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The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

warontherocks.com

231–240 of 282 posts

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#231
post #209

Earlier quoted context omitted.

IF the APS system (Trophy or Arena) could hit the sabot in time, yes, it would diminish its penetration capability substantially. Whether it can react fast enough to do so is doubtful. 3500mph projectiles are tough to counter. There have been plans to try to deflect it via armor so the tip gets shattered and the energy dissipated, but I'm not sure how effective that is with current armor tech.

The US latency target for APS from detection to engagement is tens of milliseconds. That is good enough for just about everything except sabot from short range.

Latency target says it all. Hard kill of sabot munitions just isn't currently feasible.

Plus, while adding layers of protection to armor (or ships and planes) is a useful endeavor, the maxim of shooting the archer, not the arrow is a better strategy. There's a point of diminishing returns when you layer so much on a vehicle instead of dealing with threats using an entire system (Artillery/Infantry/ECM/ECCM/Air Support).

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#232
post #63

The tank isn't dead because armies still need the capabilities the tank gives them. You need a long range direct fire weapon, capable of engaging armoured targets and infantry (canister or airburst rounds), with rapid engagement of multiple targets, low time to target, rapid reloads and follow up shots, and high survivability. Lighter wheeled gun armed vehicles can be cheaper, but they don't have the survivability. T…

But, this doesn’t address his points from the end of the article about cheap drone swarm attacks on the top side of tanks.

The main reason cheap drones are effective is because they come from fast-moving consumer product lines instead of the slow-moving monolithic military industrial complex side.

There is nothing fundamentally indefensible about drone swarms, the complex just hasn't had enough time to react. You can bet that, if it doesn't already exist in secret somewhere in the US, there are many teams actively working on tank-mounted drone laser defense systems.

I suspect that drones have been hard to target until now because they have a unique air signature far different from all previous air targets, not because they are fundamentally more "invisible" than a Predator or a helicopter. Given their unique shape, movement, noise, and radio profile, a CS grad could certainly cobble together a drone target acquisition system using some consumer-level optic systems combined with a radio antenna, radar, and microphone array.

And as we all know, quadcopter drones are exceedingly fragile and most of their profile is millimeter-thin plastic blades. Once you have the ability target them, you'd only need a moderately powered laser to completely disable them.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#233
post #211

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, because conflicts between superpowers can be easily summed up in a HN post. The point is that modern, competent armies have been preparing to counter the ATGM threat for over half a century.

You can't sum up highly complex topics in one sentence? Shit! ;-) On a more serious note, I would have counted the Russians in the group of competent armies. Maybe they were during the cold war, Afghanistan is not really a good measure. Maybe they were not, no way to ever find out. All being said, I'm happy that we never found out so far. Because one thing is sure, finding out involves turning whatever region is used…

I grew up a military brat, and have studied this shit for years. While I never thought the Russians (or Soviets) were 10ft tall, I never in a million years thought they would be this utterly incompetent. I have some Estonian friends who were concerned about Russia steamrolling them before NATO could really respond (they joke that Russia considers Estonia a suburb of St. Petersburg). And I always empathized with them. No strategic depth, minimal forces, ethnic Russians in the Baltics who could be used by Putin as a casus belli. And NATO seemed sclerotic and weak.

Now? I think that NATO could easily handle almost anything Russia could throw at it, short of nukes.

It really is amazing how poorly they've performed. And the BTG concept has been utterly disproven as a brittle, unsustainable force.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#234
post #6

Perun https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mUyAPQEb01Q Chieftain https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8 Bernard https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPth_xqBXGY Extreme summary, blame me if I missed something obviously important - unsupported tanks will die to infantry or artillery and have done so since shortly after the inception of the tank. Tanks are actually pretty cheap compared to replacing a human, it costs quite…

Not sure I agree the $8.9M cost of an M1 Abrams is 'cheap' And you don't just have the cost of the tank - there's also the cost of all the logistics needed to get the tank to the battlefield, no matter where it is in the world - and then to feed it a constant supply of fuel, ammo, spare parts and repair.

War is terrible for people. I want to state that because sometimes people fixate on technical systems.

Tanks are expensive, missiles that can defeat tanks are cheap. But the question is, what is a replacement good for a tank? What fills the role? What is the role?

Does it take a platoon to replace a tank?

The lifetime value of a human is only going up. Most soldiers go on to take jobs and contribute to the economy of a nation.

You could think of a tank saving the lives of the 3 people inside it, or the lives of the 10 or 20 people it would take to fill the role if the tank was not available. You could think of the days, hours, or minutes of fighting it might save, which might translate to many more lives saved.

Also consider the political cost of loss of life.

I don't think it is AT ALL clear how to evaluate the relative costs here. One would have to consider the mission at hand and the value of that mission.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#235
post #6

Perun https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mUyAPQEb01Q Chieftain https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7T650RTT8 Bernard https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPth_xqBXGY Extreme summary, blame me if I missed something obviously important - unsupported tanks will die to infantry or artillery and have done so since shortly after the inception of the tank. Tanks are actually pretty cheap compared to replacing a human, it costs quite…

Not sure I agree the $8.9M cost of an M1 Abrams is 'cheap' And you don't just have the cost of the tank - there's also the cost of all the logistics needed to get the tank to the battlefield, no matter where it is in the world - and then to feed it a constant supply of fuel, ammo, spare parts and repair.

