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To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

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Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#231

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've worked as a DRO in the Canadian election. There is no way to steal an election in Canada. Whatever the Balkans have, that isn't what I'm talking about because the way it works in Canada is like this: 1. I take someone's ID, I look them up on the voter list. If they are not on the voter list I take their proof or the sworn testimony of someone that does live in the district that they live where they say they live…

Your system requires the people involved with counting not to lie. Works great in Canada, not so well in Serbia. Aside from that it's literally impossible to obtain a nemid if you don't exist, and, once you cease existing so does your id.

No it doesn't, we have observers from every party. If I lie the press finds out.

False nemids can be created. Prove me wrong.

See the problem? Even if what you are saying is true it is very hard to prove the inverse and just the ability for foreign propaganda to delegitimise a voting process is enough reason to move to a voting system that is impervious to this type of attack.

Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#232

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your system requires the people involved with counting not to lie. Works great in Canada, not so well in Serbia. Aside from that it's literally impossible to obtain a nemid if you don't exist, and, once you cease existing so does your id.

No it doesn't, we have observers from every party. If I lie the press finds out. False nemids can be created. Prove me wrong. See the problem? Even if what you are saying is true it is very hard to prove the inverse and just the ability for foreign propaganda to delegitimise a voting process is enough reason to move to a voting system that is impervious to this type of attack.

This isn't how empirical evidence works. It's a system you know nothing about that has never been compromised, unlike a faked passport. It's impossible to prove you wrong because the burden of evidence is on your table.

What you are asking me to do is impossible because there is no way I can convince you when you've turned your back on facts.

Aside from that, the system you've described which works pefectly fine in Canada is extremely similar to the voting system in Iraq, Russia and Serbia, places where telling on liars obviously isn't hindering elections from being manipulated.

You may be safe right now, but you're protected by the people running your system, not the system itself.

Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#233
post #228
post #227

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not been solved though, at least here in the UK where people are against mandatory ID cards.

That's a separate issue. Why would you want to allow voting without any ID?

It's definitely not a separate issue, it's fundementally linked. Voter registration is separate and not tied to any electronic ID, so you saying it's a solved problem isn't true.

Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#234

Why is it that electronic voting is so vehemently opposed here on HN and by many technologists in general when virtually every other existentially vital system they rely on is run electronically?

It's worse than not working. It's because nobody can ever be sure if it's working or not. Granted what is publicly known, it not working is a very likely outcome, but nobody will ever be able to contest it.

How can any one person be sure that a completely paper based voting system is working fraud-free in a country with hundreds of millions of people?

How can you be sure the financial system you use is working?

>nobody will ever be able to contest it.

See blockchain. If everyone has a copy of the vote registry, then they can contest it if things don't match up.

Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#235

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>For other systems, a disruption is just inconvenient for most people. Like if I can't use my credit card for a day, I don't care Would there not be far more immediate and direct inconvenience if no one could use their credit cards for a day, than if they couldn't vote for a day? (Assuming the following day both systems were back up and running) What is so inconvenient about have to wait an extra day to cast a vote o…

A disruption in voting brings the results into question. So it isn't just a matter of voting the next day, it's a matter of determining whether you have to redo the entire election, and whether you have to do that with different procedures or equipment and whether other jurisdictions have to redo their elections and whether past election are legitimate and on and on.

>it's a matter of determining whether you have to redo the entire election, and whether you have to do that with different procedures or equipment and whether other jurisdictions have to redo their elections and whether past election are legitimate and on and on.

Are you implying that these aren't already pre-existing problems that we haven't witnessed in recent decades?

Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#236

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The point is to do pen&paper elections instead. It's the ultimate "open source" solution since everybody who can hold a crayon in the right direction can participate in the verification of the process.

The problem with pen and paper elections is that they rely on honest counting. It's true that it's easier to manipulate a terrible digital system but that doesn't mean pen and paper is safe. Block chain technology would offer an open record that couldn't be manipulated, something paper does not. I mean, I live in Denmark, one of the least corrupt countries in the world and we've had politicians caught changing votes…

In Minnesota, honest counting is enforced by process. Any ballot handling, whether marked or unmarked, requires the presence of members of at least two different parties. At no point is a single person (or group from just one party) ever left alone with ballots.

We've had two full-on hand recounts at the state level in the past decade or so, and the final results where within a few hundred from the original count in each case, with three million votes cast. Good process solves a lot of problems.

Re: To Protect Voting, Use Open-Source Software

#237
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're primarily worried about attacks which can modify the result of elections, your threat model is broken.

What should you be primarily worried about? It's like serving your e-commerce website over HTTP because there have been very few security breaches. Why not get a certificate and use HTTPS? It's a massive improvement in security for a very small cost.

Not analogous,because attacks relying on coordinating large numbers of people (with a high rate of detection) simply doesn't scale. We should be worried about electronic attacks on voting infrastructure, political attacks on districts, political attacks on the registration process etc.
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