Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure, but that'd be a waste. Part of the reason e.g. Cellebrite is obsessive about not telling people many specifics about their product capabilities outside of NDA is that Apple is quite serious about trying to fix these things, and "we can crack every iPhone before the 14" probably tells them a fair bit about what might have a flaw. Tools like that lose a lot of value if anyone paying enough attention can infer the…
There is a difference in targeted software supply attacks vs. weakening encryption for everyone by introducing a master key. Apple would be required to cooperate by US law, it may never become public either. But as I said, Apple doesn't have to know, or "know". This feature inherently compromises security. Contrary to device encryption, OS update security depends on a single key held by Apple (rather several devOps g…
"We can be legally compelled to give up data we have" and "we thought letting people have custom kernel modules was a bigger threat" are not particularly incompatible with "we design things so we don't have keys to your data we can be compelled to give up" and valuing people's security. (I am not a fan of the latter, to be clear, but there are reasonable reasons you could argue for it.)
But yes, I would probably, at the moment, bet that if the NSA can sign a custom iOS build on consumer hardware, Apple doesn't know about how, both because that's a very hard secret to keep, and because you'd see a massive uptick in people avoiding Apple devices in governments that might be of interest to US intelligence if even a rumor of that got out.