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FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

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Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#231

Putting on my user hat... "OK. Signal has forward secrecy. So messages are gone after I receive them. Great!" Oh, you didn't turn on disappearing messages? Oh, right, then forensic tools like Cellebrite can get them. You have to turn on disappearing messages. The default is off. Oh, you did turn on disappearing messages? We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Turns out Apple was doing that. T…

Use SimpleX if you really want a secure messenger. Endorsed by Whonix, which in endorsed by Snowden.

https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat#Recommendation

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#232

Settings > Notifications > Notification Content > Show: "Name Only" or "No Name or Content" I've had this enabled to prevent sensitive messages from appearing in full whilst showing someone something on my phone, but I guess this is an added benefit as well.

I allway say it: it is the defaults, stupid (paraphrasign).

The Defaults have to be the most sensitive ones.

If you are a supposed super secure app, this should be the default.

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#233
post #147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Making the product worse for everybody because a minority can’t manage their own settings is a terrible strategy.

Do most people keep the notifications disabled for their messaging apps?

Personally, I have multiple messaging apps. I have notifications on for work slack, which is high signal, and I have notifications off for personal discord which is noisy and low priority.

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#234
So Signal is sending the notifications through Apple's ecosystem somehow, presumably to save battery life by not having a persistent connection to Signal's servers? That's what I think happens on Android, too. When I had Lineage years ago, I had a persistent connection to Signal as the notifications didn't come through Google. Unfortunately there was a persistent notification for the persistent connection with no way to remove it.

After these news Signal should ask the users ASAP and on new installs something like:

> Do you want the notifications to pass through Apple (no privacy, better battery) or through Signal itself (better privacy, but less battery life due to the persistent connection to Signal's servers.

It should be as part of the setup wizard, not inside the settings.

Correct me if I've misunderstood something.

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#235

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal should switch the default to being less verbose.

They should also signal your counterparty's security posture. Basically, give you a heads up that the other side has settings that make the system less secure.

I'd prefer the receiving end looks at sender's metadata on the message, and uses that to determine where the line is between recipient-convenience and betrayal.

I suppose you could do both, but "Hey I've got something extra important to send you, but it says need to change your settings first please hurry" seems worse than "sometimes I don't get full notifications on my watch, weird."

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#236

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We build Signal for everyone, and that includes a lot of people who are not as technologically literate as the average tech worker. For a lot of people, they don't even know they dismissed the notification permission prompt, they were just closing boxes. For them, the reminder is helpful and prevents them from experiencing missing notifications. Striking a balance between helping these people and annoying more techno…

Ask frequently but add a "don't ask again" option. Then everyone is happy.

Not really. A portion of users will randomly tap that just to get rid of the question. They don’t read.

The easiest way to experience that yourself is to set your device to a language you barely understand. You’ll find yourself dismissing dialogs just like all those illiterate normies.

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#237

Putting on my user hat... "OK. Signal has forward secrecy. So messages are gone after I receive them. Great!" Oh, you didn't turn on disappearing messages? Oh, right, then forensic tools like Cellebrite can get them. You have to turn on disappearing messages. The default is off. Oh, you did turn on disappearing messages? We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Turns out Apple was doing that. T…

I think one of the main issues is that end-to-end message encryption is a sham as long as backups are not encrypted. I could have good device security, but if the person I'm talking to does not use ADP, iMessage and WhatsApp messages get backed up with only at-rest encryption (I think Signal opts out of standard iOS backups) and possibly the same for backups of the iPhone notification database (which the article suggests as a possibility).

Similarly on Android, WhatsApp suggests unencrypted backups to Google Drive by default.

Putting on my tinfoil hat, I am pretty sure that Google/Apple/Meta have some deal (successor to PRISM) where end-to-end encrypted messaging is tolerated as long as they have defaults that make it possible to access chats anyway. Apple not enabling ADP by default and WhatsApp doing Google Drive backups that are not end-to-end encrypted is the implementation. Since most people just use the defaults, it undermines security of people who care.

It's a 'win-win', the tech companies can wash their hands in innocence, the agencies get access to data, and phone users believe that they are chatting in a secure/private manner.

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#238

So Signal is sending the notifications through Apple's ecosystem somehow, presumably to save battery life by not having a persistent connection to Signal's servers? That's what I think happens on Android, too. When I had Lineage years ago, I had a persistent connection to Signal as the notifications didn't come through Google. Unfortunately there was a persistent notification for the persistent connection with no way…

In my recollection, which may be imperfect:

1. On android if Google Play isn't available (or you install the no Google apk version) it'll use a websocket for notifications. Apple doesn't allow a persistent connection except through their own notification framework.

2. In either case Signal doesn't send message contents through the notification framework (not even encrypted). Once Signal receives a notification the app wakes up and reaches out to the signal service directly for actual encrypted message.

3. Regardless when signal shows the contents of your message in the notification menu of your device your device keeps a record on your device of that message content.

The FBI here didn't get anything from apple, once they had the apple device unlocked they looked at the notification database on the device to get the message contents. This isn't really any different from the fact that if the FBI has your unlocked phone they can read your signal messages. The notable bit is that the notification database retains messages even after the app is deleted.

Re: FBI used iPhone notification data to retrieve deleted Signal messages

#239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My Samsung also keeps a history of notification content. Under Settings->Notifications ->Advanced -> Notification History

However, if this is important to you then you want Signal to stop telling Android to make the notifications. If it doesn't exist nobody will accidentally make it available. Deleting that history is good to know about after the fact, but preferably lets just not create the problem.

I need the notifications though.

But you can set them without content. That actually works with signal because all it sends through Google Firebase is a notification to wake up the app. If you have the content turned on the app basically fills the content in the notification locally. But you can turn that off.

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