepe will be the crowning jewel of my rare Pepe collection.

Maybe this is how 4chan finally demolishes itself.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#253
post #154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> A hash collision allows you to create material that matches CSAM signatures, without being CSAM. This is not correct. Hash collisions won’t match the visual derivative.

Sorry, this is not even wrong. The visual derivative is just a resized, very-low-resolution version of the uploaded image. "Matching the visual derivative" is completely meaningless. The visual derivative is not matched against anything, and there is no "original" visual derivative to match against. If enough signatures match, Apple employees can decrypt the visual derivatives, and see if these extremely low resoluti…

I just want to be clear if I understand this... many images can result in the same hash, but the hash can and will be reversible into one image? And that image is a low res porn photo derived from the algorithm's guesswork? So once a hash matches they don't check if there was a collision and the photo is completely unrelated, they just see the CG porn? If that's the case then why even look at the derived image?

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#254
post #232

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the realistic danger here is the US Government no longer needs to compel this type of activity. Reference Twitter and Facebook/Instagram voluntarily censorship per mere suggestion of the current administration/power party.

Let's be practical for a minute. What specific image would Apple voluntarily search for on behalf of the US Government? I sincerely can't think of anything.

Images, leaked government files, anti-administration phrases, unflattering memes of the president, statements that contradict the government's current stance, etc.

All things current at social media companies seem willing to censor after suggestion of the administration.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#255

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I believe being downvoted because this is thoroughly covered in the thread. Suggest you read it all again.

I did my best skimming comments the algorithm showed me, including related posts' comments. But man am I bad at reading comprehension. If I miss anything then surely I am willing to be corrected. But so far I don't see comments that show us how to penetrate the four-layer system (local hash check, semantic check by user, on-server hash check, and human reviewer).

Ah ok! Here's the relevant part of the thread for that. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28229832

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#256
post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Before they make it to human review, photos in decrypted vouchers have to pass the CSAM match against a second classifier that Apple keeps to itself. Presumably, if it doesn’t match the same asset, it won’t be passed along. This is explained towards the end of the threat model document that Apple posted to its website. https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Security_Threat_Model...

How...exactly did they train that CSAM classifier? Seeing as that training data would be illegal. I'd be most interested in an answer on that one. They are willing to make that training data set a matter of public record on the first trial, yes? Or are we going to say secret evidence is just fine nowadays? Bloody mathwashing.

honestly asking — why is it illegal?

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#257
Ongoing related threads:

Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’ - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28225706 - Aug 2021 (401 comments)

Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28219068 - Aug 2021 (662 comments)

Convert Apple NeuralHash model for CSAM Detection to ONNX - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28218391 - Aug 2021 (177 comments)

(I just mean related to this particular project. To list the threads related to larger topic would be...too much.)

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#258
post #35

So, what does Apple get out of all this, except negative attention, erosion of their image, possible privacy lawsuits, etc? I just don't understand what Apple's motivation would have been here. Surely this fallout could have been anticipated?

My guess is that internally, they've realized they have a big CP problem on iCloud. That's a huge liability.

I have series doubts about that. CSAM really isn't an issue in the US, culturally and legally.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#259
post #151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What happens if someone leaks or guesses the weights on that "secret" classifier? The whole system is so ridiculous even before considering the amount of shenanigans the FBI could pull by putting in non-CSAM hashes.

Can't they just make a new one and recompute the 2nd secret hash on the whole data set fairly easily? Also, the whole point is that it's fairly easy to create a fake image that collides with one hash, but doing it for 2 is exponentially harder. It's hard to see how you could have an image that collides with both hashes (of the same image mind you).

Two hash models is functionally equivalent to a particular type of one double-sized hash model. So it shouldn't be any harder to recompute against a 2nd hash, if that 2nd hash were public.

Of course, it won't be public (and if it ever became public they'd replace it with a different secret hash).

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#260
post #254

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Let's be practical for a minute. What specific image would Apple voluntarily search for on behalf of the US Government? I sincerely can't think of anything.

Images, leaked government files, anti-administration phrases, unflattering memes of the president, statements that contradict the government's current stance, etc. All things current at social media companies seem willing to censor after suggestion of the administration.

You seriously think Apple would voluntarily search private devices for images which aren't illegal and don't even hint at any action which is illegal?

I don't think you're being serious.

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