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1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

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Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#231
post #141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have a similar conspiracy theory for DDG, the rapper. I used to go to DuckDuckGo by typing "ddg" in Google. Now, it's all mentions to DDG the rapper.

https://duck.com works. Ironically, the domain was given to DDG from Google.

Here is a gift, let's make your brand less searchable.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#232

And this is how whitehats get turned into blackhats and just choose to use this information to perform social engineering or exploit devices.

I've seen this go from -2 points to 2 points, now back to 1. Interesting how people are so divided on this when people I've brought up this topic to all agree that good people often get taken advantage off especially in cases like this.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#233
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"If you won't illustrate the impact of our mistake, we aren't obligated to listen to you" is peak CYA

Not even close to the point I was making: If you want to get taken seriously, write to audience.

"My neighbor said he saw smoke coming from my house, but he never said anything about fire!"

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#234
post #11

A $1.3 billion revenue company being too tight to pay this after all, even on their 2nd chance, is so short-sighted it's absurd. They're putting out a huge sign saying "When you find a vuln, definitely contact all our clients because we won't be giving you a penny!". Incredible. This must be some kind of "damaged ego" or ass-covering, as it's clearly not a rational decision. Edit: Another user here has pointed out th…

> A $1.3 billion revenue company being too tight to pay this after all, even on their 2nd chance, is so short-sighted it's absurd. I'll give an "another side" perspective. My company was much smaller. Out of 10+ "I found a vulnerability" emails I got last year, all were something like mass-produced emails generated based on an automated vulnerability scanning tool. Investigating all of those for "is it really an issu…

https://www.sqlite.org/cves.html provides an interesting perspective. While they thankfully already have a pretty low surface area from overall design/purpose/etc, You can see a decent number of vulns reported that are either 'not their fault' (i.e. wrappers/consumers) or are close enough to the other side of the airtight hatchway (oh, you had access to the database file to modify it in a malicious way, and modified it in a malicious way)[0]

[0] - https://sqlite.org/forum/forumpost/53de8864ba114bf6

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#235
post #200
post #152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Apple and Google weren’t involved as email sender addresses.

Read the repro steps again: > Create an Apple account with support@company.com email and request a verification code, Apple sends verification code from appleid@id.apple.com to support@company.com and Zendesk automatically creates a ticket It's a clever attack.

I agree with your point, but that email's not the best example because it would have passed SPF/DMARC/DKIM. It's a step or two later that involved sending a spoofed email from appleid@id.apple.com :

  const sendmail = require('sendmail')();
  
  // Assuming the ticket you created in step #2 was assigned a ticket ID of #453 
  // verification email landed somewhere near there
  const range = [448, 457];
  for (let i = range[0]; i 

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#236
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you google "Zendesk annual revenue" you will find that perhaps many of those 6000 employees are doing something after all.

Big companies are places where you get kudos for only taking two weeks to solve a problem you’ve solved elsewhere in two days. To an extent it’s Little’s Law. The latency requires more “CPUs” to handle the traffic.

This is super loud to me RN because some of these "big" companies are case studies in Mythical Man Month's "N channels of communication" as well as weird flashbacks to discussions on costs context switching and schedulers in various CS courses.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#237
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Only the customer domain owners can fix the underlying issue, which is a missing SPF/DMARC configuration.

That doesn't sound right. Aren't these @zendesk.com addresses?

No, it's spoofed appleid@id.apple.com addresses. But you are correct that it's not customer SPF/DMARC configuration that's the problem.

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#238
post #154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That doesn't sound right. Aren't these @zendesk.com addresses?

The spoofed addresses were support@company.com, is my understanding. Zendesk is very well aware of SPF/DMARC, from their support pages.

The spoofed address was appleid@id.apple.com . support+id@company.com was the to address, not the from address.

https://gist.github.com/hackermondev/68ec8ed145fcee49d2f5e2b...

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#239
>Personally, I’ve always found it surprising that these massive companies, worth billions, rely on third-party tools like Zendesk instead of building their own in-house ticketing systems.

Ah, yes, why do laymen always think this?

I mean, I get it, Krupp and mining towns used to be a thing, so it is possible.

But every big company should build a ticketing system? Why not an email solution, OS, network routers too?

Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor

#240
post #200

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Read the repro steps again: > Create an Apple account with support@company.com email and request a verification code, Apple sends verification code from appleid@id.apple.com to support@company.com and Zendesk automatically creates a ticket It's a clever attack.

I agree with your point, but that email's not the best example because it would have passed SPF/DMARC/DKIM. It's a step or two later that involved sending a spoofed email from appleid@id.apple.com : const sendmail = require('sendmail')(); // Assuming the ticket you created in step #2 was assigned a ticket ID of #453 // verification email landed somewhere near there const range = [448, 457]; for (let i = range[0]; i

This is exactly my point: if Apple has SPF/DKIM/DMARC configured correctly, then Zendesk should be validating the email sender. That they didn't is technically an SPF/DKIM/DMARC issue - a bug in Zendesk - but it is not a customer misconfiguration issue.
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