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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

krackattacks.com

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Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#231

Post by danilocesar »

twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Where did you find the information that it needs SDR? I couldn't find it in the paper (but I didnt fully read it) or the website.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#232

Post by Gaelan »

haggy wrote: post #158
filomeno wrote: post #150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can (try) to restrict your browsing to HTTPS sites only. But it's very difficult to ensure that all the communications your device is making (background services, vendor apps...) go through that channel.

This issue is two-fold right. You can install plugins that force SSL client side (on the main site and any AJAX calls thereafter) but like you said you have no idea what calls that site is making server side. They could be sending everything you send them over plaintext after the initial TLS secured request. Rough times.

Luckily, the servers past the initial SSL link won’t be using wifi, so at least you won’t be any worse off than before.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#233

Post by drzaiusapelord »

sequence7 wrote: post #102

As an Android user is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor. This really does highlight the absolute disaster zone that the Android handset market has become as far as updates are concerned. I'm sure the Pixels will get a fix relatively quickly but almost every other Android user is going to be left in security limbo.

Ubiquity just released a patch for KRACK and soon others will I imagine. From a client perspective, same as always, wait for a patch from your OS vendor. edit: it seems this patch only handles modes where the AP is a client like a bridge or site-to-site. Its still a client-side fix and patching AP's used traditionally won't fix this.

In practice, everything of value should be going over TLS. If you're worried you should be using a VPN on untrusted networks. This attack, if I'm reading it right, doesn't do anything someone on your wlan or lan can't do right now via ARP poisoning and other attacks. So being on that work connection or restaurant wifi is almost the same risk level of this attack.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#234

Post by sp332 »

Ambroos wrote: post #109
sequence7 wrote: post #102

As an Android user is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor. This really does highlight the absolute disaster zone that the Android handset market has become as far as updates are concerned. I'm sure the Pixels will get a fix relatively quickly but almost every other Android user is going to be left in security limbo.

This is one of those things that should be better with modern handsets and the security patch level for Android. Hopefully a fix for this is included in the November set. In general most bigger manufacturers have been somewhat decent in updating their flagship devices. With a Sony flagship from the last 18 months for example, you usually won't run more than two months behind on security updates. Samsung is similar if…

According to https://char.gd/blog/2017/wifi-has-been-broken-heres-the-com... it will be in the November 6 Android patch level.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#235

Post by cjg_ »

danilocesar wrote: post #164
cjg_ wrote: post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The WPA key is not recovered so it should only affect the unpatched client.

I wasn't even thinking about the key. I was thinking about compromising a device using a targeted tcp hijack. And then using that device to compromise the rest of the network. Long shot tough.

Sure that might be possible, for example to serve some malware to that device. More likely is that a device you allow onto your wifi already have some malware from earlier.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#236

Post by gsnedders »

pfg wrote: post #191
endorphone wrote: post #166

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Nexus 5 was released 4 years ago. At the same time the iPhone 5C was released. The 5C also won't receive a patch for this. There is a problem with handset abandonment, but this is true across all vendors, and it does not underline sequence7's claim that this is solely an Android problem.

To be fair, these two examples are both on the extreme end: The Nexus 5 being one of the longest supported Android phones on the market, and the 5C having a rather short support period, compared to other iPhones like the 5S, which was released along with the 5C and got iOS 11. Security updates for the Nexus 5 also stopped shipping about a year earlier. There's still room for improvement for Apple (5 years of security…

Has anyone ever taken a vendor to court on the basis of consumer rights and not providing security updates and the product therefore not being fit for purpose?

For example, under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in the UK the product must last for as long as a reasonable person would expect it to, and Apple's interpretation of that is five/six years (see https://www.apple.com/uk/legal/statutory-warranty/).

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#237

Post by ibmthrowaway218 »

snerbles wrote: post #180
cm2187 wrote: post #172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Also doesn't it require the attacker to have access to your wifi already? If that's the case, it's a hazard for connecting in a Starbucks or on your mobile service wifi, but you would be safe on your home or corporate wifi (unless the attacker is a colleague or relative!).

Totally safe, until your local war-driver sniffs out your insecure device and comes back at two in the morning to upload illegal content via your ISP.

Except the attack doesn't get you access to their wireless network. It allows you to redirect someone from their wireless network to your own (spoofed) wireless network and then you can snoop the traffic.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#238

Post by makomk »

cm2187 wrote: post #172
twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Also doesn't it require the attacker to have access to your wifi already? If that's the case, it's a hazard for connecting in a Starbucks or on your mobile service wifi, but you would be safe on your home or corporate wifi (unless the attacker is a colleague or relative!).

Nope. The man-in-the-middle attack it uses involves forwarding and replaying encrypted packets without decrypting the contents, so all it requires is that the attacker be within range of your wifi; they don't need any of your keys or passphrases.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#239

Post by Someone1234 »

pfg wrote: post #221
pixl97 wrote: post #208

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Too bad DNS doesn't fall under properly protected against local attacks.

Fortunately, SSL/TLS (with HSTS) does not depend on your local DNS resolver being secure.

HSTS only works if you have visited the site before or it is hard coded (see Chrome and Google services for example).

Reality is that DNS remains and will continue to remain a giant hole in TLS.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#240

Post by bitexploder »

mikehollinger wrote: post #199
twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Special gear isn't all that expensive. From a cursory view of the video and a skim of the paper, they're using hostapd, which means that they simply need a wifi adapter with a sufficiently-good driver. Anything with the RTL8188CUS seems to be pretty nice (that's what I'm using in a raspberry pi project, myself). So - I agree with you that there's a barrier to entry, but it's not that big of a barrier.

Agreed. Not specialized equipment. Just something that lets you shoot raw frames and run as a WiFi AP. I have 2 such USB WiFi dongles in my bag for setting up such environments.

Give: http://www.tp-link.com/us/products/details/cat-5520_TL-WN722... a shot. It will let you setup an AP in a VM easily, etc. It is our currently anointed dongle for VM hosted MiTM setups.

I haven't tested it, but it should work fine if they are just using mods to hostapd.

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