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Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

sandervenema.ch

251–260 of 350 posts

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#251
post #50

Like a lot of crypto-puritanism it is rather mixed up. He says he recommended Signal because it was easy to use (more consumer friendly I guess) and secure, then says he wouldn't have gone in the direction of making it easier to use and criticises the things that make it user friendly, like using phone numbers instead of usernames. He says he thinks the protocol is secure, then says he doesn't want it to use GCM beca…

I agree overwhelmingly with what you wrote, except that I want to point out that this isn't "crypto-puritanism". It's just hipsterism. The author isn't a cryptographer, and if you asked a panel of 10 cryptographic engineers what messaging system they'd recommend, 9 of them would say "Signal". The 10th wants you to use something else because they're working on an attack for that "something else", and want their paper…

I think these types of posts are also the inevitable result of people overestimating our organizational capacity based on whatever limited success Signal and Signal Protocol have had. It could be that the author imagines me sitting in a glass skyscraper all day, drinking out of champagne flutes, watching over an enormous engineering team as they add support for animated GIF search as an explicit fuck you to people with serious needs.

I invite those who have opinions about Signal to start by getting involved in the project. To my knowledge the author of this blog post has never submitted a PR, issue, or discussion post to any of our repositories or forums. Many of these points are things that we would like to address, and we could use the help. The day to day reality of developing apps like these is a lot of work.

To provide some color on a few of these:

> Dependency on Google Cloud Messaging

To clarify this for casual readers, no data at all is transmitted over GCM. GCM is only used as a push event to tell the Signal Android client to wake up and connect to the Signal server to retrieve messages from the queue if the app isn't in the foreground.

This is pretty fundamentally just how Android works. However, people who want to use Google's OS without any Google services flash custom ROMs onto their devices that are missing this dependency.

I have said many times that I have no problem with supporting these custom ROMs. But I would like someone from that community to submit the PR: "I would consider a clean, well written, and well tested PR for websocket-only support in Signal. I expect it to have high battery consumption and an unreliable user experience, but would be fine with it if it comes with a warning and only runs in the absence of play services."

Nobody has done it.

> Your contact list is not private

First, on Android 6+ you can just disable the contacts permission and everything works (although you obviously won't see your contact names).

However, we also spend a lot of time thinking about this class of problems, as well as metadata in general. Right now things are playing out alright for one specific class of attack:

https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand...

We'd obviously like to do even better. The nice thing about having a centralized service is that we can eventually take steps in this direction. People seem to equate federation with meta-data hiding for reasons I've never totally understood, but I think serious metadata protection is going to require new protocols and new techniques, so we're much more likely to see major progress in centralized rather than distributed environments (in the same way that Signal Protocol is now on over two billion devices, but we're unlikely to ever see even basic large scale email end to end encryption).

> Lack of federation

I've tried to write about why I don't feel like this is going to be a part of our future here: https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/

However, I would love it if someone proved me wrong. The Signal clients and server already support federation, so there shouldn't be any technical hurdles stopping the people who are really into federation from using our software to start their own federated network that demonstrates the viability of their ideas.

If anyone needs help doing that, let me know. I'd be happy to help.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#252
Signal may not transmit any payload via Google Cloud Messaging, but Signal's requirement to run Google Play Services compromises the user's privacy in ways that have nothing to do with Signal. If you run Play Services then you have a device which provides your communications metadata, whereabouts, and device usage habits to Google.

I don't trust Google with this information and don't want to carry such a device, but a handful of friends and family use Signal, so I must choose between easy/secure communication with them, and reducing my exposure to corporate surveillance.

Signal may be "pragmatic" among the current choices (just like the project's decision to use GCM is pragmatic), but OpenWhisperSystems absolutely deserves criticism for:

1. Tying secure communication to running what amounts to Google's spyware on your device

2. Offering no alternative for privacy-conscious users

3. Showing hostility to those trying to introduce such an alternative to the project

I think those dismissing these concerns as "crypto-puritanism" will be on the wrong side of history.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#253
post #115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Plus the complaint about giphy seems to completely miss the point that the more 'random messaging users' Signal attracts the better from a POV of deniability/etc.

Although the masking effect may be useful, my immediate thought was how much extra code and buffer overflows had been added to the client. Android doesn't have any sandbox mechanism like pnacl to contain such code.

The code in question is written in Java, so the type of memory corruption vulnerabilities you're thinking about are not a possibility: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/tree/master...

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#255

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal and Telegram are not the same thing. Telegram has, according to Reuters, been actively compromised by people working for oppressive regimes (Iran, in particular). If you're just using a secure messenger on general principles, it doesn't matter much which one you use. Probably WhatsApp is your best choice. But if you actually need secure messaging, you should be using the safest secure messenger. Since we don't…

I don't think we disagree. If you need secure messaging, go with Signal. I'd agree (with less credentials to back it up compared to people that work in that industry cough ). I said that for me they are basically equivalent. And for now I pick Telegram as the best compromise I'm going to get (still using my mobile number, still a silo, crappy encryption vs usability and cross-platform/multi-device support). You seem…

> If you need secure messaging, go with Signal.

How can Signal be considered secure if Google has the metadata?

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#256

I highly recommend Conversations (disclaimer: I've worked on it in the past, although I'm not a project "member" per say): https://conversations.im/ It's open source, uses a federated, open protocol, and can do multiple types of encryption including OTR and OMEMO (an XMPP wire format that uses the Axolotl ratched devised for signal). It does not do VoIP, so it would just be for chat (although there is a large bounty…

I never understood properly where Conversations app fit in. Is it a Jabber client to aggregate all the IM clients/accounts or is it also a independent highly secured instant messaging app on its own too?

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#257

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think we disagree. If you need secure messaging, go with Signal. I'd agree (with less credentials to back it up compared to people that work in that industry cough ). I said that for me they are basically equivalent. And for now I pick Telegram as the best compromise I'm going to get (still using my mobile number, still a silo, crappy encryption vs usability and cross-platform/multi-device support). You seem…

> If you need secure messaging, go with Signal. How can Signal be considered secure if Google has the metadata?

Google does not have the metadata.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#258

Wire ( http://wire.com ) has worked well on iOS for encrypted text/files/audio/video. Open-source client, no contact sharing neeeded. No phone number needed, you can register with email by using a desktop browser at http://app.wire.com , then logging into the mobile app. Group chat for text only. Timed/ephemeral messages for 1:1 text/files. Feature matrix, https://wire.com/privacy/ . Could use more documentation (e.g…

Timed coming to groups in couple of weeks.

Documentation is also getting a refresh in 2 weeks.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#259
The truth which a lot of Moxie fans don't want to admit is he thinks there is nobody better to be entrusted with this project. I don't think this was ever meant to be a community project -- he just opened some parts so he could pretend it is. Also he is a limelight hogging security diva who always wants to be in the news and have people talk about him. If he allowed others to contribute and be recognised, he worries they might overshadow him.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#260

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If you need secure messaging, go with Signal. How can Signal be considered secure if Google has the metadata?

Google does not have the metadata.

Don't they have your contact list? And isn't there a mobile number associated with the account?

Edit: OK, I get that maybe these are non-issues.

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