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A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

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Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#231

Post by naasking »

skissane wrote: post #230
naasking wrote: post #225

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> There's a great philosophy paper making this argument: Schwitzgebel, Eric. “If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious.” Maybe, but this strikes me as a borderline category error, like saying, "If databases can order results, then they are probably sorting algorithms". The argument makes assumptions that consciousness is transitive or "sticky" in some sense, where if a property applies to a par…

> The argument makes assumptions that consciousness is transitive or "sticky" in some sense, where if a property applies to a part of the system it must also apply to some aggregate of those parts. I think the argument is really about substrate-independence. If consciousness is just about functional properties, then why can’t a social collectivity exhibit those functional properties? Many materialists do in fact endo…

I have no problem with substrate-independence, but given substrate independence that doesn't mean the "consciousness" property is transitive in the way needed to claim the US is conscious. You need additional assumptions beyond just materialism and substrate independence.

Computations are mechanistically clear, deterministic and substrate independent, but they still have properties that we use to classify them. Just because some component of a larger computational system has a property (or classification), it does not entail that the larger system has that property (or classification). Consciousness could be like this.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#232

Post by andoando »

ben_w wrote: post #223
andoando wrote: post #218

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you seem to be saying is that the machinary your traditional computer program executes on is capable of executing intelligence. What I said is thst a traditional computer program (say Excel) is not intelligent in itself, as it cannot, itself, without further input from a human, adapt.

> What I said is thst a traditional computer program (say Excel) is not intelligent in itself, as it cannot, itself, without further input from a human, adapt. Excel is as capable of adapting to new input as any AI, and the input need not come from a human specifically: the act of adapting to input is an automatic consequence of being able to perform linear regression. In fact, this is the real value of a spreadsheet…

>Excel is as capable of adapting to new input as any AI, and the input need not come from a human specifically: the act of adapting to input is an automatic consequence of being able to perform linear regression.

I said 'sensory input', as in, "any primary, real world data". Can I just download excel, and without feeding it machine learning algorithms, feed it a bunch of videos or text and have it learn history?

>If "adapting to input" is your test for intelligence, however, it is a test which a thermostat will pass.

Not just adapting to specific input the system is designed for, adapt it to ANY input. A thermostats function will never change on its own without modification, just like excels, or whatever other traditional program.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#233

Post by heyjamesknight »

skissane wrote: post #229
heyjamesknight wrote: post #224

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That would be because I linked the wrong article. The original is here, different journal: https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/jo...

I think this article has the problem that it is addressing an interdisciplinary topic with too much focus on only a single discipline, which can be a sign of lacking sufficient diversity in disciplinary background of peer reviewers. Scott Aaronson’s attempted refutation of IIT - https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 - I think is better in that he actually tries to relate IIT to some of the philosophical literature (e.g.…

I'm not a "believer" in IIT. But I think its an incredible idea and taking the time to really understand what Tononi et al are proposing is a mind-expanding experience. It may not explain consciousness but it does make you think about what things could be a part of it. And any attempt to mathematically formalize cognitive science gets a vote of approval from me.

My personal belief is that consciousness requires dynamic continuity. I don't think an algorithmic system is conscious because it's "cognition" is discrete and the information isn't integrated across frames. I don't have a "why that works"—its just a gut belief.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#234

Post by wat10000 »

heyjamesknight wrote: post #233
skissane wrote: post #229

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this article has the problem that it is addressing an interdisciplinary topic with too much focus on only a single discipline, which can be a sign of lacking sufficient diversity in disciplinary background of peer reviewers. Scott Aaronson’s attempted refutation of IIT - https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799 - I think is better in that he actually tries to relate IIT to some of the philosophical literature (e.g.…

I'm not a "believer" in IIT. But I think its an incredible idea and taking the time to really understand what Tononi et al are proposing is a mind-expanding experience. It may not explain consciousness but it does make you think about what things could be a part of it. And any attempt to mathematically formalize cognitive science gets a vote of approval from me. My personal belief is that consciousness requires dynam…

Funny, I was just thinking in the opposite direction. There's "I think therefore I am," but there isn't really "I thought therefore I was." I know I'm conscious, but I only have the memory of being conscious before, which could be false. Conscious could just be a snapshot, although it certainly doesn't feel like it.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#235

Post by ben_w »

andoando wrote: post #232
ben_w wrote: post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What I said is thst a traditional computer program (say Excel) is not intelligent in itself, as it cannot, itself, without further input from a human, adapt. Excel is as capable of adapting to new input as any AI, and the input need not come from a human specifically: the act of adapting to input is an automatic consequence of being able to perform linear regression. In fact, this is the real value of a spreadsheet…

>Excel is as capable of adapting to new input as any AI, and the input need not come from a human specifically: the act of adapting to input is an automatic consequence of being able to perform linear regression. I said 'sensory input', as in, "any primary, real world data". Can I just download excel, and without feeding it machine learning algorithms, feed it a bunch of videos or text and have it learn history? >If…

> and without feeding it machine learning algorithms

It has some built-in.

