231–240 of 797 posts
At some point, someone has to pay for an organisation whose job will be to review the contents of all of these modules.
Maybe one could split the ecosystem into "validated" and "non validated" stacks ? much like we have stable and dev branches ?
The people validating would of course give their own identity to build trust. And so, companies (moral person) should do that.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's not "node" or "Javascript" the problem, it's this convenient packaging model. This is gonna ruffle some feathers, but it's only a matter of time until it'll happen on the Rust ecosystem which loves to depend on a billion subpackages, and it won't be fault of the language itself. The more I think about it, the more I believe that C, C++ or Odin's decision not to have a convenient package manager that fosters a ca…
I've worried about this for a while with Rust packages. The total size of a "big" Rust project's dependency graph is pretty similar to a lot of JS projects. E.g. Tauri, last I checked, introduces about 600 dependencies just on its own. Like another commenter said, I do think it's partially just because dependency management is so easy in Rust compared to e.g. C or C++, but I also suspect that it has to do with the si…
It would be lovely if Python shipped with even more things built in. I’d like cryptography, tabulate/rich, and some more featureful datetime bells and whistles a la arrow. And of course the reason why requests is so popular is that it does actually have a few more things and ergonomic improvements over the builtin HTTP machinery.
Something like a Debian Project model would have been cool: third party projects get adopted into the main software product by a sworn-in project member who who acts as quality control / a release manager. Each piece of software stays up to date but also doesn’t just get its main branch upstreamed directly onto everyone’s laps without a second pair of eyes going over what changed. The downside is it slows everything down, but that’s a side-effect of, or rather a synonym for stability, which is the problem we have with npm. (This looks sort of like what HelixGuard do, in the original article, though I’ve not heard of them before today.)
Serious question: should someone develop new technologies using Node any more? A short time ago, I started a frontend in Astro for a SaaS startup I'm building with a friend. Astro is beautiful. But it's build on Node. And every time I update the versions of my dependencies I feel terrified I am bringing something into my server I don't know about. I just keep reading more and more stories about dangerous npm packages…
It's not "node" or "Javascript" the problem, it's this convenient packaging model. This is gonna ruffle some feathers, but it's only a matter of time until it'll happen on the Rust ecosystem which loves to depend on a billion subpackages, and it won't be fault of the language itself. The more I think about it, the more I believe that C, C++ or Odin's decision not to have a convenient package manager that fosters a ca…
(These are arguably good things in other contexts.)
I guess it's not going to happen...
containerize all the things...Nix, Podman, Docker. It's not a big hassle once you get through the initial steps. Would be good to see projects (like those recently effected) nudging devs to do this via install instructions.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's not "node" or "Javascript" the problem, it's this convenient packaging model. This is gonna ruffle some feathers, but it's only a matter of time until it'll happen on the Rust ecosystem which loves to depend on a billion subpackages, and it won't be fault of the language itself. The more I think about it, the more I believe that C, C++ or Odin's decision not to have a convenient package manager that fosters a ca…
I'm a huge Go proponent but I don't know if I can see much about Go's module system which would really prevent supply-chain attacks in practice. The Go maintainers point [1] at the strong dependency pinning approach, the sumdb system and the module proxy as mitigations, and yes, those are good. However, I can't see what those features do to defend against an attack vector that we have certainly seen elsewhere: projec…
I don’t believe I can do the same with Rust.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's not "node" or "Javascript" the problem, it's this convenient packaging model. This is gonna ruffle some feathers, but it's only a matter of time until it'll happen on the Rust ecosystem which loves to depend on a billion subpackages, and it won't be fault of the language itself. The more I think about it, the more I believe that C, C++ or Odin's decision not to have a convenient package manager that fosters a ca…
While I agree that dependency tree size can be sometimes a problem in Rust, I think it often gets overblown. Sure, having hundreds of dependencies in a "simple" project can be scary, but: 1) No one forces you to use dependencies with large number of transitive dependencies. For example, feel free to use `ureq` instead of `reqwest` pulling the async kitchen sink with it. If you see an unnecessary dependency, you could…
Rust has already had a supply chain attack propagating via build.rs some years ago. It was noticed quickly, so staying pinned to the oldest thing that worked and had no cve pop in cargo audit is a decent strategy. The remaining risk is that some more niche dependency you use is and always has been compromised.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's not "node" or "Javascript" the problem, it's this convenient packaging model. This is gonna ruffle some feathers, but it's only a matter of time until it'll happen on the Rust ecosystem which loves to depend on a billion subpackages, and it won't be fault of the language itself. The more I think about it, the more I believe that C, C++ or Odin's decision not to have a convenient package manager that fosters a ca…
Using C++ daily, whenever I do js/ts are some javascript variant, since I don't use it daily, and update becomes a very complex task. frameworks and deps change APIs very frequently. It's also very confusing (and I think those attack vectors benefit exactly from that), since you have a dependency but the dep itself dependent on another dep version. Building basic CapacitorJS / Svelte app as an example, results many d…
Being incredibly strict with TS compiler and linter helps a bit.
why don't web devs just learn html and css properly, and maybe xslt for the really complex transformations then use vanilla js only when it's truly necessary? instead we've got this absolute mess of bloated, over-engineered junk code and ridiculously complicated module systems.
the issue is not that devs don't know what they are its that they don't pin packages if you run `npm i ramda` it will set this to "ramda": "^0.32.0" (as of comment) that ^ means install any version that is a feature or patch. so when a package is released with malware they bump version 0.32.1 and everyone just installs it on next npm i. pinning your deps "ramda": "0.32.0" completely removes the risk assuming the vers…
I see that as a desirable feature. I don’t want new functionality suddenly popping into my codebase without one of my team intending it.