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Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

blog.mozilla.org

231–240 of 777 posts

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#231

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So I should block outgoing TLS requests to be able to stop DoH? Seems a bad idea.... At least with DNS I could run a local DNS server and block outgoing port 53 from anything else. Now I no longer have this option and each app gets to look up what it wants, when it wants. Sure, it's great that my ISP cannot see what's in these requests but nor can I! And it also means that any application (eg. any Google product) can…

Don't put devices on your network if you don't want to give them network access. And don't block technologies and protocols that help people protect themselves just because they also help devices protect themselves from you MITMing their connections. If you want to run a device reverse-engineering lab you have more work to do to break the security of a device. Also remember that if you can break the security of a dev…

> Don't run devices on your network you don't trust.

Oh, is that all?

How about I trust the devices until a secretary clicks on a (spear)phishing link that runs a zero-day. Then what? The host is compromised so I can no longer trust any end-device monitoring software on it, and now the network traffic is opaque.

And that doesn't even get into things like academia where students and visiting researchers bring devices of unknown providence. If if they're on DMZed networks, they could be spewing garbage onto the Internet and getting my CIDR range blacklisted.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#232
post #61

Questions I couldn’t find answers to in the post or linked info about the Trusted Resolver Program: What’s in it for the Cloudflare & NextDNS? Are they getting paid to handle this traffic or paying to have the opportunity to access this data? Can users outside the US opt-in? The comment about having “no plans” to enable this outside the USA seems a bit disingenuous. Hard to believe they built this program / feature a…

> The comment about having “no plans” to enable this outside the USA seems a bit disingenuous The comment actually very clearly says "we do not have plans to roll out the feature in Europe or other regions at this time ". Also I have mixed feelings about this. On one hand yeah, encryption is great and someone sitting between me and my ISP will no longer be able to monitor my DNS queries. On the other hand I don't fee…

Why? If you know how to run your own pihole, you know how to turn off DoH? You're not being forced into this, a default setting is getting flipped and you're entirely free to go "no thanks" and flip it back, so if you trust whoever owns the IP that you're using as real, unencrypted DNS server, then just keep using that. Same as for folks who want to keep using unencrypted emails "because encrypted mail isn't fully encrypted anyway and just makes things harder".

As tech changes, solutions change, but at least for the foreseeable future your DNS intercept will keep working just fine until everyone switches over to DoH and stops offering an opt-out.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#234

As a resident of a country whose government and ISPs heavily and habitually censor the Internet for political reasons, I for one truly appreciate Firefox's DoH. They should also enable 'network.security.esni.enabled' by default because the censors here have upgraded from DNS to SNI-based blocking. I get it that better solutions are possible, but got to teach people to first walk before teaching them to run. AFAIK, Ch…

I'm surprised that they wouldn't block the DNS providers in your country though?

Just 2-3 years ago, normal DNS to CloudFlare or Google DNS were enough to bypass my ISP's DNS redirection. Then those got disabled and while I switched to DoH, many others switched to paid VPNs. Now they've moved up to SNI blocking. They may catch on to the trend and block DoH IPs too if DoH becomes popular.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#235

Why are people so down on DNS over HTTPS? DNS is the primary way governments control and spy on web access.

The problem I have with DNS over HTTPS is that it's something implemented in the browser, that ignores the DNS configuration of your PC and your local network. That has some implication, for example you are unable to access local hosts on your network by their hostname (for example https://fileserver). Also you have a solution that works only on one program, while the rest of the system DNS requests remain unencrypted, that is bad.

Browsers shouldn't implement DNS theirself, and should use operating system APIs to do all the DNS queries. That is how networks work, and doing that differently creates problems (imagine if every program has its implementation of DNS over HTTPS, you have to configure correctly the DNS server in each of them, and good luck debugging it when one implementation is broken...)

As a technical motivation, HTTPS in an high level protocol, and using it for DNS is kind an overhead. We already have DNS over TLS that is a standadized protocol, that can be used, and that the operating systems are starting to implement.

I use DNS over TLS in my local network, but rather than having configured all the computers to use it I have configured a local DNS server that encrypts the requests, for every host in the network, and also filters trackers and ad servers. Thus I don't want Firefox to mess aroung with my local network configuration that is fine.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

DoH can be blocked by IP addresses, DNS canary and probably SNI, while DoT by IP addresses and port number. So "DoT is DoH with a kill switch." is again nonsense.

Virtually every router on the Internet has the built-in capability to block DoT with a single configuration change, but you can attempt to create a blacklist of DoH resolvers to try to stop that, so they're totally equivalent. That's the argument you've got.

Not quite.

Nothing prevents Google or Cloudflare to run DoH on the same IPs as their user-facing services. Unless you are willing to block Search, for example, you might be SOL without TLS-terminating proxy.

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#238

I’m wondering, is the US a phased roll out or is this in light of government mandated censorship in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, etc.?

The last entry at their FAQ posted today indicates that they’re focusing on US-only and does not commit to worldwide plans. (But it’s also buried in an image where I can’t copy-paste, ugh.) Link to that FAQ:

https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2020/02/25/the-facts-mozi...

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Don't put devices on your network if you don't want to give them network access. And don't block technologies and protocols that help people protect themselves just because they also help devices protect themselves from you MITMing their connections. If you want to run a device reverse-engineering lab you have more work to do to break the security of a device. Also remember that if you can break the security of a dev…

> Don't run devices on your network you don't trust. Oh, is that all? How about I trust the devices until a secretary clicks on a (spear)phishing link that runs a zero-day. Then what? The host is compromised so I can no longer trust any end-device monitoring software on it, and now the network traffic is opaque. And that doesn't even get into things like academia where students and visiting researchers bring devices…

So you're counting on malware's continued use of plaintext DNS as part of your network's security strategy?

Re: Mozilla’s DNS over HTTPs

#240

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So I should block outgoing TLS requests to be able to stop DoH? Seems a bad idea.... At least with DNS I could run a local DNS server and block outgoing port 53 from anything else. Now I no longer have this option and each app gets to look up what it wants, when it wants. Sure, it's great that my ISP cannot see what's in these requests but nor can I! And it also means that any application (eg. any Google product) can…

Don't put devices on your network if you don't want to give them network access. And don't block technologies and protocols that help people protect themselves just because they also help devices protect themselves from you MITMing their connections. If you want to run a device reverse-engineering lab you have more work to do to break the security of a device. Also remember that if you can break the security of a dev…

> treat the intermediate network between them and the servers they talk to as hostile

Unfortunately they also treat the user as hostile and untrusted. Your phone, browser, OS, or TV treat you as hostile when they send data to the manufacturer and give you no way of assessing yourself or actually controlling this. We have standards and protocols that ensure the data is kept perfectly secure and inscrutable between your device and the manufacturer but absolutely nothing is put in place to give you any control over this. Your choice is binary: use it or not. Every security decision seems to work out better for those companies than for the user.

In this case both DoH and DoT provide the required security for the users but one of them takes a little bit of control away from them.

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