Reading between the lines on this, it's plainly apparent why there's been repeated attacks on encrpytion by the US government. From this, through RSA's Dual_EC_DRBG, to the present day, it's obvious that the US highly values rigging the deck to aid their decryption, and that the current democratisation of encrpytion protocols is a threat to them. I mean, you only need to read their repeated admissions that without MI…
Putting my tinfoil hat on, after reading the Snowden disclosures I'm convinced that they do have limited means of attacking encrypted communication but they would rather rely on these (expendable) means. Once they lose their crypto vulnerabilities it will force them to be even more overt.
It's time to resurrect the one time pad (not referring here to 2 factor authentication (2FA), I should hope to include 2FA FIDO in a Sneakernetwork standard), but rather the process of generating random data, shared between only two people, for the purpose of the most primitive of systems of encrypted communication. Simplest, but most secure(!!!)
There is a lot of research in this area, and each issue can be addressed (for example, the risk of reuse can be solved in various ways).
What we need is a way to "sneakernetwork" our otp random data to our friends. Like a business card, only where it's a mutual otp between these friends. For most people, 99% of important communications could be handled this way, through only a single contact. Certainly one could easily text for life with a single SDHC card of otp. And an SSD could handle phonecalls. A lifetime of video calls (again, between the two parties) aren't out of reach either.
What we also need is a networking protocol that supports forwarding through the web of trust messages to parties known only at the fringes of one's social network. For example, connections of the 1st degree are sneakernetworked contacts. Like you visit your mother, you share an otp blob. Now, even if your mother is in another country you can never visit, you can always talk to her about politics or religion without any worries about oppressive authorities. But out from there, anyone who is in your mother's 1st degree network can be added to your own 2nd degree network, depending upon her permissions. This kind of p2p interworking.
Before you object that "real" encryption is also needed, I agree, "real" encryption in addition to otp (it needs to be throughout a well-designed sneakernetwork system). But otp is superior, and, if you have to choose, choose otp.
There is no reason why the security of assymmetric encryption should matter to ordinary (or the majority of extraordinary) people.
It might be different for you, but 100% of the people I've had important conversations with have been friends I know from life, family, which I unsurprisingly know from life, and financial institutions of various kinds, which have offices for physical contact.
And I know the very thought of otp makes some people ill. It reminds one of hack jobs. Yet there it is, as factual, the best encryption, perfectly suited to normal people, and with data capacities at the level where it's beyond practical. What we lack is adequate paranoia and vision in the tech community.