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Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

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Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#241
post #201

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary. When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem. The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider…

Axioms are only arbitrary in terms of the logical system they are involved in. If they conflict with other axioms, one of them has to go. So the choice of axioms isn't totally arbitrary, even at the level of logic.

When it's time to take an idealized theory and use it to make predictions about the real world, we first have to check that the axioms match our sense data. If they don't, it's not an applicable theory. That removes another degree of arbitrariness when putting any theory into practice.

"Feeling" good or bad is the bedrock of morality. From the vantage point of the human mind, our entire experience is colored with judgement. e.g. This is net good, that is net bad, etc. There are interesting questions to ask about how that evolved, or why it presents itself in consciousness, but it is first and foremost just a fact about the human experience.

That isn't arbitrary. A human cannot will their experience to stop containing judgements.

So yes, many people have come up with many theories about morality, ethics, and meta-ethics, but we can and should discard any of them that don't have their axioms satisfied by ground truth.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#242
post #201

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary. When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem. The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider…

He’s not saying we have instinctual ethical views. He’s saying we have a biologically determined interpretive framework we use to evaluate ethical questions.

This is what he was talking about when he said we make a leap from scattered data to specific conclusions, and we all do this in a similar way. We all just have different data. However when we have very similar data, such as living in a particular culture, we mostly come to the same conclusions. The interpretive framework sets that reference frame for human ethics.

The comparison to visual systems is apt. Intelligent spiders would have a different biologically determined ethical interpretive framework in the same way that they would have a different visual system.

Within the range set by our biology there is a considerable degree of arbitrariness, for sure. He spells this out clearly at the beginning. He’s not arguing there is no relativism. He’s arguing against the absolute unlimited relativism espoused by Foucault because that’s what he was asked about.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#243
post #205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not stealing, but as I said, stealing from one's friends. Most cultures frown on that.

I can easily imagine a culture where it's only OK to steal from friends. Because a friend would "obviously" be happy for you to have it, but it's not OK to steal from anyone else. Like how it's OK to prank a friend, but not a stranger - but the friend doesn't actually want to be pranked (i.e. the friend does not want to be stolen from).

> I can easily imagine a culture where it's only OK to steal from friends.

It is easy to imagine contexts in which taking something from your friend is morally permissible, because in that context you know the other person won't mind that you've done so. But because they don't mind, it's no longer stealing. Taking becomes stealing when you should reasonably expect the other person to feel hurt by the taking. Hurtfully taking things from your friends is universally immoral in all cultures, but different cultures have different expectations and standards for what kind of taking causes hurt feelings.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#244

Earlier quoted context omitted.

His debate opponents seem to be pretty nasty with him and come out the gate swinging. Why blame him for doing the same?

For me, it's because you expect a mature discussion when it's philosophy and not some immature US-News shouting contest.

Philosophers can be pretty vicious.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#245

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Read Kant. Nah. And either way following such a reasoning would just tell you whether a statement meets a condition defined by an arbitrarily chosen axiomatic system. Whether someone chooses to call that moral or not is still subjective. Look, I can do it right now: bool is_moral(string s){ return false; }

Math is also composed of arbitrarily chosen axiomatic systems, and yet math is still objective. I'm afraid such trivial arguments aren't much challenge to moral realism, which you'd know if you actually bothered to read anything about it.

Yes, but math just seeks to find truths that are internally consistent. is_moral("not murdering people") is objectively true in the exact same sense that mathematical truths are true. Yet this tells us nothing at all about whether not murdering people is moral.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#246

I’m not educated in philosophy, except my interest in natural philosophy, so I may be completely confused here. My sense is that morals are based on values that were instilled in humans in the evolutionary milieu. Half a million years of living as bands of Hunter gatherers. But these values are not completely consistent. For example, we think that stealing from others is wrong, but we also think that not sharing is w…

I don't believe morals have much to do with an inheritance of values, mostly because mankind, from civilization to civilization, has largely kept the same set of basic morality regardless of where they are or what religion they possess. Sure, some things change, but theft, murder, lying, etc... they're pretty universally seen as wrong. And in the instances where they AREN'T seen as inherently wrong, it's usually a cl…

