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Forced Exposure

groklaw.net

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Re: Forced Exposure

#241

Post by BruceM »

nanoscopic wrote: post #223
JshWright wrote: post #189

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'd love to see PJ publish her public key and encourage people to learn how to use it. That helps, but it doesn't mask the data groups like the NSA are really after (who is talking to who, and when).

I am in the process of developing a new messaging system to address exactly that issue ( anonymous communication where it is unclear who is talking to who ) The way in which it will work is having all users of the system constantly send encrypted streams to each other ( mostly gibberish ). When you want to send a real message you simply replace the encrypted gibberish with some real content. It will implement "onion"…

Check out the mixmaster anonymous remailers:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixmaster_anonymous_remailer

Re: Forced Exposure

#242

Post by lkrubner »

It is almost a cliche at this point, but it is worth remembering Martin Niemöller's words. He made the same mistake that many people are making today: thinking they don't have to worry because they are not the people whom the government is persecuting today. And the unfolding of events taught Martin Niemöller a very painful lesson. In an ideal world, the public would hear his words and learn the lesson without having to repeat all the mistakes of the past.

He wrote:

First they came for the communists, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a communist.

Then they came for the socialists, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a socialist.

Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a trade unionist.

Then they came for me, and there was no one left to speak for me.

Re: Forced Exposure

#243

Post by einhverfr »

VLM wrote: post #212
einhverfr wrote: post #182

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you can use elections for is to extort policies from elected officials. The problem is that means being willing to vote for the greater evil if you don't get the things the country needs and our country is unwilling to enter into that mentality.

I think you're missing the point that the actual important policies are not up for debate and are agreed to by both sides before the two winners are picked for us to vote on. All the electorate gets to decide on is meaningless stuff. Both candidates will always want the elimination of privacy, destruction of the middle class, complete subservience to wall street, etc. The electorate gets to decide on unimportant stuf…

That's why voting is the final act of a series of political actions, and merely should be cast as an up/down "keep this guy" vote without looking too close at the alternatives.

We have to take over the conversation and stop listening to the challenger. The challenger doesn't exist. It is up/down on the incumbent.

Re: Forced Exposure

#244

Post by jdbernard »

logn wrote: post #211

I posted this in response to the American being groped on travel to India, got -3 karma points: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6240211 Now I'm reading this story, in which pj explains her story which was exactly my point from the comment linked above. What's the deal? Anyhow, yes, when the sum of human communication is read by the US government (and other governments and private intel corporations) then it's in…

It was downvoted likely because it was off-topic and added nothing to that discussion.

Re: Forced Exposure

#245

Post by snowwrestler »

lazyjones wrote: post #207
snowwrestler wrote: post #193

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What a joke. Please educate yourself about the history of successful social movements like labor rights, civil rights, environmental protection, etc. The privacy movement has not even begun to begin what is necessary to change the law. For example: can you name the leading organization that works solely on privacy? There isn't one. The issue is only sort-of covered if you add up the partial work of a bunch of differe…

I don't see the necessity to play exactly the same game our political establishment is playing (raising millions, spin-doctoring, bribery) in order to beat the system from within. It may be one way to do it, but it's costly and seems extremely inefficient. Hopefully there are other ways to achieve something. Frankly, I am unsure about your intentions for writing the above post. You insinuate that organizations like t…

My point is that it is, objectively, a gargantuan, costly, and difficult effort to make a significant change to U.S. federal law. Wishing it was easier does not make it so.

My disrepectful tone was not nice and I apologize for that.

I just get so frustrated when I see people who seem unwilling to face that reality. Your comment above read to me like a hopeful programmer saying "I've read a few books and done some coding exercises but none of that seemed to create the next Google." (And yes, I am saying it is that hard to make big changes in the law.)

Re: Forced Exposure

#246

Post by nanoscopic »

BruceM wrote: post #241
nanoscopic wrote: post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am in the process of developing a new messaging system to address exactly that issue ( anonymous communication where it is unclear who is talking to who ) The way in which it will work is having all users of the system constantly send encrypted streams to each other ( mostly gibberish ). When you want to send a real message you simply replace the encrypted gibberish with some real content. It will implement "onion"…

Check out the mixmaster anonymous remailers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixmaster_anonymous_remailer

The problem with this is that it is basically this "server x supposedly receives stuff and then sends stuff on without linking identities A and B".

What if I don't trust server X to really be doing that?

What if the government contacted owner of server X and altered the software not to do that?

The system I am designing keeps anonymity without any need to trust the server. Hence the name. Don't trust anyone.

Re: Forced Exposure

#247

Post by nanoscopic »

avoutthere wrote: post #236
nanoscopic wrote: post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am in the process of developing a new messaging system to address exactly that issue ( anonymous communication where it is unclear who is talking to who ) The way in which it will work is having all users of the system constantly send encrypted streams to each other ( mostly gibberish ). When you want to send a real message you simply replace the encrypted gibberish with some real content. It will implement "onion"…

Anybody building such systems today should have a plan for when (not if) they receive a National Security Letter.

Fuck the NSA.

Dear NSA: I can and will be designing a fully anonymous open source distributed messaging system that is entirely secure even if you tap every line in the world. At the very best, you will be able to accuse people just of running the software. If you don't like this, I'd advise you that your only option is to hire me and/or pay be enough money to become disinterested in finishing the creation of the software.

Re: Forced Exposure

#248

Post by willvarfar »

nanoscopic wrote: post #231
willvarfar wrote: post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Its a subject I keep an eye on, e.g. freenet and off-the-record messaging. I think these systems cannot work :( If you can make a system that is immune to traffic analysis - http://williamedwardscoder.tumblr.com/post/54088903127/onion... is my own blog but I'm about to shoot it down - then you basically have an open router and the spam abuse that implies. Any reasonably anonymous system will collapse under the weight…

Your final statement here is not true. The way in which you keep anonymity with an onion system is as follows: 1. Use a central originating server for onion packet sourcing 2. Make it public who all users are 3. Have onion packet creation contain "token of receipt" for all messages along the chain. 4. Rate limit message origination from users 5. Ban users who refuse to forward encrypted packets at a steady rate 6. On…

How do you rate limit users? Are not originator traffic and pass thru traffic indisquishable, so a receiving peer cannot tell the if a node is just well connected and has a lot of traffic on behalf of others, or is an abuser?

And how to measure forward rates?

Re: Forced Exposure

#249

Post by vtail »

FedRegister wrote: post #159
xradionut wrote: post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you want to use it, you can figure it out. It requires more work than most people care about.

Not in the same way that you can use email though. It is unsafe to use GnuPG on a computer you do not own or trust like a computer at a public library or an Internet cafe. It is, however, possible to register an email address on such a computer and send unencrypted email on that same computer with some precautions and still be fairly sure that the contents will not be connected to you.

What stops you from encrypting the body of the message on you own computer and use USB stick to just copy over an encrypted file?

Re: Forced Exposure

#250

Post by gbog »

bostik wrote: post #187
auggierose wrote: post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That implies you have not read 1984. You should.

Oh, I have. It's just far too long ago, and I had the misfortune of reading a translation. A bad one, at that. So I couldn't place the quote. I just knew it from different context. Much the same way it took me years to find a quote that my gradeschool math teacher used and which had lodged itself firmly in my brain. Namely: "To study and not think is a waste. To think and not study is dangerous." - Confucius

Kudos for this accurate and relevant Confucius quote, it is rare nowadays.

In fact, reading this guy's Analects, you'd find a mine of secular wisdom aphorism that sound obvious but are all the more urgent to remember by the times running.

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