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Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

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Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#251

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A less labor-intensive approach would be require CAs to revalidate the 'proof of ownership' basis of issued certificates monthly, and publish a revocation via CRL if the validation times out or fails for 1 month + 1 day. This would further encourage automation of the ecosystem without requiring redeployment in the cases where automated verification passes each month.

Less labour intensive for whom? Anyone using email validation now needs to click a link every month, or their cert goes away. I used to have the unfortunate task of managing a massive SAN cert used for white-label hosting with a bunch of our customer's domains. Getting every single customer to get their tech person to look at the mailbox and click a link was often a multi-month process.

Less labor intensive than requiring validation and deploying a new signed certificate every month.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#252
post #57

With the tightening of certificate trust, demise of self-signed certificates, etc., is there any remaining way to establish a consumer-oriented HTTPS server on a local network? Thinking of things like routers, printers, and self-hosted IoT devices here. Some of the label printers we support at work have simply atrocious workarounds to get them to work, and I'm wondering if it's the manufacturer's fault or if that use…

It’s a glaring security hole, IMHO. I create such devices and the only way I know is self-signed certs, but the browsers complain a lot about that. Ideally there’d be a way to sign .local domains with browsers handling it while letting people know to verify the identity of their local devices/services and that the identity isn’t verified by https like most sites. The issue lies between the browsers and https system.…

How is that different than how self signed certs work now?

My browser warns me, I can accept the warning for that particular certificate, and it warns me again if it changes..

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#253

I'd quite like to see this eventually getting to more like 1 month, maybe 7 days - forcing continuous automated issuance. Ideally, something more like 1 hour - like a JWT - would be nice, but not particularly practical as you need to allow some margin for incorrect local clocks time

OCSP stapling may be what you're looking for. The certificate stays the same, but an additional short-lived signature indicating that it wasn't revoked yet is attached.

Aside from not spamming the CT log and possibly making it easier to offload the generation of the OCSP responses to a more efficient architecture than the one needed to issue certificates, I'm not sure how mandatory OCSP stapling is better than just reissuing the certificate every day/week.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#254
post #192
post #189

It’s disgusting. It’s not up to them to decide how long a certificate should be valid. Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace.

>Especially when they’re so expensive to buy and complicated to replace. Letsencrypt is free and easy to replace (it's automatic, and takes maybe 5 minutes to set up on a new server). EV certificates might be harder, but I've heard good things about certsimple.

>EV certificates might be harder

EV certs are completely worthless (as in they provide no extra value above that provided by regular DV certs) so nobody should care if they're harder to obtain.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#255

Remember the good old time when it was not an almighty cartel of browsers that controlled your internet? This is so an arbitrary decision and so much a pain in the ass. Again, a limited number of people used their corporate interests to decide for the whole world with almost no discussion. The worst is that the "security" argument for this change is quite weak. Yes, we can think that shorter certificates are a little…

“Yes, we can think that shorter certificates are a little bit better to trust for the user, but that should be the choice of the website that you visit.”

I would think the choice on how long to trust a certificate should be on the user, possibly using the hint that the creator of the certificate gave. You wouldn’t trust a certificate from evil-empire.com, no matter its expiration date, would you?

The discussion should be about whether the browser should make that decision on behalf of the user. I’m not sure I’m in favor of that. On the other hand, browsers already do a lot in that domain, for example by their choice of trusted root certificates (and changes to that list)

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#256
post #55
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Will browsers start allowing self signed certificates though?

As long as you first create a root certificate then you can create how many certificates you want.

Assuming non-chained root CAs remain trusted.

I can forsee the browsers eventually treating self-created CAs like they currently treat self-signed certs. if they're not traceable to a trusted root CA then there's no accountability, from a browser perspective, in the event of abuse or breach.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#257
post #180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> How is HTTP harmful when you visit my website about amateur radio? "Unharmful" HTTP sites are used to silently hack people's computers and keep them under observation for months. Every unsecured site contributes their small piece to keep the web unsafe for people who needs it to be safe. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/06/moroccan-...

This is exactly the same as blaming getting shot at a neighbor's BBQ on the neighbor for not hiring private security to deal with the government army specifically attacking you. If your threat model includes nation state attacks you're gonna have problems no matter what. Change your personal behavior accordingly. Don't tell everyone else they need to wear bullet proof vests around the house and hire corporate securit…

You're right, today. But as everything, stuff that starts as very advanced tools only at the disposal of big agencies, with time ends up being reachable for more mundane users, or in this case, criminals.

So, in a way, it's probably just a matter of time that the kind of silent hack depicted in the Amnesty article is used for attacks targeted towards more general victims. I don't look forward to the day that just by reading an unprotected HTTP site is enough to get my phone compromised as part of a widespread scamming effort from someone trying to get credit card details or banking stuff... but it will propbably end up coming if we don't move all together for a more secure WWW.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#258

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the browser correctly explained what you were doing, and warned you that this is an attack unless you are in control of the entire network and the machines on it, I don't see the problem.

What would it say? “You’re connecting to an IoT device that has a worthless certificate. Would you like me to open up a completely pointless AES256 session with it and pretend that you have a secure connection?” Just use HTTP.

HTTP traffic would be unencrypted, so everyone (esp. on Wifi) could record passwords etc. flying around. With HTTPS, you at least need to MITM the connection to do that. If you establish trust in some other way (cert ID printed on the device?), the connection is secure.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#259
post #5

This may be good for security, but it is extra burden for small web developers and individuals. Big players will have cert renewals automated. It's possible and free for small players to use letsencrypt, that still takes some time to set up, manage and maintain over time. Without automation, you've got an annual chore to do or your site goes offline. I think some hosts are already starting to offer free and easy SSL…

Check out Caddy Server. It was only a few days ago when I was still managing my own certs and renewing them with a Cron job. Caddy now acts as my proxy for my various web domains and it handles certs automatically. Like literally you fill out a few lines in the config called a Caddy file and you do Caddy run and it gets the certs itself. And as long as it's running, it renews them automatically.

Giving an Internet-connected program autonomous write-access to system-critical filesystems is not considered good practice in production environments.

Much better to have a separate central cert management system that handles renewals and pushes the certs outwards to the DMZ systems.

Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates

#260

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not a huge fan of it, but, it seems like the way things are going is to simply run a service which is basically a large proxy. Your device connects out with some kind of persistent connection to their central service then requests to your device go to their server, which does AAA and routes to your local device. Fixes the SSL issue, avoids any NAT headaches, enables fully remote access and most importantly for PM…

I think this is the only practical answer, unfortunately. Everything else might possibly be made to work for a personal project, but definitely isn't an option at scale.

The way plex does it works great at scale.

It requires people to care more about "self hosted" than "PM says this will centralize user access and allow us to collect data and better monetize"

I'm not knocking either model. They both work (technically) but you need to understand your market and what works better for them.

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