> mankind, from civilization to civilization, has largely kept the same set of basic morality regardless of where they are or what religion they possess

> murder ... pretty universally seen as wrong

I have no idea how you could be even passingly familiar with societies like the Mongols or Aztecs and believe this to be true.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#247

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Second, we do just fine testing mathematical laws by checking for consistency without any tests of the sort you're describing. So is there some axiomatic system that can elucidate moral truths, such as the wrongness of stealing, from first principles? >A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) Quickly skimmed through it, but: awful, just awful. I challenge Bambrough to prove to me that I have two hands…

> So is there some axiomatic system that can elucidate moral truths, such as the wrongness of stealing, from first principles? Read Kant. > Quickly skimmed through it, but: awful, just awful. I challenge Bambrough to prove to me that I have two hands. Clearly you missed the entire thrust of the argument, and Moore's before it.

Ironically I talked about Kant with my son 2 days ago. He literally couldn't get through the first sentence without disagreeing. Kant argues that the only thing that is good in itself is good will. However it is trivial to find ways in which good will leads to bad things, and therefore having good will is not necessarily good at all!

From my son's perspective, the argument did not improve from there.

So people who disagree with you are not necessarily going to be convinced by an appeal to Kant.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#248
post #215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, I can disagree with that, so what can you do then? If you can’t force everyone to agree on the same semantics, you can’t have absolute semantics Of course you are free to believe whatever you want, including absolute semantics, but that is your own personal subjective opinion (even if popular or accepted in the mainstream)

I don't know what "absolute semantics" means. If you mean "objective semantics", then yes that's already objective. If you mean "universal semantics", well there's rarely universal agreement on anything, so I'm not sure why I should find the existence of a few contrarians persuasive.

So you are essentially saying that you can keep your own ideas of “objective semantics” because you can dismiss people who disagree with you

Which means you have a subjective definition of the meaning of “objective semantics”

Objective doesn’t exist

Everyone can assign their own meaning and not agree on what something means

We are doing it right now on this thread

You might say that there is an objective reality or truth regardless of whatever anyone else says, but you can’t prove that

Your whole life experience is subjective, and you can never detach from it, you (nor anyone) can ever have an objective experience of anything

You believing that there is some sort of objective anything is just your own subjective belief

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#249
post #201

I think that the thing that most people don't realize about ethics is the meta-ethical problem that axioms are by definition arbitrary. When we really think about the fact that all of our ethical theories are based on arbitrary axioms, suddenly the teeth to ethics have a deep, serious problem. The only argument we have at that point is that the axioms "feel" correct, and I have no problem with this basis, I consider…

This is really silly and largely a result of our Western desire to turn everything into an impartial science when the experience of life is anything but. Ethics are not arbitrary. If you do violence to me, that causes me suffering. If you have sex with my husband or my wife without my consent, that's gonna cause me suffering. Both of these things are also highly likely to cause you suffering because most people who a…

Well those are very simple scenarios, but very quickly you get to a place where things are not so clear. For example, as soon as you need to compare two sufferings, you find trouble: is it ethical to kill before being killed? is it the same to have your neighbour suffer vs. someone whose suffering is far away and you don't perceive? It it better to have a child suffer, an adult, or an old man? Two people suffering less vs. one people more? Future people vs. current people? What's the relationship of not being alive / not being born / dying, to the avoidance of suffering?

Different people have different ethical opinions, so it is not so clear cut.

Re: Chomsky explains why nobody is a moral relativist

#250
post #164

It's weird to hear Foucault described as "amoral" when he himself claimed to be a moralist [1]. What is meant by moral relativism in this case I think is merely that morals do not come to us handed down by God or Nature as Chomsky claims, but are a constant choice made by people over a potentially infinite range. But to assert that the morals don't come from God is not to say that morals are not valuable or worth hav…

Well, after raping countless boys in N. Africa and helping introduce HIV in the continent, I'd say he's IMmoral. EDIT Add citation: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/4/16/reckoning-with-...

Foucault was working in Tunisia from 1966-1968. HIV is thought to have spread to NYC in '71, and SF in '75 which is where Foucault probably was infected. AIDS was first clinically described in '81, and Foucault died in 1984 from AIDS.
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