Linear regression is a machine learning technique.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#236

Post by skissane »

naasking wrote: post #231
skissane wrote: post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The argument makes assumptions that consciousness is transitive or "sticky" in some sense, where if a property applies to a part of the system it must also apply to some aggregate of those parts. I think the argument is really about substrate-independence. If consciousness is just about functional properties, then why can’t a social collectivity exhibit those functional properties? Many materialists do in fact endo…

I have no problem with substrate-independence, but given substrate independence that doesn't mean the "consciousness" property is transitive in the way needed to claim the US is conscious. You need additional assumptions beyond just materialism and substrate independence. Computations are mechanistically clear, deterministic and substrate independent, but they still have properties that we use to classify them. Just…

Schwitzgebel‘s isn’t assuming any property of consciousness is transitive.

Rather what he is saying is this: given many candidate substrate-independent materialist definitions of consciousness, if the property is true of individual humans and animals, it will true of their social collectivities. But, he says “many”, not “all”-he’s not claiming you can’t define properties of consciousness for which that is false, he’s simply putting the onus on the proponents of the “materialism can explain consciousness” project of explaining in detail how, and justifying such a definition.

Furthermore, he’s not claiming that properties of consciousness are transitive from individual organisms to any arbitrary grouping of them. Rather, he’s pointing to social collectivities such as countries or governments as being so coordinated they sometimes act like they have will of their own emerging from the coordinated wills of their individual members. This isn’t true of arbitrarily defined wholes of which those individuals are part, e.g. the set of all humans (anywhere on earth) whose first name starts with the letter A. You are interpreting his point in terms of part-to-whole transitivity in general, but that’s not the case-the emergent properties of social groups are far more complex than simple part-to-whole transitivity. And it is those emergent properties he points to as evidence they may have a consciousness distinct from those of their individual members

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#237

Post by heyjamesknight »

wat10000 wrote: post #234
heyjamesknight wrote: post #233

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not a "believer" in IIT. But I think its an incredible idea and taking the time to really understand what Tononi et al are proposing is a mind-expanding experience. It may not explain consciousness but it does make you think about what things could be a part of it. And any attempt to mathematically formalize cognitive science gets a vote of approval from me. My personal belief is that consciousness requires dynam…

Funny, I was just thinking in the opposite direction. There's "I think therefore I am," but there isn't really "I thought therefore I was." I know I'm conscious, but I only have the memory of being conscious before, which could be false. Conscious could just be a snapshot, although it certainly doesn't feel like it.

Your brain is still physically continuous and dynamic. ANNs are not, there are distinct frames.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#238

Post by wat10000 »

heyjamesknight wrote: post #237
wat10000 wrote: post #234

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Funny, I was just thinking in the opposite direction. There's "I think therefore I am," but there isn't really "I thought therefore I was." I know I'm conscious, but I only have the memory of being conscious before, which could be false. Conscious could just be a snapshot, although it certainly doesn't feel like it.

Your brain is still physically continuous and dynamic. ANNs are not, there are distinct frames.

I agree this seems like an important difference. It’s just interesting to me that there’s no proof that my consciousness is continuous. I’m going to continue to assume that it is, but it’s unknowable.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#239

Post by Terretta »

jarkami wrote: post #196
vidarh wrote: post #166

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, in fact my ability to draw from memory places I've seen is, if anything, from experience, substantially above average. However, when I draw from memory, my drawings do tend to be more stylized. I can "imagine" what a building looks like, but I can't see it. Even our language makes this hard to describe, and the reason why I didn't realise that this isn't how other people do it, because most of our language for r…

I am largely in the same boat -- I've taken to telling people that I think very well spatially (that is my primary method of thought) but not at all visually. I am much better than most people seem to be when it comes to tasks involving space, direction, and so on -- basically abstractions of reality, not images of it. But if you want me to actually visualize an apple in my head? Yeah, I can't do that at all. Not eve…

This seems similar to how mine works too.

It’s as though the connections among things are dimensional rather than visual. I can “render” blueprints as this thread discussed, or know which way I’m facing deep in an intricate tube station, but am not “picturing” it, it’s just, this is how these things relate in space time. Although I can do the same with exterior architecture (is that an image?) or street corners. I don’t think I’ve ever “seen” anything: picture yourself on a beach, counting sheep, always assumed were metaphorical expressions.

I also feel concepts are dimensional, and can tell if a piece of a concept is missing because where it should be is empty. Think how periodic table of elements worked.

A red ball on a green table maps to billiards in dimensional concept space so I can render that too.

Re: A new proposal for how mind emerges from matter

#240

Post by naasking »

skissane wrote: post #236
naasking wrote: post #231

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have no problem with substrate-independence, but given substrate independence that doesn't mean the "consciousness" property is transitive in the way needed to claim the US is conscious. You need additional assumptions beyond just materialism and substrate independence. Computations are mechanistically clear, deterministic and substrate independent, but they still have properties that we use to classify them. Just…

Schwitzgebel‘s isn’t assuming any property of consciousness is transitive. Rather what he is saying is this: given many candidate substrate-independent materialist definitions of consciousness, if the property is true of individual humans and animals, it will true of their social collectivities. But, he says “many”, not “all”-he’s not claiming you can’t define properties of consciousness for which that is false, he’s…

> Rather, he’s pointing to social collectivities such as countries or governments as being so coordinated they sometimes act like they have will of their own emerging from the coordinated wills of their individual members.

The complexity of this behaviour could be at the level of an amoeba rather than a human mind. It's just not persuasive without knowing more about the specific characteristics of what materialist consciousness requires.

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