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Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

sandervenema.ch

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Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#241

Post by [deleted] »

tptacek wrote: post #237
throwaway101416 wrote: post #234

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am not using Telegram and wouldn't have used it if I was a US journalist working on something potentially dangerous, but I don't think this is a good argument. As long as Telegram isn't compromised by USA-allied countries (Iran is somewhat allied with Russia), it might be a safer choice than Signal for US journalists. The reason is that USA can easily send a letter to Google that would reveal a lot about that perso…

To me, this is madness. I shouldn't have to care what global power my messaging service is aligned with. With Signal, I don't.

[deleted]

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#242

Post by api »

throwaway101416 wrote: post #235
api wrote: post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People need to get the fact that all traffic across the Internet traverses lots of people's systems. There is no difference between it relaying off Google vs Verizon, AT&T, Amazon, OVH, or dozens of other carriers and cloud providers. Like you say that is the point of end to end crypto.

There is a difference, because these people in the middle don't have your contacts and don't have root on your phone.

This is a common problem with nearly all software, especially on phones.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#243

Post by throwaway101416 »

api wrote: post #242
throwaway101416 wrote: post #235

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a difference, because these people in the middle don't have your contacts and don't have root on your phone.

This is a common problem with nearly all software, especially on phones.

A common problem that is mostly solved by other services (like the black phone).

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#244

Post by throwaway101416 »

tptacek wrote: post #237
throwaway101416 wrote: post #234

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am not using Telegram and wouldn't have used it if I was a US journalist working on something potentially dangerous, but I don't think this is a good argument. As long as Telegram isn't compromised by USA-allied countries (Iran is somewhat allied with Russia), it might be a safer choice than Signal for US journalists. The reason is that USA can easily send a letter to Google that would reveal a lot about that perso…

To me, this is madness. I shouldn't have to care what global power my messaging service is aligned with. With Signal, I don't.

With Signal, you clearly do as they send a lot of your information to Google explicitly (like contacts) and Google has root on your phone.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#245

Post by [deleted] »

codedokode wrote: post #212
trimbo wrote: post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is why there is a fingerprint ("Safety Numbers" in Signal), and a warning on every message when that fingerprint changes.

Warning still does not fully prevent the attack. The attacker can still access the account and obtain the data stored at a server (like contact list if it is stored there).

[deleted]

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#246

Post by fao_ »

throwaway101416 wrote: post #221
zigzigzag wrote: post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does it actively avoid anti-mass surveillance methods? There are no metadata obfuscation mechanisms that work at scale against all adversaries. Using GCM is without a doubt a big win for privacy because adversaries that have backbone taps (like your friendly local intelligence agency) just see SSL to google.com which tells them nothing of any use, not even that you use Signal. A big encrypted packet from google.c…

There are such mechanisms. Wire for example, doesn't require you to sign up with a phone number. You don't even have to have a phone. How is it not an obfuscation mechanism that works at scale? Also, what if google has a rogue employee who works for one of the surveillance agencies? Trusting all your private data to an advertising company that has root access on your device in an app that is explicitly built around s…

  Also, what if google has a rogue employee who works for one of the surveillance agencies?
  
  Trusting all your private data to an advertising company that has root access on your
  device in an app that is explicitly built around security and privacy is insane.
In that eventuallity they might be able to keylog or otherwise monitor the activity of applications anyway. I don't see how you can avoid that sort of eventuality aside from tossing the mobile phone and using snail mail and a OTP. Even then there could be someone looking over your shoulder.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#247

Post by bascule »

wtbob wrote: post #92
SapphireSun wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Here's what Moxie said about this issue: https://whispersystems.org/blog/contact-discovery/

And here's my write-up of how a private set-intersection protocol could be used to enable users to securely swap contacts: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11289223 It's a solved problem, but Signal doesn't implement it.

The protocol you describe is a synchronous online protocol where Alice and Bob have to be online at the same time (and if they're doing this at Charlie's behest, so does Charlie). Signal is designed for asynchronous communication where both participants don't have to be online to discover each other or send each other message.

Also, how does this protocol even help? What's the use case? It allows participants to discover mutual contacts, but what then? Do we use Bob as a web-of-trust style introducer? What if Alice doesn't even want to talk to Charlie? Do we do this for all the friends Alice has in common with Bob? Do we do this for all the friends Alice has in common with everyone? Does Charlie initiate the process, only to have it only work if all three of them are online at the same time? Who kicks it off and why, and what would the user experience be?

You end your last post with "So, problem solved" but I'm not sure this protocol even solves any practical problems for the Signal use case, and seems like a mere first step of solving a much more complicated problem of actually trying to turn this into a useful feature with good UX.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#248

Post by throwaway101416 »

fao_ wrote: post #246
throwaway101416 wrote: post #221

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are such mechanisms. Wire for example, doesn't require you to sign up with a phone number. You don't even have to have a phone. How is it not an obfuscation mechanism that works at scale? Also, what if google has a rogue employee who works for one of the surveillance agencies? Trusting all your private data to an advertising company that has root access on your device in an app that is explicitly built around s…

Also, what if google has a rogue employee who works for one of the surveillance agencies? Trusting all your private data to an advertising company that has root access on your device in an app that is explicitly built around security and privacy is insane. In that eventuallity they might be able to keylog or otherwise monitor the activity of applications anyway. I don't see how you can avoid that sort of eventuality…

it would be much harder to implement such monitoring if they don't have root on your device.

There are degrees of difficulty. If you use Signal, you make it more difficult than if you use whatsapp but easier than if you have a rooted phone with open source software.

Also, you make it easier than it has to be with giving away contacts/phone numbers.

Re: Why I won't recommend Signal anymore

#249

Post by upofadown »

hannob wrote: post #203
SamWhited wrote: post #5

I highly recommend Conversations (disclaimer: I've worked on it in the past, although I'm not a project "member" per say): https://conversations.im/ It's open source, uses a federated, open protocol, and can do multiple types of encryption including OTR and OMEMO (an XMPP wire format that uses the Axolotl ratched devised for signal). It does not do VoIP, so it would just be for chat (although there is a large bounty…

I think Conversations is probably getting a lot right, but you also mention its biggest flaw: > do multiple types of encryption including OTR and OMEMO Oh and it can also do something else: no encryption at all. That's the problem with XMPP: The user is faced with three different encryption modes, none of them is the default. There shouldn't be multiple types of optional encryption. There should be one that works and…

In practice you always get TLS. That's really all you need if you trust the server.

Something fairly significant has happened in the world of XMPP recently. You can get real certificates for XMPP servers under your control from letsencrypt. That means that things now work transparently between clients and servers and between servers. As a result, organizations that do things that some governments might not approve of can do transparent encryption simply by setting up a server or servers in places that such governments can not physically get at.

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