Earlier quoted context omitted.
Usually this is done the other way around - servers verifying client devices using a chip the manufacturer put in them and fully trusts. They can trust it, because it's virtually impossible for you (the user) to modify the behavior of this chip. However, you can't put something in Apple's server. So if you don't trust Apple, this improves the trust by... 0%. Their device says it's been attested. Has it? Who knows? Th…
Usually the attestation systems operate on neither side having everything to compute a result that will match attestation requirements, and thus require that both server-side and client-side secret are involved in attestation process. The big issue with Apple is that their attestation infrastructure is wholly private to them, you can't self-host (Android is a bit similar in that application using Google's attestation…
Under the assumption that Apple is telling the truth about what the server hardware is doing, this could protect against unauthorized modifications to the server software by third parties.
If however, we assume Apple itself is untrustworthy (such as, because the US government secretly ordered them to run a different system image with their spyware installed) then this will not help you at all to detect that.