Remember the good old time when it was not an almighty cartel of browsers that controlled your internet? This is so an arbitrary decision and so much a pain in the ass. Again, a limited number of people used their corporate interests to decide for the whole world with almost no discussion. The worst is that the "security" argument for this change is quite weak. Yes, we can think that shorter certificates are a little…
Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
231–240 of 375 posts
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#232Earlier quoted context omitted.
Buy a domain, create a subdomain for local use, and issue ACME certs with Let's Encrypt every 60 days. If your vendor device or software doesn't support automated certificate rotation, put nginx/haproxy/envoy in front of it.
This won't work either, btw: You'd have to request from Let's Encrypt a new certificate for each individual device . LE has several rate limits that will prevent that from working for anything more than a trivial number of devices: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/ The only way I see how this would work is if you not just purchase a domain but also an internet-facing server and do the renewal and certificate…
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#233With the tightening of certificate trust, demise of self-signed certificates, etc., is there any remaining way to establish a consumer-oriented HTTPS server on a local network? Thinking of things like routers, printers, and self-hosted IoT devices here. Some of the label printers we support at work have simply atrocious workarounds to get them to work, and I'm wondering if it's the manufacturer's fault or if that use…
It’s a glaring security hole, IMHO. I create such devices and the only way I know is self-signed certs, but the browsers complain a lot about that. Ideally there’d be a way to sign .local domains with browsers handling it while letting people know to verify the identity of their local devices/services and that the identity isn’t verified by https like most sites. The issue lies between the browsers and https system.…
Asking the end user to accept downgraded security is a huge security antipattern.
Also, if I’m operating an evil wifi AP at a coffee shop and I intercept your web request for bankofamerica.com with a redirect to bankofamerica.local, would HSTS prevent the redirect? Or could I then serve you a bad cert and trick you into accepting it?
Also, what sokoloff said makes a lot of sense. Encryption without authentication is worthless, and that cert chain only works in so far as someone at the top vouches for someone’s identity. If that’s your print server, then you are the one vouching for its identity. It makes more sense for you to be the certificate authority and just build your own cert chain.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#234Earlier quoted context omitted.
It’s a glaring security hole, IMHO. I create such devices and the only way I know is self-signed certs, but the browsers complain a lot about that. Ideally there’d be a way to sign .local domains with browsers handling it while letting people know to verify the identity of their local devices/services and that the identity isn’t verified by https like most sites. The issue lies between the browsers and https system.…
Why do you need to use self-signed certs? (As contrasted with CA-signed certs that happen to be signed by a CA that you own and trust as suggested by arwineap?) It took my a little over an hour one evening to figure out how to create my own CA, trust it, and sign certs for all my local devices (except my UniFi cloud controller which I admit I gave up on due to time).
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#235Earlier quoted context omitted.
I admit, that's a solution, even if a very unpleasant one: Installing a custom root CA is intentionally complicated, so this is hardly doable as an onboarding experience. The setup must be repreated for every single client device that should access the server. There remains the question how I would get the CA certificate onto client devices in the first place. Lastly, with asking consumers to install a CA certificate…
> Lastly, with asking consumers to install a CA certificate, I ask for a significantly more powerful permission than if I could just have them trust my certificate. CA certificates can be constrained. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#236Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's no cert because there's no need for one in the first place. Mentioning that is pretty silly - it's obvious that there's nothing wrong with a static site with now cert, and no one is arguing against that.
> there's nothing wrong with a static site with no cert Not really. Google says "switch to HTTPS or lose ranking": https://webmasters.googleblog.com/2014/08/https-as-ranking-s...
I disagree with "switch to HTTPS or lose ranking", but that's an HTTP vs. HTTPS issue with Google's search ranking, not about Chromium or Mozilla. This article is about Chromium & Mozilla making stricter rules for HTTPS certificates. That's not a bad thing, to hold HTTPS sites to a better standard.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#237Earlier quoted context omitted.
Without buying a domain. (and continously spending money to keep it owned)
There’s always the .local TLD, which is reserved for this use case: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/.local
This document specifies that the DNS top-level domain ".local." is a special domain with special semantics, namely that any fully qualified name ending in ".local." is link-local, and names within this domain are meaningful only on the link where they originate. [...] Any DNS query for a name ending with ".local." MUST be sent to the mDNS IPv4 link-local multicast address 224.0.0.251 (or its IPv6 equivalent FF02::FB).
I'd recommend using something like .lan instead.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#238With the tightening of certificate trust, demise of self-signed certificates, etc., is there any remaining way to establish a consumer-oriented HTTPS server on a local network? Thinking of things like routers, printers, and self-hosted IoT devices here. Some of the label printers we support at work have simply atrocious workarounds to get them to work, and I'm wondering if it's the manufacturer's fault or if that use…
Do self-signed certs not work? Yes, you have to tell your browser to permanently accept them the first time you connect, but after that, they work.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#239Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're describing a completely different attack vector, which is the entire point - to push attackers to different attacks. if we eliminate HTTP, we can focus more effort on the attacks you're describing. Regardless of the content, hijacking is a danger to users.
It's worrisome that you injected yourself into the conversation between me and my users. How is this any of your business?
And are you blocking all Web traffic except from people who your users, somehow? If not, then everyone is your user.
Re: Chromium and Mozilla to enforce 1 year validity for TLS certificates
#240Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're describing a completely different attack vector, which is the entire point - to push attackers to different attacks. if we eliminate HTTP, we can focus more effort on the attacks you're describing. Regardless of the content, hijacking is a danger to users.
It's worrisome that you injected yourself into the conversation between me and my users. How is this any of your business?
It isn't my business so I've done nothing to reach out to your users or interfere in your website. We're having a discussion about technology on a technical forum.
It is the browser developers' business though since they are tasked with protecting users from these specific threats.