Apple's mistake is that they seemingly believe there is pushback because people misunderstand how it works. The reality is more nuanced: People understand exactly how it works, and how it works is that it is turn-key onboard spyware, that Apple pinky-swears isn't being used wrong today . For example if the scope/mission expands (e.g. foreign governments), suddenly you've created a drag-net for whatever "badness" is o…
About that "manual review"... Refer to pages 10 and 11 of the technical paper. >The server then uses the decryption key to decrypt the inner encryption layer and extract the NeuralHash and visual derivatives for the CSAM matches. This "visual derivative" term shows up repeatedly. To me, the implication seems to be that Apple doesn't look at the actual suspected image before deciding whether to proceed with a report.…
In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
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Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#242How long till China asks Apple to scan iPhones of Chinese citizens for pro-democracy files and images? Apple can no longer claim it isn’t possible. How long till Apple gets a secret warrant from the FISA courts to scan for a certain file on all US iPhones? Apple can’t claim it isn’t possible. It could be happening now. We wouldn’t know because all we have is a list of hashes.
Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#243Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sometimes the slippery slope is not a fallacy, but the natural consequence of seeking more control. This feature can be horribly misused in the future, for example, to find people who have sent/received/downloaded Tiannanmen pictures, because instant messaging pictures can be automatically added to your albums. You can't trust a feature whose only impediment from being abused in the future is such pinky promise.
Pictures is just a pretense. Step #2 will be URLs of pictures that users send each other using the phone's keyboard. Step #3 will quietly expand the definition of a URL to any keyboard input. At that point, Apple will have a god's eye view into all communications of their users, be it over WhatsApp, Signal, SMS or an online forum. Imagine having a dashboard that shows in realtime with gps coordinates how many text me…
Step back for a second and think about why perhaps falling for the ‘but the children’ trap tells you Apple wants to go in the absurd direction you are pointing. Think about if it makes any sense at all they would want to go that way, think about why they would even let you know and think about how plausible it is for these steps to lead to each other.
Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#244Apple's mistake is that they seemingly believe there is pushback because people misunderstand how it works. The reality is more nuanced: People understand exactly how it works, and how it works is that it is turn-key onboard spyware, that Apple pinky-swears isn't being used wrong today . For example if the scope/mission expands (e.g. foreign governments), suddenly you've created a drag-net for whatever "badness" is o…
> and more than a few are worried about the implications
Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#245Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#246What will happen if this catches someone like Hunter Biden? Hypothetically speaking. Though he's kind of famous on 4chan. Will apple have an exemption list for the elite. Because this could bring down elected governments if its actually applied equally.
There must be tremendous amounts of dirt on most powerful people but it rarely sees the light of day and how it is obtained is never revealed?
Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#247Apple's mistake is that they seemingly believe there is pushback because people misunderstand how it works. The reality is more nuanced: People understand exactly how it works, and how it works is that it is turn-key onboard spyware, that Apple pinky-swears isn't being used wrong today . For example if the scope/mission expands (e.g. foreign governments), suddenly you've created a drag-net for whatever "badness" is o…
About that "manual review"... Refer to pages 10 and 11 of the technical paper. >The server then uses the decryption key to decrypt the inner encryption layer and extract the NeuralHash and visual derivatives for the CSAM matches. This "visual derivative" term shows up repeatedly. To me, the implication seems to be that Apple doesn't look at the actual suspected image before deciding whether to proceed with a report.…
It may be grayscale and resized/normalized in other ways. Only apple knows exactly what it is.
It's only a matter of time until internet trolls find a way to abuse this. The database is stored on user's devices, so someone downloading it and permuting innocuous images enough until they match the database, and then spreading them for funzies via some underhanded method (wallpaper download sites?)... is not too far fetched.
Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#248Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It almost sounds like a feature Apple is building to explicitly support the imprisonment of dissents through tje false planting of child pornography. But you can already do this without these changes - cf the UK police officer currently under investigation for having CP on her phone that someone else sent her and (she claims) never opened. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/aug/02/former-polic...
Once again, "People can already do this" is not a rebuttal or a defense.
Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features
#249Earlier quoted context omitted.
About that "manual review"... Refer to pages 10 and 11 of the technical paper. >The server then uses the decryption key to decrypt the inner encryption layer and extract the NeuralHash and visual derivatives for the CSAM matches. This "visual derivative" term shows up repeatedly. To me, the implication seems to be that Apple doesn't look at the actual suspected image before deciding whether to proceed with a report.…
I don't see any reasonable way here. Either somebody looks at the images - i.e. they have some underpaid poorly trained grunt to look at horrible abuse images which is probably illegal to look at whole day, having about 3 seconds to make a decision on each - or what they're doing is just a sham, "Did the computer say 'it matches'? Yes it did! Review complete, match confirmed!" I don't see any non-horrible way of doin…