Now I'm really curious what the cost of a modern U.S. soldier is. Recruitment and acquisition, training, outfitting, salary, food, etc. And if you build a tank once then you can park it in a warehouse nearly in perpetuity, whereas I expect humans require much more upkeep to retain skills and replace from turnover.

I'm guessing the total lifetime cost of a trained soldier is less than $8.9M but I wouldn't be suprised to find that the figures are comparable in the end.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#236
post #214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Price tag is a small part of it. Have you ever humped a combat load? It sucks. You’re rolling out with 40 lbs of stuff hanging off you before we even talk sustainment. Javelin has gotta be 40-50 lbs. Add that on. Want an extra missile? Add another 30 or so. Now suppose you don’t run into any armor, this is why every infantryman doesn’t/won’t carry one. Maybe 1 per squad, if we want to be super aggressive maybe 1 per…

Most of the weight is in the missiles themselves at 35 lbs (15.9kg) the targeting unit is only 14 lbs (6.4kg). So for defensive scenarios or preset ambushes the missiles could be brought in via vehicle and prestaged. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-148_Javelin

Not to go in circles here, so the ultimate point here is same as the article: there have and will continue to be a threat / counter threat environment and will continue to evolve.

What we are witnessing from Russia is not how armor should be employed. Armor is not suddenly obsoleted due to tech that’s been out for decades. That take is probably overly simplistic and wrong.

By the way, I’m a big proponent of FD2030.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#237
post #218
post #207

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's no "sabot style." It's either a sabot, or a HEAT round. A sabot is typically a depleted uranium dart with no warhead at all.

Oh, then clearly I was mistaken. Take your upvote!

I also should have been clearer, there are other options. The Brits like this idea of HESH. This works against both tank armor (though less than APFSDS rounds) and fortifications alike. This way the tanks can carry just one type of armor instead o f having to manage a mix. HESH has persisted because the Brits like rifled barrels, and doing a sabot round with a rifled barrel has proven quite difficult.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#238
post #229
post #221

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The horizon is hundreds of miles away at altitude. You have to consider that visual range includes optical enhancement (telephoto lens etc.)

IRST can help, but it's like viewing the world through a straw. It works best when cued by other systems. I'm unaware of any telephoto systems in use since the F-14 was retired (obviously excluding the few airframes Iran might still be using). Unaided pilot vision is unlikely to spot a target at 22 miles without some type of guidance.

True overall, (although don't discount the effect of a pair of binoculars in the cockpit) but in this case we're talking about intercepting a radar target for visual confirmation. If you have a radar track, by definition you would have the type of guidance you need to put other sensors on target.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#239
post #140
post #63

The tank isn't dead because armies still need the capabilities the tank gives them. You need a long range direct fire weapon, capable of engaging armoured targets and infantry (canister or airburst rounds), with rapid engagement of multiple targets, low time to target, rapid reloads and follow up shots, and high survivability. Lighter wheeled gun armed vehicles can be cheaper, but they don't have the survivability. T…

What we're seeing is that low cost precision guided munitions can engage tanks from beyond their direct fire range. Within direct fire range they can be engaged by even lower cost munitions fielded by light infantry and light vehicles. The tank also suffers from requiring large amounts of fuel, making supply line strikes more dangerous to armored advances. The first point is the big one, the future of ground forces m…

Then the drone swarm meets this and one or the other survives: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pb5_F4_Eod8 (As an aside, it always fascinates me that arms manufacturers not only create ads and brochures but that they're often done rather well.)

A lot of the breathless enthusiasm for drones seems premature. SAMs didn't make aircraft obsolete, air to ground missiles from aircraft and helicopters didn't make tanks and other vehicles obsolete, and there's doesn't seem to be any reason to believe that adjustments won't be made by the various militaries to provide protection against drones.

Re: The tank is dead: Long live the javelin, the switchblade, the ... ?

#240
post #225

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The article you linked makes it sound like sensor and rocketry failures on some platforms that were retired 15 years ago, nothing to do with a general fear of BVR missile use. Also I believe the willingness to engage unidentified radar tracks has more to do with the nature of the conflict. I doubt the same restraint would be shown in a war against a near peer foe.

The point was not the zero kills, the point is that the US navy decided to use them in only two occasions. In the case of the US involved conflicts it was working with allies and fighters lacking modern IFF that made the likelihood of friendly fire or collateral losses unacceptable to them. It's a matter of acceptable risks. The AIM-54 was designed with a world war III in mind, employed in the middle of the ocean in…

As a counter example, the US has continued to use the BVR AIM-120 even after accidentally shooting down one of their own helicopters in an IFF failure. [1]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIM-120_AMRAAM#United_States_o...

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