Earlier quoted context omitted.
That is a non-sequitur. Investigators should have access to accident data regardless of whether the pilots did their job. Root cause analysis isn't the only reason: it would be good for pilots to have this case study, as well as analysis on how systems responded to the abrupt change. Having this data is strictly better than not having it.
Middle ground would be to have full media access for investigators, but a union rep managing a review and redaction process to have anything immaterial to the investigation redacted. This preserves both valuable data and privacy. Checks and balances.
Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
241–250 of 285 posts
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#242Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sounds like a lot of steps and paperwork… steps and paperwork that might easily and regularly get fudged.
The idea is that the system as a whole should be resilient to a certain degree of this, as it will be caught in other places or at least reported at a (hopefully non-fatal) aviation incident that leads to a report and analysis, at which point you backtrack and issue recommendations that actually have clout (like, you can't fly with your plane anywhere in the world if you don't fix this). Of course if the entire indus…
In a normal, healthy situation a company like Boeing should not feel threatened if some problems are exposed from time to time. That is assuming that everybody understand that uncovering these problems is part of the process and is necessary to improve safety and is exactly why and how we have good safety in the first place.
It only becomes a problem when that safety record becomes blemished too much.
I am pretty sure it actually has worked successfully for many decades up until some point, evidenced by consistently improving safety record.
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#243Earlier quoted context omitted.
On one hand I agree with you. On the other hand, if someone recored my whole work day every day I would not be happy. I don't think you would stay at your job of that was a condition of it. There has to be a better solution to this issue.. extended recordings in an emergency, triggers based on conditions, private keys for pilots... IDFK, cause I try not to get involved in engineering that might KILL someone.
> if someone recored my whole work day every day I would not be happy Many people live with this reality every day already. Remote workers with screen sharing software, certs installed so companies can spy on everything you do, retail workers under cameras all day.
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#244Earlier quoted context omitted.
The largest US pilots union opposes it on pilot privacy grounds. (To be clear, I think having an expectation of vocal privacy while you are in charge of an airliner is absurd.)
My wife ridicules me because when we went out to eat, before a multitude of children , I would often say “nobody ever tipped me as a meat clerk when I was working in 45 degrees elbows deep throwing away and scraping rotting meat from the shelves and gutters and then serving ‘fresh shrimp ‘ and organic grass fed filet mignon” when I felt expected to tip 20% for an already over priced meal. As my first boss, meat clerk…
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#245Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not what is at stake here though. CVRs are not intended for improving process like a call-center recorded line. "Both recorders are installed to help reconstruct the events leading to an aircraft accident." [ntsb.gov] This creep of intended-use is exactly why many people oppose surveillance in the first place.
I don't understand. You're saying that the purpose of cockpit voice recorders is not to improve aviation safety via allowing a thorough investigation of accidents? If there is any other purpose, I don't know what it would be.
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#246Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also I’m kinda surprised an airline wouldn’t inspect a newly acquired plane before putting customers in it.
The checklist for that is very different from what the manufacturer would do. It would take a lot of time and therefore be very costly to verify every single bolt, rivet and weld was done correctly.
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#247Earlier quoted context omitted.
On one hand I agree with you. On the other hand, if someone recored my whole work day every day I would not be happy. I don't think you would stay at your job of that was a condition of it. There has to be a better solution to this issue.. extended recordings in an emergency, triggers based on conditions, private keys for pilots... IDFK, cause I try not to get involved in engineering that might KILL someone.
Why not? Do you think other engineers are better suited for such work? I’m just curious, because I personally work on things that could kill people directly or indirectly.
I like the fact that I can say "People may have acted like someone was going to die, but my code never killed any one"... its a preference, I want to know I can have a bad day, fuck up, and not have to carry the weight for my whole life.
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#248Earlier quoted context omitted.
The largest US pilots union opposes it on pilot privacy grounds. (To be clear, I think having an expectation of vocal privacy while you are in charge of an airliner is absurd.)
My wife ridicules me because when we went out to eat, before a multitude of children , I would often say “nobody ever tipped me as a meat clerk when I was working in 45 degrees elbows deep throwing away and scraping rotting meat from the shelves and gutters and then serving ‘fresh shrimp ‘ and organic grass fed filet mignon” when I felt expected to tip 20% for an already over priced meal. As my first boss, meat clerk…
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#249A very thorough preliminary report. I've worked for a long time in quality systems, and this is a perfect example of a systemic failure. They've got work being handed off between Boeing employees and 3rd party contractors with insufficient controls in place to verify that very basic tasks are being performed. I'd be curious to know how many non-conformances they typically see during assembly of a plane and whether ma…
I was speaking with some friends at a Christmas party who work for the Navy - they’ve taken deliveries of planes from Boeing with the same sort of issues that start in the factory. They even went as far as to say the whole lot of planes should’ve been rejected but weren’t. Multiple things not built to spec. The planes they worked on did not share an assembly line with the 737 but another Boeing model…
I didn't follow how that issue evolved.
Re: Alaska Airlines flight 1282 NTSB preliminary report [pdf]
#250Earlier quoted context omitted.
Rumor has it the controls are there, but subvert-able. Apparently, there are two ticketing systems (one for "history of plane," Boeing internal, and one for "day-to-day onsite work," visible by contractors and Boeing management). The work to fix the rivets was logged in the day-to-day, but management and the onsite staff managed to convince themselves that merely opening the plug to fix the vacuum-seal trim did not c…
You might want to cite your source on this, which I'm guessing is the purported insider speaking about same? From the portions of the report that hint at corroboration, > Documents and photos show that to perform the replacement of the damaged rivets, access to the rivets required opening the left MED plug (see figure 15). To open the MED plug, the two vertical movement arrestor bolts and two upper guide track bolts…