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A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

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Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#241

Post by nitrogen »

Steve44 wrote: post #231
bobdole1234 wrote: post #171

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, they want to collect everything to find something to hang you with after the fact. There is way too much volume and noise to find threats in the hurricane of hay flying past to find the needles in real time. But if you have someone specific to start targeting, you can quite easily take their whole life apart and find their friends and make all these connections after the fact. The goal isn't to stop attacks, it's…

It helps them to find people who they were in contact with and so get deeper into their network. If they have a log of all the telephone calls they are then able to run a simple "SELECT * from BigTable WHERE 'badphone' = NumberCalled" and then take the investigation from there. I know that's simplified but gives a highly filtered starting point of people of interest. Another reason not to publicise their successes is…

You don't need all the call records in government hands to get that info. A narrow warrant for the call records of the named suspects would suffice.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#242

Post by mryan »

downandout wrote: post #229
jacquesm wrote: post #228

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't see this scheme working. It would require a whole bunch of sensors and a chunk of local computing power to make a 'kill' decision (or at least, an attempt to immobilize) on an individual in a crowded space based on the reliable detection of bullets fired from a gun. The kill device could be disabled prior to discharging a fire-arm, it could trigger falsely, it could be made to trigger falsely on purpose and i…

It wouldn't require "a bunch of sensors". Anyway, generally you're referring to technical challenges, all of which could be readily solved.

> The only way to deal with any form of mass shooting is to have systems in public places that can automatically detect and disable the shooter within milliseconds of their first shot.

You are proposing that public spaces be fitted with some kind of system that can reliably detect bullets based on their "speed, size, and shape" profile.

How do you propose to do this without using a bunch of sensors?

> and much more to do with governments wanting as much surveillance and control over their populations as possible

Outfitting all public spaces with sound and vision recording/analysis devices seems like the very definition of mass surveillance and control.

> Anyway, generally you're referring to technical challenges, all of which could be readily solved.

Of course, we should not get bogged down in the technical implementation detail, but you can't just brush away these - very valid - technical criticisms of your idea.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#243

Post by throwaway7767 »

Khaine wrote: post #237
pakled_engineer wrote: post #199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They found one of the terrorists phones dumped in a garbage can outside the theatre they attacked, and got the address of their hideout from the messages, so used just regular police work. All these guys were already on watch lists for fighting in Syria and returning just nobody seems to ever watch the watch list.

France has something like 11,500 on the extremist watchlist. I'm not sure its practical to watch and monitor that many people with the staffing levels of French Intelligence without acting like the stasi

That's precisely the point being discussed. The "collect it all!" mentality of the intelligence agencies just increases the size of the haystack and does not actually result in stopping these incidents, as they are now spread too thin.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#244

Post by derf_ »

nitrogen wrote: post #240
downandout wrote: post #229

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It wouldn't require "a bunch of sensors". Anyway, generally you're referring to technical challenges, all of which could be readily solved.

How would you detect a moving bullet unambiguously?

This is basically a solved problem for supersonic ammunition (not fired from a silenced weapon): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boomerang_%28countermeasure%29 (not to suggest in any way that the proposal is practical on a wide scale).

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#245

Post by criddell »

throwaway7767 wrote: post #243
Khaine wrote: post #237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

France has something like 11,500 on the extremist watchlist. I'm not sure its practical to watch and monitor that many people with the staffing levels of French Intelligence without acting like the stasi

That's precisely the point being discussed. The "collect it all!" mentality of the intelligence agencies just increases the size of the haystack and does not actually result in stopping these incidents, as they are now spread too thin.

> does not actually result in stopping these incidents

My point was that collecting it all isn't necessarily about stopping incidents, it's about instantly knowing everything about a terrorist once they are identified through other means. There's certainly value there and the debate is whether or not the cost is too high.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#246

Post by wlesieutre »

mike_hearn wrote: post #235
wlesieutre wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My biggest concern isn't so much that the government could get a warrant with probable cause and intercept a few emails or monitor my web browsing, it's that for all I know (seems pretty likely?) a significant chunk of everything I do online is intercepted and stored forever , encrypted or no. If we allow a ban on secure end-to-end encryption, are we setting ourselves up for a future government to go back and demand…

Just use companies that delete stuff when you ask them to. There's no need for encryption to solve the lifelong-record problem.

Yes but...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Data_Center

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#247

Post by rayiner »

jacquesm wrote: post #216
rayiner wrote: post #201

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What about people who think it's simply unjust when innocent people are killed in the name of some religious/political end? E.g. I know that there is almost no chance that I'll be the victim of gang violence. But that doesn't mean I have to just accept the existence of gang violence in my community.

> What about people who think it's simply unjust when innocent people are killed in the name of some religious/political end? I don't think that you'll find many exceptions to that. > E.g. I know that there is almost no chance that I'll be the victim of gang violence. But that doesn't mean I have to just accept the existence of gang violence in my community. So, as a member of that community you then have the option…

I don't disagree that it's hard to eradicate. But I don't see anyone saying we should just refuse to be scared by gang violence and not try to do anything about it.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#248

Post by Zigurd »

rnovak wrote: post #135
jacquesm wrote: post #101

So, here's my take on all this 'surveillance is good for you'. It more or less proves (to me at least) that the government(s) and the various secret services have absolutely no idea who to monitor specifically. So instead of targeting their operations they want to monitor all of us, just in case something of interest pops out that then allows them to focus their attention. It's a pretty scary thought: just imagine, a…

The only thing that can prove or disprove anything is the abundance of information, which we don't have. We have no idea how many attacks have been prevented (everyone likes to claim this is zero....but they do so without any evidence to support that, as relevant information is surely classified beyond Top Secret). We have only the slightest, tiniest, smallest idea of what the NSA and other intelligence organizations…

> We have no idea how many attacks have been prevented

Yes, we do. We know ALL of the FBI's high profile terrorism cases. Apart from the Tsarnaev brothers, it has been all cases where one or more fools got snared by a provocateur.

So unless you believe that there is a secret system of arrest, a secret court that hears terrorism trials, and secret prisons all operating inside the US, we know exactly how effective mass surveillance of the US population has been in preventing terrorism.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#249

Post by caskance »

Karunamon wrote: post #202
caskance wrote: post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Never heard of Hanlon's razor?

What is the simpler answer that you think I've overlooked? Corruption in government is not exactly a new phenomenon...

I'll take that as a no, since you've clearly confused it with Occam's.

Re: A Back Door to Encryption Won't Stop Terrorists

#250

Post by marcosdumay »

russnewcomer wrote: post #61
marcosdumay wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No idea. Also no idea why the GP isn't being downvoted. Just because some politician claimed that it's tech's people responsibility to fix their flaws, it does not make it true. It's repetitive, but the police did have all the information they needed to go after such people even before the murdering. What does the GP want? A machine that queries the news from the day after tomorrow? (Because tomorrow won't do - the p…

Clearly I didn't get my point across. If the Paris police had all the information they needed to go after such people, but didn't, that's the technical problem that really needs solved, not an encryption backdoor.

Well, that's not a technical problem.
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